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THE FRENCH HUISSIER AS A MODEL FOR U.S.
CIVIL PROCEDURE REFORM
Robert W. Emerson*
Huissiers dejustice serve multiple roles in the French legal system. One is that of
a court officer who compiles dossiers (reports). In that role, the huissier is
d'audiencier (literally translated as "hearing" or "assisting") and works directly
for the court system itself
The huissier's report remains alien to the American lawyer, who is steeped in no-
tions of procedure and "testimonialism" and in principles of fairness which
appear ancient, but are rather modern dissimulations of law and equity's rich his-
tory in the American tradition. An important aspect of most legal processes, the
collection of data in preparation for litigation is particularly marked by rhetorical
differentiations and historical adaptations reflecting upon (actually, reinforcing)
a cross-cultural dissonance that discourages both harmonization and legal ex-
perimentation between the two great Western legal cultures (Civil Law and
common law).
The apparent discord between the two systems leads courts and commentators rou-
tinely to overestimate the disparity between the use of a French-styled investigative
magistrate as opposed to the U.S. trial method. Despite the distinct nature of gath-
ering evidence according to the French and U.S. traditions, the huissier is a type
of figure found since the origin of the Western legal tradition. Vestiges remain in
the United States, although American scholars and practitioners often overlook
these manifestations (e.g., trustees and bailiffs). Still, the increasing complexity of
commercial litigation, the harmonization of international civil procedure outside
the United States, a growing corpus of international privacy standards, and a
concern for the competitiveness of US. courts in attracting and inducing business
development may cause re-examination of discovery rules, particularly the use of
masters and investigative magistrates.
Realizing that the French system is reflected in US. law not only may aid in reso-
lution of disputes where both French and US. courts might claim jurisdiction,
and where issues of transnational discovery often become key to resolving conflicts
of law, but further can function as a paradigm from which particular administra-
tive functions in U.S. courts may be reformed and harmonized with international
standards and with principles of efficiency.
* BA, University of the South; J.D., Harvard Law School. Huber Hurst Prof. of
Business Law & Chair, Dept. of Management & Legal Studies, Hough Graduate School of
Business, Warrington College of Business Admin., University of Florida. Any errors are the
author's own.
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I. INTRODUCTION TO THE HUISSIER
A. Gathering and Reporting Evidence
It is rare, but far from astonishing, for an American adjudicator
to adopt factual determinations from a non-U.S. jurisdiction.' That
seems to be far less controversial, or at least newsworthy, than when
a U.S. court refers to foreign laws for support.2 Indeed, it seems
that after a lengthy history of utilizing foreign case law in its deci-
sion making,3 American courts now face considerable criticism for
doing so.4
1. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 202 (1895) (finding that a foreign judgment
will not be recognized by a U.S. court unless "there has been opportunity for a full and fair
trial abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a sys-
tem of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice between the
citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procur-
ing the judgment"); see also Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Indus., Inc., 416 F.3d 146,
158-59 (2d Cir. 2005) (same).
2. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575--78 (2005) (disallowing capital pun-
ishment for minors under the age of 18, with Justices citing various international human
rights laws, treaties, and cases). Justice Scalia criticized the use of international human rights
standards. Id. at 622-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The majority's discussion of foreign law was
discussed widely in the media. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, Judicial Tourism: What's Wrong with
the U.S. Supreme Court Citing Foreign Law, WALL ST. J., Sep. 16, 2005, at A14 (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.opinionjournal.com/
editorial/feature.html?id=1 10007265; Charles Lane, 5-4 Supreme Court Abolishes Juvenile
Executions, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at Al (on file with the University of Michigan Jour-
nal of Law Reform), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A62584-2005Marl.html; Jeffrey Toobin, Swing Shift: How Anthony Kennedy's Passion for Foreign
Law Could Change the Supreme Court, NEW YORKER, Sep. 12, 2005, at 42 (on file with the Univer-
sity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/
2005/09/12/050912fafact.
3. Justice O'Connor, dissenting, argued that "[o]ver the course of nearly halfa century,
the Court has consistently referred to foreign and international law as relevant to its assess-
ment of evolving standards of decency." Roper, 543 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor,J., dissenting).
4. The swelling debate has engendered heated commentary, both in popular and
academic periodicals. See Dahlia Lithwick, We Can't Execute Them, but Should We Lock Up Teens
for Life?, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 16, 2009, at 28; Stuart Taylor Jr., The Court, and Foreign Friends, as
Constitutional Convention, 37 NAT'LJ. 655 (2005). Compare Youngjae Lee. International Consen-
sus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REv. 63, 64-75 (2007)
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Yet, adapting foreign legal innovations is still crucial to the evo-
lution of law. Adjustments and inclusions by U.S. courts come from
a multiplicity of sources, including brief encounters with foreign
legal professionals. For example, a quarter-century ago, with little
fanfare, an Illinois appeals court relied on the reports of French
administrative officers-huissiers-to support its holding that
McDonald's Corporation justifiably terminated the right of its
franchisee, Raymond Dayan, to develop and operate certain res-
taurants in Paris. Stating that the central issues were factual,6 the
Court then upheld the use of huissier d'audiencier reports produced
for previous French litigation: "[T] he trial court properly admitted
... the huissiers' reports in evidence as past recollection recorded.
The underlying rationale ... relies on the fact that the proffered
document contains sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trust-
worthiness and reliability .... .",
So, who exactly are these huissiers? Huissiers dejustice serve multi-
ple roles in the French legal system, and the traditional translation
as "bailiff' is not necessarily comprehensive or exact. For instance,
according to Martin Weston, the Senior Translator at the European
Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, the only reasonably precise
translation is "'court usher and bailiff,' though either 'court usher'
(arguing that the practice of citing foreign law is justifiable on the grounds that it aids in
understanding U.S. constitutional issues), and Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S.
Supreme Court's Use of Foreign Law, 2007 U. ILL. L. REv. 637, 637-42 (arguing such use must
be made with caution), withJacobJ. Zehnder, Note, Constitutional Comparativism: The Emerg-
ing Risk of Comparative Law as a Constitutional Tiebreaker, 41 VAL. U. L. REv. 1739, 1740 (2007)
(arguing that, outside of cases with international elements, the use of foreign law as prece-
dent leads to a "slippery slope" toward thwarting domestic democratic institutions).
5. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan 1), 466 N.E.2d 958, 969-71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
Franchisors tend to have a court-recognized right to terminate, regardless of contractual
provisions, whenever a franchisee's breach threatens the viability not only of the franchisee's
own business but has, or threatens to have, an adverse impact on the entire franchised sys-
tem. Id. (finding that the franchisor had good cause to terminate regardless of contractual
specifications because the franchisee had failed to maintain quality, service, and cleanliness
standards). For more on franchising terminations, see Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Termi-
nations: Legal Rights and Practical Effects When Franchisees Claim the Franchisor Discriminates, 35
AM. Bus. L.J. 559 (1998). Franchisees' rights of association are considered in Robert W.
Emerson, Franchising and the Collective Rights of Franchisees, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1503 (1990), and
the clauses typically found in franchise contracts are discussed in Robert W. Emerson, Fran-
chise Contracts and Territoriality: A French Comparison, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL Bus. L.. 315
(2009); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor's Duty of Care Toward
Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L. REv. 905 (1994); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47
AM. Bus. L.J. 191 (2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Territories: A Community Standard, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REv. (forthcoming 2010); Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Agreements,
Alleged Fraud, and Parol Evidence: From Bedlam to Bright Lines (Oct. 18, 2009) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
6. Dayan 1, 466 N.E.2d at 962.
7. See infra Part III for a discussion of the huissier d'audiencier.
8. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 970.
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or 'bailiff will usually suffice when the text is clearly referring to
only the one function or the other."9 The huissier operates as an
enforcer of debt obligations and judgments, as well as a process
server, when acting as a bailiff.'0 This Article focuses on the use of
the huissier as a court usher, serving as a compiler of dossiers in the
form of constatations, consultations, and the various forms of expertise
in the French system." In the role of usher, the huissieris known as
a huissier d'audiencier or huissier audiencier. The designation audien-
cier, literally translated as "hearing" or "assisting," indicates that
these huissiers de justice work directly for the court system and are
not assigned to or paid by private parties. 2
The huissier's report, a dossier typically signifying accuracy and
professionalism to French practitioners,9 remains alien to the
American lawyer, who is steeped in notions of procedure and in
principles of fairness which appear ancient. These principles, how-
ever, are modern and often, in fact, dissimulations of law and of
9. MARTIN WESTON, AN ENGLISH READER'S GUIDE TO THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM
107-08 (1991) (citing O'Rooney, Notes on the Criminal Laws and Related Matters in Cer-
tain Countries, U.N. Office of Conference Services, English Section (1962) (unpublished
multilingual glossary of legal terms and "cursory notes on some systems of law, judicatures
and courts")). Weston's work has been hailed as a superb work providing deft, lucidly rea-
soned translations that highlight the difficulties of translating French legal terms into
English and gives excellent explanations for the preferred version of a term's meaning.
Bernard Rudden, An English Reader's Guide to the French Legal System By Martin Weston, 40
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 755, 756 (1991) (book review). See infra Part III.A.1 for a discussion of
the meaning of audiencier and the historical development of the various types of huissier.
10. See UNION INTERNATIONALE DES HUISSIERS DEJUSTICE (UIHJ), THE JUDICIAL OF-
FICER IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, http://www.uihj.com/ressources/10066/96/3108.pdf
[hereinafter UIHJ] (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); WES-
TON, supra note 9, at 107.
11. Those italicized terms are explained infra notes 212-236 and accompanying text.
12. See Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 968; WESTON, supra note 9, at 107; infra Part III.A.1.c
(discussing the expertise); see also infra notes 207-211 and accompanying text.
13. "In France, oral testimony does not commonly occur in civil litigation. Indeed,
French civil procedure is marked by a strong distrust of oral evidence." Kent A. Lambert,
Comment, The Suffocation of a Legal Heritage: A Comparative Analysis of Civil Procedure in Louisi-
ana and France-The Corruption of Louisiana's Civilian Tradition, 67 TUL. L. REV. 231, 242 &
n.48 (1992). Lambert relies upon, inter alia, James Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Pro-
cedure, 34 AM. J. COMP. L. 459, 478 (1986), which cites a centuries-old French proverb, "Qui
mieux abreuve, mieux preuve," meaning, in effect, "He who gives [the witness] more to drink
gets the better proof." Beardsley provided the commonly-used translation of "a witness who
is well wined and dined will testify well," id. at 478 n.85, with another translation being, "A
well-plied witness will come up to proof," JOHN BELL ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAw 90
(2d. 2008). See also CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] arts. 1317-69 (Fr.) (concerning documentary evi-
dence, oral evidence, presumptions, admissions of parties, and oaths); Louise Harmon,
Etchings on Glass: Reflections on the Science of Proof 40 S. TEX. L. REV. 483, 504 n.68 (1999) ("In
France, the witnesses are examined outside of the proceedings of the trial itself, which
means that the court cannot assess the 'integrity' of the witness, only the (literary) 'integrity'
of a text." (citing BERNARD S. JACKSON, L w, FACT AND NARRATIVE COHERENCE 173
(1988))).
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the American tradition's rich history of equity.' 4 Indeed, defining
the nature of this disjunction between inquisitorial and adversarial
legal systems is a semantic exercise of dramatic proportions. 5 One
important aspect of most legal processes, the collection of data in
preparation for litigation, is particularly marked by rhetorical dif-
ferentiations and historical adaptations that reinforce a cross-
cultural dissonance discouraging both harmonization and legal
experimentation between the two great Western legal cultures.
This apparent discord between the two systems apparently leads
courts and commentators routinely to overestimate the disparity
between the use of a French-styled investigative magistrate as op-
posed to the U.S. adversarial trial method. 16 Despite the distinct
nature of gathering evidence in the French and U.S. traditions, the
huissier is a type of figure found in legal systems since the origin of
the Western legal tradition.' 7 Vestiges remain in most Western legal
cultures, including the United States," where bailiffs, trustees, re-
ceivers, and sheriffs, among others, serve in administrative and
other subordinate roles as court officials or semi-private govern-
ment adjuncts.19
While the investigative magistrate, or evolutions thereof, appears
in the great majority of Western legal systems, U.S. scholars and
practitioners often overlook the manifestations of that figure in
current law and, furthermore, there is a dearth of discussion about
14. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the
Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1183 (2005); see also Wil-
liam T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery-i 792-
1992, 18 DEL.J. CoRP. L. 819, 821-22 (1993).
15. See William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was it Like to Try a Rat, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 1889 (1995) [hereinafter Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I)] (discussing the
relevance of legal philosophy to comparative law); William Ewald, The Jurisprudential Ap-
proach to Comparative Law: A Field Guide to "Rats", 46 Am. J. COMP. L. 701 (1998) (clarifying
the former article); see also Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, Comparative Law Beyond Post-
Modernism, 49 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 800, 813 (2000) (defining and challenging relativism in
post-modern comparative legal scholarship: "[relativism is the position that neither univer-
sal knowledge exists (epistemic relativism), nor universally valid norms (moral relativism),
because insights and values always depend on the standpoint of the epistemic or moral sub-
ject").
16. Yet, the importance of inquiry into the differences and similarities between the
continental and American systems cannot be underestimated. Professor Kessler argues, for
instance, that "we [in the United States] have failed to be self-conscious about the fact that
we are adopting inquisitorial procedure, and as a result, our use of such procedure has been
minimal, conflicted, and, at times, troubling." Kessler, supra note 14, at 1274.
17. See Pedro A. Malavet, Counsel for the Situation: The Latin Notary, a Historical and Com-
parativeMode4 19 HASTINGS Irr'L & Coas'. L. REv. 389, 416 n.120, 450 (1996).
18. Id. at 406-27, 450-52; see also Kessler, supra note 14, at 1198-1210.
19. See infra Part III; infra Part I.B.
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Latinate institutions in America's legal literature. 20 All the while,
the increasing complexity of commercial litigation, the harmoniza-
tion of international civil procedure outside the United States,21 a
growing corpus of international privacy standards,22 and a concern
for the competitiveness of U.S. courts in attracting and inducing
business development2 are significant pressures toward reexamina-
tion of federal rules regarding discovery, particularly in the use of
24
masters and investigative magistrates.
Thus, examining the manner in which the French system is re-
flected in U.S. law reveals the inherent connection between U.S.
procedure and its foundation in Continental methods." This can
26
serve many useful purposes, among which is to function as a para-
digm from which particular administrative functions in U.S. courts
20. See, e.g., Malavet, supra note 17, at 392 ("[T]his profession has never been thor-
oughly studied in our legal scholarship.").
21. Consider, for instance, the ALI/UNIDROIT Principles of Transnational Civil Pro-
cedure, which, while "not intended to unify existing national laws, but rather to enunciate
common principles and rules ... and to select the solutions that are best adapted to the
special requirements of international commercial contracts," MJ. Bonell, Unification of Law
by Non-Legislative Means: The UNIDROIT Draft Principles for International Commercial Contracts,
40 AM. J. CoMp. L. 617, 622 (1992), nonetheless, in their limited jurisdictional context, may
provide an opportunity for experimentation in the law and a working basis by which
harmonization might overcome the traditional associations of procedural law with state
sovereignty. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A Drafter's Reflections on the Principles of Transna-
tional Civil Procedure, in ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
at xlvii (2006) [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES]; Marcel Storme, Procedural Law
and the Reform of Justice: From Regional to Universal Harmonisation, 6 UNIF. L. REv. 763, 765
(2001) (discussing the philosophical underpinnings of procedural law as a state sovereignty
prerogative); George A. Zaphiriou, Harmonization of Private Rules Between Civil and Common
Law Jurisdictions, 38 AM. J. CoMP. L. Supp. 71, 71 (1990) (defining harmonization as "short
of unification and only an approximation (rapprochement or Angleichung) of rules or a coor-
dination of policies").
22. See, e.g.,Jennifer Toole et al., International Litigation, 41 INT'L LAw. 329, 355 (2007)
(finding that amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will come into conflict
with long-standing European privacy concerns); see also Tribunal de grande instance [T.G.I.]
[ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Marseille, Feb. 20, 1974, Gaz. Pal. 1974,Jurispr. 544,
M. Candas (Fr.) (forbidding U.S. style 'fishing expeditions' through French courts).
23. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 162-63
(2008) (justifying relaxation of securities regulation due to concerns about deterring for-
eign businesses from investing in the United States).
24. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1251-52.
25. Id. at 1274-75; see also id. at 1183 ("[T]he truth is that inquisitorial procedure is
neither alien to our traditions nor inherently unfair. As late as the nineteenth century, An-
glo-American courts of equity (from which, in fact, masters originally emerged) employed a
mode of procedure, which like that used in the courts of continental Europe, derived from
the Roman-canon tradition and thus was significantly inquisitorial." (footnotes omitted)).
26. For example, it could aid in the resolution of disputes where both French and U.S.
courts might claim jurisdiction, and where issues of transnational discovery often become
key to resolving conflicts of law. The focus of this Article, however, is American usage of the
huissierin domestic proceedings.
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may be reformed and harmonized with international standards
and with the principles of efficiency. 7
B. Comparative Law in Theoretical Context
This Article examines the contemporary context in which the
huissier audiencier operates. It endeavors to understand how the dis-
covery process can be made more efficient by using neutral third
parties, such as special masters, to bring about the just resolution
of disputes in a more predictable and non-intrusive manner than
current U.S. procedure permits. We also should come to appreci-
ate how the huissier audiencier is already a functional figure in
American litigation. As scholars have opined concerning sociologi-
cal and comparative legal analysis:
[C]ontemporary legal systems in the economically developed
world have much more in common with each other than with
their past histories, as can be seen by comparing the extent to
which law in present day societies deals with essentially mod-
ern institutions and problems such as corporations and
transport and the rights of individuals and consumers.28
In comparing two modern legal doctrines-the French Nouveau
Code de Procddure Civile's ("N.C.P.C.") use of third parties and writ-
ten evidence and the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure's
("FRCP") rules for special masters,29 discovery, 30 and the gathering
of testimony l-one can identify the similarities between these re-
27. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1251 ("[Ajdversarial procedure can lead to great ineffi-
ciencies and unfairness." (citing Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37
STAN. L. REv. 589, 640-41 (1985))). Of course, an irony is that sometimes American com-
mentators who strongly oppose numerous characteristics of American adversarialism are not
enamored of any U.S. court's turning to foreign law for sources to underlie a judicial opin-
ion. See, e.g., Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, Not So Friendly Amici: Look Who's Filing Supreme Court
Briefs Now, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 24, 2006, at 11; Jeremy Rabkin, Courting Abroad: The Use
and Abuse of Foreign Law by the U.S. Supreme Court, WLY. STANDARD, Apr. 10, 2006, at 29.
28. David Nelken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Adaptation, in ADAPTING LEGAL CUL-
TUREs 7, 8 (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds., 2001) (citing Lawrence Friedman, Some
Comments on Cotterrell and Legal Transplants, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra, at 93); cf.
William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (H): The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM.J. COMP. L.
489, 510 (1995) ("The study [of comparative law] can not confine itself to an investigation
of a single, present-day legal system, but must also contain a substantial historical and com-
parative component. For in attempting to limit the link between law and society, one must
consider how laws originate, how they evolve, and how they differ from society to society;
and this can only be done by detailed comparative studies.").
29. See FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 43.
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gimes and understand how current U.S. practice unnecessarily di-
minishes the potential of the special master. Ultimately, this Article
makes plain that greater efficiency is possible in keeping with
American legal values through the adaptation of particular aspects
of the huissier.1
2
Of course, we must not ignore the historical developments that
gave rise to the current regimes, nor the reality that the adjustment
and evolution of courtroom methods is a process fraught with any
number of policy considerations. Policymakers must tailor poten-
tial legal "transplants" to the unique conditions of domestic
litigation . By limiting this Article's scope to commercial litiga-
tion-that which, inter alia, affects corporations and contracts and
brings into play complex civil matters such as product liability-its
analysis, with some exceptions,34 is not generally subject to the con-
straints found in criminal procedure and discovery. Moreover, this
circumscribed, practical federal approach allows for future legal
experimentation, with greater sensitivity to local legal cultures.
Consider, for instance, Justice Louis Brandeis' "laboratories of de-
mocracy" pronouncement, 36 perhaps one of the most cliched
32. See, e.g., Robert F. Taylor, A Comparative Study of Expert Testimony in France and the
United States: Philosophical Underpinnings, History, Practice, and Procedure, 31 TEX. INT'L L.J.
181, 182 (1996) ("Historically, those who have sought to transform or modernize their own
legal culture have looked to the tools used by other legal cultures to deal with similar prob-
lems."); see also 1 KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN K6LZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
LAW: THE FRAMEWORK 19-20 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV.
131, 150 (2006) ("[Flor those who are committed to cultural relativism, consultation of
comparative law will make little sense.").
34. See Susan R. Klein, Redrawing the Criminal-Civil Boundary, 2 Buw. CriM. L. REV. 679,
717-21 (1999) (on the theory that courts imbue traditionally civil hearings with criminal
aspects in order to incorporate criminal law protections for defendants). Another law review
article suggests some constitutionalizing of civil proceedings (e.g., juvenile courts) to in-
clude criminal procedural fights: "The Court has constitutionalized juvenile court
procedures related to more adversarial facets of the fact-finding process (juveniles' rights to
protection from coerced confessions; procedural due process in certification hearings; no-
rice, counsel, and confrontation on cross-examination; and protection from self-
incrimination) ... ." Michael L. Skoglund, Note, Private Threats, Public Stigma? Avoiding False
Dichotomies in the Application of Megan's Law to the Juvenile Justice System, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1805,
1825 n.93 (2000).
35. See 21A AM.JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1073 (2008) (describing constitutional rights to
confrontation of witnesses in U.S. criminal cases); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 51 (2004) (same); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 495-96 (1966) (holding that, unlike
civil trials where party admissions are generally admissible, a defendant's confession to law
enforcement was inadmissible because defendant had not waived his Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights to remain silent and have counsel, respectively). Compare Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the right to ajury trial for all felony criminal case to
the states), with Charles A. Rees, Preserved or Pickled?: The Right to Trial byJury After the Merger of
Law and Equity in Maryland, 26 U. BALT. L. REV. 301, 348 (1997) (noting no such incorpora-
tion of the Seventh Amendment right in civiljury trials).
36. New States Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
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phrases on federalism and definitely one of the most cited:37 "It is
one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou-
rageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and
try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.,
3 8
By following Brandeis' basic tenet, that federalism presents the
opportunity for legal experimentation in limited jurisdictional con-
texts, one may show that the use of the huissier is possible in U.S.
law, and how such a use will lead to desirable gains in efficiency
and competitiveness in the international markets.
C. The Huissier as Model: Complications and Possibilities
This Article is divided into sections to clearly explain the huissier
to the U.S. practitioner, and to explore the potential uses of the
huissier under current law and as a proxy for reexamining U.S. dis-
covery. First, this Article traces the historical development of the
U.S. system of discovery, especially regarding nineteenth century
equitable jurisdiction and the growth of commercial law and the
emergence of the French huissier dejustice in the Civilian tradition.
Second, it examines the uses of the huissier audiencier in current
litigation by reviewing huissier practices in modern France, and by
looking at the use of huissier reports and testimony in U.S. cases.
Next, it offers an economic analysis of the huissier audiencier, show-
ing how procedural costs in U.S. litigation can be reduced by
providing masters with greater powers. Finally, this Article consid-
ers the changing legal environment and the pressures on U.S. civil
discovery to adapt itself to new international standards, both
through the civil rulemaking procedure, as in the 2003 amend-
37. As of May 24, 2010, Brandeis' maxim on federalism was cited in 24 different U.S.
Supreme Court opinions since 1980. Of course, dozens of other courts have also invoked the
Justice's adage.
38. New States Ice Co., 285 U.S. at 311. But see Michael S. Greve, Laboratories of Democracy:
Anatomy of a Metaphor, FEDERALIST OUTLOOK (Am. Enter. Inst. for Pub. Pol'y Research,
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2001, at 1, 1 (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/Laboratories%20ofo2Democracy%
20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Metaphor.pdf (arguing that Brandeis' metaphor reflected not a
commitment to federalism but his favoring of "scientific socialism" and that Brandeis' actual
views, not the hackneyed phrase, continue to dominate judicial discourse and to inhibit
"experimental, federalist politics"); G. Alan Tarr, Laboratories of Democracy? Brandeis, Federal-
ism, and Scientific Management, 31 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 37, 37 (2001) (agreeing that
Brandeis was a champion of federalism, but contending that abandonment of his "laborato-
ries of democracy" metaphor would actually help states innovate; Brandeis' axiom actually
rested on a public policy concept "inimical to federal diversity" and favoring scientific man-
agement).
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ments to the FRCP, and also by external pressures, such as revised
notions of privacy rights. These influences, when viewed in per-
spective, explain the growth of the special master with the increase
in complex litigation toward the close of the twentieth century;
furthermore, they demonstrate the potential for the huissier to
serve as a model for U.S. civil procedure reform within the preex-
isting framework of the master.
II. HISTORY
The codification of law in ancient Rome served as the progeni-
tor of the legal institutions of the major Western powers in the
modern era. Thus, the customs, traditions, and juridical concepts
that form the basis of the Continental and French procedural sys-
tems emerged out of Rome. Indeed, the development of these
systems is directly traceable to the ancient Roman codes.39 These
codes affected the English system, too; while the common law's his-
tory was complicated by its separate origins, the transplantation
and adaptation of legal cultures due to political upheaval' ° or more
subtle shifts in social and economic pressure have provided it with
distinct, Latinate qualities that continue to influence its adversarial
approach to procedure. A genuine "American exceptionalism
41
thus may be an exaggeration, but also is certainly a recent phe-
nomenon to be distinguished from the English as well as
Continental legal formats.2
39. SeeJOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 11-13 (1969); CHARLES M.
RADDING, THE ORIGINS OF MEDIEVAL JURISPRUDENCE 23-30 (1988); STIG STROMHOLM, A
SHORT HISTORY OF LEGAL THINKING IN THE WEST 53 (1985); Malavet, supra note 17, at 408-11.
40. The Norman Conquest of 1066, for example.
41. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LIFE 6-9
(2001). American exceptionalism is defined by:
(1) more complex bodies of legal rules; (2) more formal, adversarial procedures for
resolving political and scientific disputes; (3) more costly forms of legal contestation;
(4) stronger, more punitive legal sanctions; (5) more frequent judicial review of and
intervention into administrative decision and processes; (6) more political contro-
versy about legal rules and institutions; (7) more politically fragmented, less closely
coordinated decisionmaking systems; and (8) more legal uncertainty and instability.
Id. at 7 (footnotes omitted).
42. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1199 ("[I]t is clear that [the English Court of Chancery]
had deep roots in the Roman-canon tradition."). See generally R.H. Helmholz, Magna CarLa
and the ius commune, 66 U. CHI. L. REv. 297 (1999) (tracing the development of the Magna
Carta to Roman and canon laws of Medieval continental Europe).
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A. Equity, Masters, and U.S. Discovery in Historical Context
The emergence of an American exceptionalism to Continental
legal standards might be traced to Medieval England and the vari-
ous political developments from the thirteenth century onward,
after which a constitutional system was erected seeking to protect
life, liberty, and property by due process of law.4 3 Yet, the common
law courts, relatively empowered under a new compromise be-
tween the English Parliament and Crown embodied in the Magna
Carta (which restrained monarchical authority by establishing due
process rights"), were insufficient and indeed inefficient.45 By the
reign of Edward 111,416 chancery47 jurisdiction had already departed
from the constitutional orthodoxy of the Magna Carta and had be-
gun to incorporate principles of the Civil Law into the common
law system, advancing William of Normandy and his progeny's taste
for strong government.48 English chancery, a body of law reflecting
Continental procedure, was the model for the equity and chancery
courts in the United States.4 9 Those early American courts' dra-
matic influence on the development of modern discovery and civil
procedure remains evident.
1. The American Courts of Equity Before 1938
The year 1938 was a watershed in American legal tradition. In
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,50 the U.S. Supreme Court abandoned
43. Due Process of Law Act, 1368, 42 Edw. 3, c. 3; Due Process of Law Act, 1354, 28 Edw.
3, c. 3 (the statutory rendition of Magna Carta, in which the phrase "due process of law" was
first used);J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 97 (4th ed. 2002).
44. Magna Carta, cl. 24.
45. For instance, the Magna Carta brought with it new provisions that fit awkwardly
with preexisting practices of the courts, many of which were retained, such as the awarding
of dower only in lands the husband held on the day of marriage. Helmholz, supra note 42, at
315 & n.66 (citing Janet Senderowitz Loengard, Rationabilis Dos: Magna Carta and the
Widow's "Fair Share" in the Early Thirteenth Century, in WIFE AND WIDOW IN MEDIEVAL ENG-
LAND 59 (Sue Sheridan Walker ed., 1993)).
46. Edward III lived from 1312 to 1377 and reigned as king of England from 1327 to
1377. BAKER, supra note 43, at 97-99.
47. Id. at 99 n.14.
48. Id. at 98-99 & n.12; see also SAMUEL MAXWELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PLEAD-
ING UNDER THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: DESIGNED FOR ALL THE CODE STATES 3
(Chicago, Callaghan & Co. 1892) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform), available at http://books.google.com/books/download/A~treatise onthe_law_
of pleadingunder_.pdfPid=nI9AAAAIAAJ&output=pdf (noting that pleadings in English
courts of equity were based upon the Civil Law, abandoning the technicality driven empha-
sis in the common law).
49. SeeKessler, supra note 14, at 1198-99.
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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Justice Joseph Story's century-old aspiration for the creation of
general federal common law."1 On another front, while the adop-
tion of the FRCP in 1938 resulted from an evolution in U.S. law,
the FRCP's merger of law and equity2 dispensed with numerous
anachronisms that continue to plague foreign-especially Civil
Law-jurisdictions.s This streamlining and updating process,
though, eliminated or weakened valuable procedural mechanisms
that could provide greater effectiveness in adjudication in the
twenty-first century."
Equity was already established in North America by the seven-
teenth century and by 1776 some kind of equity system existed in
each of the thirteen colonies.55 However, as with ecclesiastical
courts during the English Civil War56 and later that same century
51. Id. at 78-80 (overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) and stating that
"there is no federal general common law"); see also TONY A. FREYER, HARMONY AND DIs-
COURSE: THE SWIFT AND ERIE CASES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1981); John Hart Ely, The
Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 702-06 (1974).
52. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1184 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 1). The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure are not a product of direct congressional legislation; instead Congress enacted
the Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2072 (2006)), authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure. 2005
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, at xi-xii (Stephen C. Yeazell ed., 2005).
53. Consider, for instance, the comments of a French practitioner, renowned interna-
tional lawyer Elie Kleiman. He noted that French jurists have tried to reform their legal
system and remove anachronisms to a much greater extent than their Italian counterparts,
but with only limited success:
Actually, the French and the Italians share the same inheritance from the Roman
times, although in France we have had several reforms that culminated in a new set of
rules in the mid-'70s and also in the '80s, and rules are regularly kept up to date so
that we don't have to struggle every time we go to court with remnants from the Ro-
man times. Which might lead some of you to think that it's better to litigate in France
than in Italy. [sic] I don't know, it depends on the stakes, of course, and it depends
on many things. We still have strange remnants from the past in France, too.
Elie Kleiman, Address at the International Law Practicum of the International Law and
Practice Section of the New York State Bar Association: France (Jan. 27, 1999), in Hot Tips for
the Practitioner With Clients Involved in International Business, Trade and Finance, 12 INT'L L.
PRACTICUM 64, 71-72 (1999) (emphasis added).
54. See Kessler, supra note 14, at 1251; infra Part V.
55. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1202.
56. 16 Car., c. 10-11 (Eng.) (the Long Parliament, in 1642, struck against the powers
of ecclesiastical courts by abolishing the commission for ecclesiastical causes, the regional
councils, and the Star Chamber). Indeed, James I (ruler from 1603 to 1625) has been
faulted for ignoring the festering problems that led to rebellion, war, and ultimately the
execution of his son and successor Charles I. Furthermore,James' most serious "breach with
his first parliament was his refusal to restrict the authority or to reform the abuses of the
ecclesiastical courts." CHARLES HARDING FIRTH. OLIVER CROMWELL AND THE RULE OF THE
PURITANS IN ENGLAND 11 (Oxford Univ. Press 1953) (1900).
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during the Glorious Revolution,57 chancery courts in the American
colonies came under particular pressure during the American
Revolution:
Such distrust of equity manifested itself in section 30 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, where Congress declared that federal
courts must adopt the common-law method of presenting tes-
timony orally in the courtroom, thus eschewing the equitable
tradition of gathering testimony through pre-prepared, writ-
ten interrogatories and then concealing it from the
parties .. 58
This evisceration was only temporary, however, as equitable prac-
tice returned after the Revolution, perhaps as a result of the
limited remedies available at common law.59 Nonetheless, it was
plain that equity lacked the common law's positivist and political
conception of due process and, as before the Revolution, it became
increasingly viewed as furtive,0 inflexible,61 and a vestige of oppres-
sive imperial power.62 At that time, the equity courts gathered
testimony ex parte by a court official65-the commissioner or mas-
65ter'-who was not unlike the huissier audiencier. Although theparties drafted, or at least had some editorial control over inter-
57. Tim Harris, The People, the Law, and the Constitution in Scotland and England: A Com-
parative Approach to the Glorious Revolution, 38J. BRITISH STUD. 28, 43 (1999) (detailing acts of
English hostility toward ecclesiastical courts, including the Declaration of Rights naming
some of those bodies as "illegal and pernicious" (quoting Lois G. SCHWOERER, THE DECLA-
RATION OF RIGHTS, 1689, at 296 (1981))).
58. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1204 (footnote omitted).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1223-24.
61. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 821-22; see also David Ferleger, Special Mas-
ters Under Rule 53: A Welcome Evolution, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF SERVING AS A SPECIAL MASTER IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1, 4 (2007) (quoting Ex
parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920)). Appointment of a special master comes from the
court's "inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for
the performance of their duties." Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. at 312.
62. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 826; see also G. Glenn & K. Redden, Equity: A
Visit to the Founding Fathers, 31 VA. L. REV. 753, 753 (1945) (describing "equity" as a "thing of
continuous growth").
63. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1224.
64. Since the middle nineteenth century the term has steadily been supplanted by
"Special Master." Anne-Marie C. Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special
Masters in the Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 644 (2002)
(citing Mississippi v. Arkansas, 415 U.S. 289, 297 n.1 (1974) (Douglas,J., dissenting)).
65. MICHAEL R.T. MACNAIR, THE LAW OF PROOF IN EARLY MODERN EQUITY 167-77
(1999); Kessler, supra note 14, at 1267; see also Carstens, supra note 64, at 644, 648 (finding
that masters served as fact-finders and for specific, substantive expertise in cases involving
disputes in areas such as water appointment and diversion); Ferleger, supra note 61, at 6
(stating that contemporary masters serve in post-trial enforcement capacities).
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rogatories, oral testimony slowly began to replace the equitable
mode of witness interrogation, partly as a result of the master's own
practices.66 For instance, masters had begun as much fact-finding as
possible in court for the sake of efficiency, thus forsaking the tradi-
tions of clandestine chancery procedure and conduct-methods
more akin to the huissieis or other third parties' out-of-court fact
gathering.6 7 The masters' informal experimentation was later rec-
ognized in case law,H and it eventually developed as the stated
preference in a majority of jurisdictions.69 This shunning of tradi-
tional, out-of-court gathering of testimony was key to the
divergence between the Civilian tradition, where the method was
retained through investigative magistrates, and the American ad-
versarial system, where oral testimony became increasingly viewed
as a means of gathering evidence in a demonstrably more efficient
70
and accurate manner.
Indeed, by the early twentieth century, masters were still found
in American courts, albeit marginalized to a formal role at trial,
as common law judges increasingly invoked equitable powers on
their own. These rising judicial efficiencies of practice almost
necessarily meant a steadily attenuated function for the masters.1
As Professor Amalia Kessler traces in her historiographical ac-
count of the lessening of American equity, by 1912 the Supreme
Court had already shown a marked preference for oral testimony
in the Federal Rules of Equity, standardizing its use in United
States courts, at law and now equity.72 Thus, the master's role be-
came increasingly murky as the twentieth century began. At once,
the master was of an inquisitorial heritage, not unlike the huissier,
with vestiges of secrecy, the dossier method of evidence gather-
ing, and limited opportunities for parties to challenge evidence.73
As one U.S. federal judge wrote:
66. JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 18-19 (2003);
Kessler, supra note 14, at 1224.
67. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1224.
68. Remsen v. Remsen, 2Johns. Ch. 495 (N.Y. Ch. 1817).
69. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1225-26.
70. See infra Part V.B. (discussing the American preference for oral testimony).
71. See Ferleger, supra note 61, at 5 ("[B]y the late nineteenth century, masters rou-
tinely were authorized to take evidence and make non-binding recommendations to courts.
The federal equity rules in 1912 restrained the use of masters, with Equity Rule 59 establish-
ing the requirement, now in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53(b), that references to
masters be justified by an 'exceptional condition.'" (footnotes omitted)).
72. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1233.
73. See, e.g., id. at 1238-41. See generally JOHN G. HENDERSON, CHANCERY PRACTICE
WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE OFFICE AND DUTIES OF MASTERS IN CHANCERY, REGIS-
TERs, AUDITORS, COMMISSIONERS IN CHANCERY, COURT COMMISSIONERS, MASTER
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Special Masters, it is said-and I agree-can and do by and
large establish closer, more informal relationships with the
two sides than could a judge. In the context of a massive case,
with many pretrial contacts, this is an extremely valuable asset
in terms of the success of the process. It must also be recog-
nized, however, that informality and the maintenance of close
working relationships with the parties exact a price:
the special masters will almost invariably come to identify
some of the parties' logistical and other problems as their
74
own.
In American jurisprudence, these inquisitorial and emotive con-
cepts were increasingly at odds with common law rules of evidence,
and their role seemed to supplant that of the jury, much as it does
in modern French civil litigation.75 The master became inhibited by
prohibitions on producing dossiers, and the ascendance of the jury
and confrontation created a disjunction between the master's in-
quisitorial heritage and the contemporary adversarial system of law.
The master retained the same autonomy and discretionary author-
ity as found in equity, but the new model for litigation failed to
reconcile this history by delimiting the master's ultimate powers in
a system that prizes in-court testimony.
Indeed, the movement toward greater recognition of the jury in
American litigation indicated that, so far as the New Deal courts
were concerned, in-court testimony was more credible than and
hence preferable to written testimony.77 Furthermore, the jury was
COMMISSIONERS, REFEREES, ETC. (1904) (arguing for reform of the master's role so as to
conform with a standardized common law evidentiary system).
74. Harold H. Greene, Introduction to MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION: A PRACTICAL
GUIDE TO THE USE OF SPECIAL MASTERS, at ix, xi (1983) [hereinafter MANAGING COMPLEX
LITIGATION].
75. HENDERSON, supra note 73, at 719 ("[A] number of the courts of this country have
taken the stand that a master's findings of fact, where the evidence is conflicting and he had
the advantage of seeing the witnesses upon the stand and of hearing them testify, is as bind-
ing upon the chancellor as the verdict of a jury is upon the trial judge in a common-law
court.").
76. Kessler, supra note 14, at 1247 (citing Cobell v. Norton, 310 F. Supp. 2d 102, 110
(D.C. Cir. 2004)).
77. This process started years earlier with the Federal Rules of Evidence amendments
in 1912, which reflected the judicial preference for oral testimony. Id. at 1244. Then it came
to a head with the nearly complete evisceration of any remaining traditional equity, inquisi-
torial powers of masters and simply left the master as equated to, and merely an alternative
to, the jury. Id. at 1242 (discussing Rule 53 of the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
The evidence is clear that New Deal court reform was intended to reduce judicial power
by giving more power to other decision-makers, namely administrative agencies and juries.
Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Article IIIJues, 87 VA. L. REv. 587, 593 (2001)
("[T]he New Deal Court largely abandoned earlier notions of defined rationality that the
Court had used to police legislatures, agencies, and juries. It did so in favor of a less legalis-
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believed to be superior in evaluating the accuracy of live oral evi-
dence rather than written statements. 78 At issue was, and is, the
accuracy of witness recollection in the differing forms of evidence
gathering, or the ability to "test" the witness. 79 The difference is
likely negligible, as recent studies have shown that there is no sta-
tistically significant decrease in witness credibility to the observer
when statements are presented by written transcript as opposed to
in person.s° Increasingly complex litigation, coupled with the lim-
ited use of juries in corporate cases, demonstrates that for
particular litigants it may be better to further isolate the potential
for jury error by having a third party professional fact-finder serve
as an additional, professionally trained guard against inaccuracy. 81
Despite the devaluation of equity in 1938 (through the integra-
tion of law and equity), the drafters of the FRCP provided for
special masters and thereby maintained the opportunity for their
future use and reform. The original rule limited masters to the
performance of trial functions,82 but over time, and especially in
tic, more common sense notion of rationality that was highly deferential to these nonjudicial
decisionmakers."). Thus, the jury was actually more tightly circumscribed by court supervi-
sion earlier in American history, and reform in the 1930s gave the jury more power, not less.
Id. at 683 (describing a judicial retreat in which "federal juries had significantly gained
power by the mid-twentieth century in many important respects, at the expense of judicial
control").
78. But see E-mail from Torun Lindholm, Professor of Psychology, Stockholm Univer-
sity, to Robert W. Emerson, Chair, Department of Management, University of Florida,
Warrington College of Business Administration (Feb. 19, 2008, 05:17:00 EST) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (noting several recent studies in which
"witness responses to specific detail questions" were no less credible when presented as tran-
script rather than video; indeed, the experiment's participants "were better at judging the
accuracy of written than videotaped statements"); infra notes 526-529 and accompanying
text (discussing Torun Lindholm, Who Can Judge the Accuracy of Eyewitness Statements? A Com-
parison of Professional and Lay-Persons, 22 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 1301, 1310 (2008),
which indicates that factfinders perform better evaluating the evidence from written tran-
scripts than from oral testimony); see also Kessler, supra note 14, at 1224 ("In the equity
tradition, however, these [quasi-inquisitorial] rights [aided by masters] were viewed as a
check on arbitrary state action and, deployed within a framework of prepublication secrecy,
as an aid in truth-seeking.").
79. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Torun Lindholm, Who Can Judge the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Statements? A Comparison of Professional and Lay-Persons, 22 APPLIED COGNI-
TIVE PSYCHOL. 1301, 1310 (2008) (undertaking to understand the differing abilities of
professional fact-finders and laypersons to estimate the reliability of an eyewitness' memory).
81. See infra Part V.B.
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note (2003); see also FED. R. Clv. P. 53 advi-
sory committee's note (1937) (substantially adopting, or adopting with some modification,
Federal Rules of Equity 49, 51-53, 59-63, 65-68); Kessler, supra note 14, at 1249 ("Brazil...
assumes that, because 'Rule 53 was intended to preserve practices developed under the
Federal Equity Rules[,] it was not designed to radically alter the adversary system.'" (quoting
Wayne D. Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Limitations on Existing
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the past decade, courts have again gained experience with masters
appointed to perform both pre- and post-trial functions. The
2003 revisions to the rule recognize the master's potential broader
purposes as well as clarify provisions regarding enforcement and
appointment.84 Today, the reconfiguration of the master, widely
sought since before 1938, has at last commenced, and with it a
need to explore the differing potentialities for the master in the
contemporary legal environment.
2. Delaware and the Effects of the American
Revolution on U.S. Corporate Law
In 1938, law and equity merged at the federal level, an occur-
rence that reflected equity's slow demise in the states during the
nineteenth century. 5 That state governments sought to consolidate
equitable jurisdiction with the courts at law echoes the early Ameri-
cans' distrust of chancery jurisdiction. 8' However, this was not the
case in Delaware, the preeminent locus for incorporation in the
United States. 7 Instead, in its unique historical and social context,
the Delaware Court of Chancery developed into a legal institution
of remarkable flexibility, using its equitable origins and proximity
to local government in attracting corporate litigants. 8 Indeed,
Sources and the Need for a New Federal Rule, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 74,
at 305, 335)).
83. THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., SPECIAL MASTERS' INCIDENCE AND ACTIVITY: REPORT
TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE'S ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AND ITS SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON SPECIAL MASTERS 1-12 (2000).
84. FED. R. CIv. P. 53 advisory committee's note (2003).
85. See William M. Wiecek, The Debut of Modern Constitutional Procedure, 26 REV. LITIG.
641, 643-44 (2007) (discussing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the New York
"Field Code" of the nineteenth-century); see also W. Hamilton Bryson, The Merger of Common-
Law and Equity Pleading in Virginia, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 77, 77-79 (2006) (discussing same at
state level).
86. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 826 ("Early colonists in Delaware and else-
where had a philosophical prejudice against arbitrary and concentrated power that naturally
made them suspicious of an institutionalized chancery tied to the royal prerogative. Unlike
other colonies, however, Delaware never had an institutionalized chancery during the colo-
nial period.... As a result, Delaware developed no long lasting prejudices against equity
and chancery courts." (citing Michael Hanrahan, The Delaware Court of Chancery: Dela-
ware's Peculiar Institution (May 2, 1974) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform))).
87. See, e.g., Michael W. Ott, Delaware Strikes Back: Newcastle Partners and the Fight for State
Corporate Autonomy, 82 IND. L.J. 159, 163 (2007).
88. Kurt M. Heyman discusses this phenomenon:
The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely regarded as the nation's preeminent state
court forum for resolving corporate disputes. This reputation stems, in large part,
from the fact that many of the nation's largest corporations have chosen to incorpo-
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"Delaware has preserved the essence" of equity as "the flexible
application of broad moral principles (maxims) to fact specific
situations for the sake ofjustice." 9 By exploring Delaware's fortui-
tous use of equity, one sees the benefits of the flexibility
underlying equity's procedural heritage.
Prior to 1701,90 equity in the English tradition was largely cor-
rective in nature and related to the common law, with three
means of administration in colonial New York and Pennsylvania:9'
"through the ... Court of Assizes in New York and ... the Provin-
cial Council in Philadelphia";92 by the Governor of New York, who
was able to correct erroneous jury results from county courts;9"
and via a de novo appeal from jury judgments in a nonjury court
rate in Delaware. Perhaps not coincidentally, the Delaware Court of Chancery is also
one of the few remaining equity courts in the nation, with its subject matter jurisdic-
tion limited to matters seeking equitable relief-including injunctive relief-and to
several other statutorily-specified areas.
Kurt M. Heyman, Expedited Proceedings in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Things of the Past?, 23
DEL. J. CORP. L. 145, 145 (1998) (footnotes omitted); see also Curtis Alva, Delaware and the
Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 919 (1990) ("Dela-
ware dominates the charter market because it is the state best able to reduce agency costs.");
William H. Rehnquist, The Prominence of the Delaware Court of Chancery in the State-FederalJoint
Venture of Providing Justice, 48 Bus. LAW. 351, 354 (1992) ("The Delaware state court system
has established its national preeminence in the field of corporation law due in large
measure to its Court of Chancery."); DonaIdJ. Wolfe,Jr. et al., Corporate and Commercial Prac-
tice in the Delaware Court of Chancery: Procedures in Equity, 54 Bus. LAW. 757, 757 (1999) ("[F]or
over 200 years practitioners in [the Delaware Court of Chancery] had no reference to con-
sult as a practice guide. Rather, the 'rules' of practice in the Court of Chancery were largely
passed down by word of mouth or by resort to yellowing subject matter files ... ."); Michael
Hanrahan & Paul A. Fioravanti, Jr., The Delaware Court of Chancery Developments from
1994-2009, at 6-7 (2010) (unpublished article, on file with author) (discussing the Chan-
cery Court's flexibility in responding to market demand for corporate and other business
disputes and its expansion into mediation and commercial matters).
89. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 821-22 (discussing the English High Court
of Chancery, which ultimately was dismantled by Parliament in 1875); see also Ryan v. Wie-
ner, 610 A.2d 1377, 1387 (Del. Ch. 1992) (providing an example of the Chancery court
applying a broad view of fairness to find that a transaction could not, in equity, be allowed to
stand); The Earl of Oxford's Case, 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch. 1615) (Ellesmere, C.) ("The
Cause why there is a Chancery is, for that Mens Actions are so divers and infinite, That it is
impossible to make any general Law which may aptly meet with every particular Act, and not
fail in some Circumstances.").
90. In 1701, equitable jurisdiction was altered by a "general court reform statute that
included ... examination of witnesses by deposition as had developed in England." Quillen
& Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 823 & n.13 ("An earlier 1665 ruling of the Court of Assizes
during the Duke of York period had attempted to introduce Chancery practice with no
evident effect."). The statute was later repealed, but Delaware courts continued to accept its
structure after legislative separation from Pennsylvania. Id. at 824; see also THE COLLECTED
EssAYs OF RICHARD S. RODNEY ON EARLY DELAWARE 241-43 (George H. Gibson ed., 1975).
91. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 822-23.
92. Id.; WILLIAM H. LOYD, THE EARLY COURTS OF PENNSYLVANIA 49-58 (1910).
93. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 823.
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codified under William Penn." Hence, equity was used in both
Pennsylvania and Delaware 95 as a proxy for imperial power, met-
ing out natural justice and favoring control over the jury.96 In
other colonies, too, equity was a significant source of law, demon-
strating how well-rooted it was in the colonists' legal tradition."
By the 1720s, however, the courts of equity had moved toward
greater codification. With the statutory creation of original juris-
diction in the English Chancery, American colonists gained a
more accessible route of appeal.9" In Delaware, the post-
Revolution state constitution continued the practice, but without
the crown.99 The most notable change to equity in the Delaware
Constitution of 1776 established an appeal from the state su-
preme court in matters of law and equity to a court of seven
persons, the Court of Appeals, with the authority and powers pre-
viously vested in England's King in Council (the monarchial
executive authority).100 Additionally, Delaware maintained a three-
94. Id.
95. Delaware was part of Pennsylvania from 1682 until the early 17 00s. In 1701,
though, delegates from the Three Lower Counties (Delaware) successfully petitioned Penn-
sylvania Governor William Penn to have a separate legislature, which first convened in 1704.
But the Delaware colony still did not have its own executive (Pennsylvania's governor also
governed Delaware) until the American Revolution. Id. at 822-24.
96. Id. at 823 ("Thus, primitive equity was used in colonial Delaware as a means of
royal power to reflect natural justice as seen by the Governor and as a means to control both
at the appeal level and at the local level the erratic swings of thejury.... In Pennsylvania the
nonjury corrective role of equity was creating the first wave of anti-chancery political ripples.
But in Delaware there was little complaint. .. ").
97. John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the Histoy of American Judging,
34 Hous. L. REv. 1425, 1438 (1998). In Connecticut, Maryland, and Virginia, for instance,
the chancellors and advocates routinely invoked natural law rights and "good conscience."
Id. at 1439 & nn.83-88 (citing 1777 Va. Acts ch. 15; Chapman v. Allen, 1 Kirby 399, 400-01
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1788); Dulany ex rel. Lord Proprietary v. Jenings, 1 H. & McH. 92, 105
(Md. Ch. Ct. 1738); Digges's Lessee v. Beale, 1 H. & McH. 67, 73, 76 (Md. Provincial Ct.
1726)). These are, of course, the historical cornerstones of equitable practice. 2 JOHN J.
KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW & PRACTICE § 20:01, at 20-1
to 20-2 (2000) ("Early Roman lawmakers employed two sources that were eventually re-
garded as undifferentiated to create laws: from jus gentium (the law of nations), meaning
rules of law which appeared to have a universal character which arose from principles com-
mon to human nature, and without regard to the location of a person within any particular
country; and, from lex naturae (the law of nature) which focused on moral order." (foot-
notes omitted)).
98. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 824.
99. Id. at 825 (citing cases discussed in William Tatem Quillen, A Historical Sketch of
the Equity Jurisdiction in Delaware (Apr. 1, 1982) (unpublished L.L.M. thesis, University of
Virginia) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
100. IGNATIUS C. GRUBB, PAPERS OF THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF DELAWARE, XVII:
THE COLONIAL AND STATE JUDICIARY OF DELAWARE 22 (Phila., J.B. Lippincott Co. 1897).
"The courts of Delaware, both of law and equity, have in most respects, doubtless, in their
organization and proceedings, and especially in matters of pleading, practice, and evidence,
adhered more closely to the old English precedents than those of any of her sister States."
Id. at 30.
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judge trial court, something widespread in Civil Law nations, in
order to guard against a single judge becoming "despotic, disso-
lute, dishonest, or disabled by physical or mental infirmity."1 °1
Nonetheless, colonial Delaware had never experienced an in-
stitutionalized chancery, and it had no familiarity with the
prejudices against what was in many colonies viewed as an
arbitrary concentration of power.0 2 This was evident, for instance
in the 1868 revision to the Rules of Equity Practice; the Delaware
chancery system, as it existed since colonial days, was faulted for
"the inadequacy of written interrogatories ... [as] cross-
examination; the difficulty ... [of] assessing ex parte affidavits
during the preliminary injunction stage; and ... [the problems
with bringing] causes [of action] to a hearing."0 3 These were
similar to the criticisms leveled against the vestiges of English
chancery and equity in Revolution-era America.
10 4
Plainly, the Delaware Court of Chancery was able to overcome
these criticisms. Partly due to the pioneering work of Chancellor
Nicholas Ridgely,10 5 to the Court's extraordinary equitable
For information on colonial appeals to the King in Council, see ELMER BEECHER Rus-
SELL, THE REVIEW OF AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGISLATION BY THE KING IN COUNCIL (1915).
101. GRUBB, supra note 100, at 49.
102. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 826 (citing Michael Hanrahan, The Dela-
ware Court of Chancery: Delaware's Peculiar Institution (May 2, 1974) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
103. Id. at 831-32.
104. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text; see also Kroger, supra note 97, at 1439
& n.87 ("In Vermont, [for instance,] the state legislature complained that the Council of
Censors, which exercised chancery powers, was deciding cases on a purely discretionary
basis, guided only by 'their sovereign will and pleasure.'" (citing GORDON S. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 407 (1969) (quoting INCREASE MOSE-
LEY, COUNCIL OF CENSORS, ADDRESS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS, reprinted in VERMONT
STATE PAPERS 537 (1823) (address given Feb. 14, 1786)))).
The invocation of equitable and natural rights was significantly rarer in America than in
English equitable jurisprudence, Kroger, supra note 97, at 1439, demonstrating distrust
beyond the merely political, one reaching into the practice of early American litigators.
105. GRUBB, supra note 100, at 64.
In December, 1801, Chancellor Killen resigned his office and Mr. Ridgely was ap-
pointed to succeed him. Prior to his appointment there had been very little business
in the Court of Chancery, and there were but few precedents for his guidance. The
entire course of equity procedure and practice was yet to be regulated and estab-
lished under the newly-created Court of Chancery.
To this task he devoted himself in his methodical way with untiring vigor and indus-
try. The rules of court, forms of practice, and general principles adopted by him are
still in use, and he is justly considered the founder of chancery jurisprudence in
Delaware.
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powers , and to the general corporations law enacted in 1899,1°7
Delaware Chancery became increasingly relevant during the nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries.108 Between 1910 and 1920,
major, modern corporate litigation emerged, with a transformed
Court of Chancery given extended powers to appoint a receiver,' °9
deem a director not an employee,"0 pierce the corporate veil in
cases of fraud,"' regulate some share purchases"' and dissolu-
tions,'1 1 and uphold the validity of out-of-state directors'
meetings. 4
Delaware was unique among the states of the early Republic in
maintaining a dual jurisdictional system after the Revolution. The
preservation of equity procedure particularly helped to make Dela-
ware predominant in American corporate law. This in turn has
given the state lasting advantages in attracting business and capital,
alongside the admiration of other states, such as California, New
York, and Pennsylvania, that are now interested in adopting equi-
table courts modeled after those in Delaware. 115 For example, many
During the entire thirty years that he was Chancellor he [unlike his predecessors]
carefully took notes and preserved his opinions in all the important cases adjudicated
by him, and these have been published by Chancellor Bates in Volume I., "Delaware
Chancery Reports."
Id.
106. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 832 & n.37 (citing Wilds v. Attix, 4 Del. Ch.
253 (Ch. 1871) (estoppel); Houston v. Hurley, 2 Del. Ch. 247 (Ch. 1860) (rescission); Bur-
ton v. Adkins, 2 Del. Ch. 125 (Ch. 1846) (specific performance); Kinney v. Redden, 2 Del.
Ch. 46 (Ch. 1838) (specific performance of parol contract); Farmers' & Mechs.' Bank of
Del. v. Polk, 1 Del. Ch. 167 (Ch. 1821) (accounting); Warner v. Allee, 1 Del. Ch. 49 (Ch.
1818) (laches)).
107. RUSSELL CARPENTER LARCOM, THE DELAWARE CORPORATION 9 (1937).
108. The statute triggered immediate criticisms of Delaware participating in a race to
the bottom. Quillen & Hanrahan, supra note 14, at 835 ("Delaware was promptly criticized
as a 'little community ... determined to get her little, tiny, sweet, round, baby hand into the
grab-bag of sweet things .... " (quoting Note, Little Delaware Makes a Bid for the Organization of
Trusts, 33AM. L. Rav. 418, 418-19 (1899))).
109. Harned v. Beacon Hill Real Estate Co., 80 A. 805, 808 (Del. Ch. 1911), affd, 84 A.
229 (Del. 1912).
110. In re Peninsula Cut Stone Co., 82 A. 689,689 (Del. Ch. 1912).
111. Martin v. D.B. Martin Co., 88 A. 612, 613 (Del. Ch. 1913).
112. In re Int'l Radiator Co., 92 A. 255, 256 (Del. Ch. 1914).
113. Butler v. New Keystone Copper Co., 93 A. 380, 383 (Del. Ch. 1915).
114. Lippman v. Kehoe Stenograph Co., 98 A. 943, 948 (Del. Ch. 1916), affld, 102 A.
988 (Del. 1918).
115. Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Forums of the Future: The Role of Specialized Courts in Resolving
Business Disputes, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 2-3 (1995). "Given Delaware's success in attracting
incorporations, the esteem in which many commentators hold Delaware Corporate law, and
that, in part, these successes are attributed to its special tribunal, other states have followed
Delaware's propitious lead." Id. at 2 (footnotes omitted).
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states have specialized business courts, and several others have
considered or are considering that approach. 16 Of course, strictly
speaking, the Court of Chancery is not a specialized court as it has
broad jurisdiction. 117 However, in other jurisdictions, specialized
courts based on Delaware's can be jurisdictionally confined to com-
mercial disputes,'18 applying new procedural devices in limited,
experimental settings not unlike the UNIDROIT-Civ Pro."1 9
3. The Special Case of Louisiana Before 1938
Another example of Civil Law principles operating in American
states, that of Louisiana, serves as a demonstration of the major
state procedural shifts after the federal merger of law and equity,
but in a state where the Equitable and Civil traditions survived.
While some have professed that Louisiana is a de facto common
law regime, recent developments allude to the Civil Law's continu-
ing presence."0 However, the procedural aspects most relevant to
In the same discussion, Dreyfuss cites to sources indicating the adoption of equitable
courts in other states. See, e.g., S.B. 1797 § 5, 137th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1994) (call-
ing for creation and evaluation of specialized commercial departments in Los Angeles
County court system); S.B. 309, 178th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1994) (bill to create a
specialized court for commercial and corporate matters); Gary Spencer, Cuomo Seeks State
Commercial Court, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 6, 1994, at 1 (state experiment with a commercial and corpo-
rate part to its courts).
116. See Mitchell L. Bach & Lee Applebaum, A History of the Creation and Jurisdiction of
Business Courts in the Last Decade, 60 Bus. LAW. 147 (2004) (showing that specialized business
courts have been established in Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michi-
gan, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island;
discussing efforts to establish specialized business courts in Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Min-
nesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin; discussing complex litigation programs in
Arizona, California, Connecticut, and Pennsylvania); Hanrahan & Fioravanti, supra note 88,
at 6 (noting that the Chancery Court receives competition from the business courts of other
states and countries). See generally Am. Bar Ass'n, Ad Hoc Comm. of Bus. Courts, Business
Courts: Towards a More Efficient Judiciary, 52 Bus. LAW. 947, 955-59 (1996-1997) (discussing
existing specialized business courts in Delaware, Illinois, NewJersey, New York, North Caro-
lina, Virginia, and Wisconsin and proposed specialized courts in California, Florida,
Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania).
117. Dreyfuss, supra note 115, at5.
118. Id.at8.
119. Similar to the UNIDROIT method of standardizing civil procedure, the Delaware
system may serve as the model for a uniform method for commercial cases. Id. at 23-35
(discussing the portability of the Delaware Court of Chancery to other states in the commer-
cial context); see also S.B. 309, 178th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1994) (proposing a
specialized tribunal for commercial cases in Pennsylvania; excluding criminal and nonbusi-
ness matters); infra Part IV.C. (discussing choice of law).
120. David Cruning, Bayou State Bijuralism: Common Law and Civil Law in Louisiana, 81
U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 437, 441 (2004) ("Louisiana is also offered as an example of bijural-
ism. As the term bijuralism implies a more than mere mixing but a sort of grafting or
welding of disparate elements together, it seems to be the appropriate term. Whatever the
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this Article, namely the gathering of witness testimony and the as-
sembling of evidence by neutral third parties, were both
supplanted by oral testimony via state law in 1938, just as was done
federally that same year.121
Nonetheless, Louisiana's bijuralist tradition has preserved the
use of notaries, the umbrella term for the branch of the Civilian
legal profession under which the French huissier de justice is
found. l2 Further, the maintenance of the Civilian tradition is im-
portant for use as a model within the federal system, particularly
regarding harmonization and adaptation of law through globaliza-
tion-the influence of quasi-supranational entities such as the
World Trade Organization ("WTO") and the North American Free
Trade Agreement ("NAFTA") on domestic legal practices. 23
Between 1825 and 1870, the law of Louisiana was dramatically
redefined. A Louisiana Supreme Court decision in 1827 found that
much of the Civil Law had survived an attempted 1825 legislative
repeal, which prompted further statutes aimed at limiting the use
of Spanish, Roman, and French law.2 4 For the next 43 years, the
state's supreme court continued to oppose the other branches' ef-
forts to repeal the Civil Law.125 In fact, it was not until 1870 that the
Louisiana Civil Code was published solely in English. 26 While these
endeavors to impose common law procedure failed, many princi-
ples of the Civil Law had eroded through a piecemeal process.1
2 7
For example, in 1937, the year before the Louisiana notary lost its
status as a separately classified legal profession, Professor Gordon
characterization, given its economic and political position within the United States, it is
remarkable that Louisiana's legal system came into existence at all.... Most surprising of
all, it shows many signs of continuing ... for the foreseeable future despite the absence of
cultural barriers.... ." (footnote omitted)).
121. 1938 La. Acts 203 (codified at LA. REv. STAT. § 35:322 (2006)) (repeal effective
Jan. 1, 2009); D. Barlow Burke, Jr. & Jefferson K Fox, The Notaire in North America: A Short
Study of the Adaptation of a Civil Law Institution, 50 TUL. L. REv. 318, 321-22 (1976) ("In the
United States, the scrivener-notarial tradition never had much influence. In those areas with
Civilian backgrounds, the dominance of common law conveyancing was delayed, but ulti-
mately its dominance was virtually total."); Lambert, supra note 13 (discussing the
procedural differences between the Louisiana system and the French system).
122. Malavet, supra note 17, at 450. "[T]he Commonwealth of Puerto Rico [also] main-
tains ... [the] Latin notary ... modeled after the Spanish notario," id. at 451, although in
Spain the huissier is known as the oficial de sala (court official), Layton B. Register, Spanish
Courts, 27 YALE L.J. 769, 773 & n.28 (1917-1918).
123. See Gruning, supra note 120, at 438 ("[B]oth NAFTA's influence on legal systems
and this older relationship between the two legal traditions can be viewed as part of the
larger subjects of legal harmonization and legal transformation .... ").
124. Gruning, supra note 120, at 444 (citing Flower v. Griffith, 6 Mart. (n.s.) 89, 91-93
(La. 1827)).
125. Id. at 444-45 & nn.32, 33 & 35.
126. Id. at 445.
127. Id. at 445-46.
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Ireland wrote that Louisiana had become a common law state.
Ireland's article, however, engendered a renaissance of the Civil
Law in Louisiana9
In 2003, when extensive reform of the Civil Code occurred, the
basic French Code Civil structure of the 1870 Code was maintained,
although modernized to reflect greater uniformity between states
in some fields of law and the evolution of legal institutions during
the twentieth century.Is° By continuing with the Civil Code system,
Louisiana has shown the compatibility of Civil Law traditions with
the American common law in the contemporary context, and that
such a mixed-law system can arguably be as efficient as more "tradi-
tional" American common law methods:
[T] he civilian character of the law is visible in the articulated
exposition of the law. Book II on property has this characteris-
tic, "tight" form of drafting. And whereas the 1825 Code
incorporated numerous didactic or doctrinal articles, the Re-
vision eliminated a great number of them. Many such
provisions appeared among the rules on contract; their elimi-
nation presents the substance of the law in a more
economical fashion, perhaps also somewhat daunting.
3
1
Nevertheless, in dispensing with the notary as a separate legal
profession, in 1938, Louisiana had moved away from the use of
third parties (i.e., non-lawyers) in evidence gathering. 132 Vestiges of
the process remain,' 13 and in any event their historical presence
further demonstrates the compatibility of evidence gathered by an
128. Gordon Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TUL. L. REV. 585, 589-90
(1937).
129. Id. at 598; see also Mack E. Barham, A Renaissance of the Civilian Tradition in Louisi-
ana, in THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND DOCTRINE IN CIVIL LAW AND MIXED
JURISDICTIONS 38-40 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974) (citing Daggett as the progenitor of the
renaissance of Louisiana's Civilian tradition); Gruning, supra note 120, at 446-47. Compare
Ireland, supra note 128 (arguing that Louisiana had moved away from its Civil Law system),
with Harriet Spiller Daggett et al., A Reappraisal Appraised: A Brieffor the Civil Law of Louisiana,
12 TUL. L. REV. 12 (1938) (defending the claim that Louisiana was a Civilian system).
130. Gruning, supra note 120, at 449-50.
131. Id. at 455.
132. Burke & Fox, supra, note 121, at 321-22. In effect, Louisiana got rid of notaries as a
separate legal profession, because the state required notaries to be lawyers. The notarial and
the legal professions fused by legislative action in 1938. Id. at 328-29.
133. See generally Alison V. Nunez, A Testament to Inefficacy: Louisiana's New Legislation Al-
lowing for the Admissibility of Videotape Evidence in the Probate Process, 67 LA. L. REv. 871, 880
(2007) (discussing the use of a notary when executing a will); Bertrand V. Tibbels, Ancient
Nebraska Jurisprudence and Institutions, 6 NEB. I.. BULL. 207 (1927) (discussing the use of the
huissier in pre-statehood Nebraska).
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investigative magistrate with the United States Constitution, as well
as showing a means toward the adaptability of American law.
B. The Development of the Huissier de justice
While the emerging federal system in the United States became
increasingly uncertain regarding the role for third parties in the
collection of evidence for trial, in France and other Civil Law juris-
dictions the role was preserved, evolved, and at least in the case of
France, transformed. This developed into a legal system infused
with a number of professional legal roles beyond the judge and
advocate, including the notaire (notary) and its cousin, the huis-
sier.134 The schism in the use of adjunct legal professionals such as
the huissier or notaire between the French and U.S. systems is dem-
onstrated through the demise of the special master in the early
twentieth century. However, as the role of the special master is
given new attention, understanding how the huissier operates can
illustrate the potential problems, and benefits, of the reemergence
of the master. Discussion of the Civil Law, and how the profession
of notaire came to play such a significant role in the Western legal
tradition, illuminates the essential characteristics of the huissier that
differentiates it from the more modern American legal tradition.
In some cases, these differences may render potential roles for the
special master impossible under principles of U.S. jurisprudence.
In other contexts, however, it provides examples of the broad
scope for legal adaptation of special masters through experimenta-
tion with broader powers in discovery, akin to those more
commonly associated with the huissier.
1. The Notarial Professions
The profession of the huissier can be definitively traced to the Ro-
man legal code,135 which invested certain official powers of the state in
professional persons.136 This innovation, which greatly reduced cumber-
some bureaucratic processes in Ancient Rome, related to official seals
134. See Malavet, supra note 17, at 450 & n.297.
135. Id. at 408.
136. Id. The use of royal scribes, law scribes, popular scribes, and state scribes also ex-
isted in the Hebrew Codes. Id. at 408-11. Similarly, in Ancient Greece, there were public
officials charged with drafting. Id.; see also STR6MHOLM, supra note 39, at 22; Michael L.
Closen & G. Grant Dixon III, Notaries Public From the Time of the Roman Empire to the United
States Today, and Tomorrow, 68 N.D. L. REv. 873,873-96 (1992).
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and gave rise to the profession of the notary,1 " through the scribass
and notarius139 who could authenticate private acts and operate in the
capacity of legal advisor to private parties"'4 More specifically, ap-
paritores served in a similar capacity to a modern bailiff, or huissier
audiencier, as they summoned persons to hear verdicts, handled
some aspects of evidentiary presentation, and generally policed
hearings.1 4 1 A related profession, executores, was more akin to mod-
ern, semi-private huissiers and county sheriffs, who were
empowered to enforce judgments and debts. 4
2
While the actual functions may have been vague, 143 the ancient
professional notariesI4 made authenticated legal documents acces-
sible to a wide variety of persons, and greatly eased the development
of the contract and the rule of law.145 Indeed, the presence of the
137. See Malavet, supra note 17, at 408-09.
138. "[C]lerk in a court or in an office." ADOLF BERGER, ENCYCLOPEDIC DICTIONARY OF
ROMAN LAW 692 (1953) (pl.: scribae).
139. "A person, usually a freedman or slave, skilled in shorthand writing; in the later
Empire notarius is [synonymous with] scriba." Id. at 599 (pl.: notarii); see also 2 MARCEL
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE § 134 n.1 (La. State Law Inst. trans., 1959); EDUARDO
BAUTISTA PONDE, ORIGEN E HISTORIA DEL NOTARIADO 24-30 (1967) (discussing the Hel-
lenic influences of the notary).
140. See Malavet, supra note 17, at 408-19.
141. Chambre Nationale des Huissiers de Justice, Son Histoire, http://www.huissier-
justice.fr/MsgByReg.aspx?id=148 [hereinafter Chambre Nationale des Huissiers de Justice]
(author's translation) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
142. Id.
143. Even as notaries continued to serve important roles in maintaining law and order in
Medieval Europe, the scope of their activities became less clear. RADDING, supra note 39, at
23-30. Nonetheless, it is likely the notary during this period served in a more limited capac-
ity due to high rates of illiteracy and the highly localized nature of legal rules, customs, and
superstitions before the emergence of the nation state. Id.; see also Ewald, Comparative Juris-
prudence (I), supra note 15, at 1898-905 (discussing the role of belief in the rationality of
animals in Medieval European jurisprudence and the concomitant influence of highly local-
ized beliefs and customs).
144. HEIKKI E.S. MATTILA, COMPARATIVE LEGAL LINGUISTICS 4 (Christopher Goddard
trans., 2006).
[I]n continental Europe one can refer to notarial language .... In these countries-
notably Latin countries-private-law documents have been drawn up, for a thousand
years, by a separate body: the notarial profession. A notary is a lawyer who can be
styled part official, part advocate. The long traditions of the notarial college explain
the specific characteristics of their language.
Id.
145. See Closen & Dixon, supra note 136, at 874-75. See generally Mario Ascheri, Turning
Point in the Civil-Law Tradition: From Ius Commune to Code Napolbon, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1041
(1996) (arguing that nineteenth century legal science and codification created greater
equality in the law and enhanced the development of the contemporary unified national
legal regime).
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notary, and of viable economies, was coupled with the rule of law
and may continue to be so related.1
6
The notary continued to evolve on the Continent, 47 and its pow-
ers grew continuously with the passage of time as well as other
independent developments in European laws between the thir-
teenth and nineteenth centuries.' By contrast, in the common
law, the notary never obtained such prominence;149 instead, the no-
tary gradually evolved into a clerical position, particularly in the
United States, where contracts were made binding if concluded in
open court under judicial authority. 50 In the United States, the
preference for use of open court would eventually come to corre-
spond to a preference for oral evidence. Conversely, in France, a
strong preference for written proof and avoiding determinations
on complex grounds beyond the judge's professional understand-
ing emerged, particularly as a result of investigative magistrates,
such as the huissier'5'
Indeed, this preference may have been emblematic of the ad-
vancement of the notarial profession in France, particularly after
the Loi Vent6se of 1803,152 which extensively reformed notarial
practice:
146. Furthermore, other undeveloped societies also dispensed with notaries where
transactions were limited. See, e.g., Closen & Dixon, supra note 136, at 876 ("In the New
World, colonists had little need for the services of a notary. At first, there were so few trans-
actions that they often were performed in the presence of the court and on a court record."
(footnote omitted)).
147. For instance, during the thirteenth century, as the European economy began to
revive and trade routes extended, there was simultaneously a marked return to legal science
and codification. Malavet, supra note 17, at 416-18. Indeed, in 1228 the Scula di Notariato
was formed, engendering greater professionalization of the notarial profession in the early
Modem West's most prestigious city of learning, Bologna. Id. at 418.
148. See PONDP, supra note 139, at 1-30.
149. See N.P. READY, BROOKE'S NOTARY 1 (11th ed. 1992) ("The importance of the Eng-
lish Notary resides not in the functions which he performs within his own legal system, but
rather in the link he provides between the institutions of the common law and those of the
civil law."); Malavet, supra note 17, at 426-27.
150. In the United States, the key aspects of notarial function, namely legal advice and
quality control, were lost. Malavet, supra note 17, at 427.
151. Beardsley, supra note 13, at 459; seeJ.A. Jolowicz, Civil Procedure in the Common and
Civil Law, in LAw AND LEGAL CULTURE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 26, 40 (Guenther
Doeker-Mach & Klaus A. Ziegert eds., 2004). Also consider that the law of evidence devel-
oped to a large extent as a by-product of the preference for jury trial, and Civil Law nations'
evidentiary rules lack the systematic nature of the American system, which frequently ex-
cludes evidence. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U.
PA. L. REv. 165, 174 & n.42 (2006); see also RENP DAVID & HENRY P. DE VRIES, THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL LAW SYSTEMS 74-75 (1958).
152. Malavet, supra note 17, at 422, 429-30. Its counterparts were the Spanish Notarial
Law of 1862 and the Italian Notarial Law of 1913, both substantially in effect today. Id. at
429-30. These laws lead to the following characteristics of the modem notary: (1) the notary
is "[a] private, liberal profession ... [where] [I]egal education and/or apprenticeship [is]
The French Huissier
The most important characteristics of this law were that it
thoroughly legislated notarial work, incorporating long-
established practice and eliminating unregulated areas, and
[that it] was immediately applied and implemented as written.
The French law defined notaries as "public functionaries desig-
nated to receive all acts and contracts to which the parties
must or wish to impart the authentic character of a public act
and to guarantee the date, keep it deposited and issue copies
and testimonies.
" 153
As the notary became increasingly codified and reliable and its
functions delimited, the profession was able to distinguish itself
from other legal professions. 5 4 Under this umbrella, the huissier
was able to be viewed as a neutral, if not independent, functionary
in a system prizing neutrality over the adversarial trial.
1 55
With the entrenchment of the notarial profession in the Lati-
nate legal tradition, the Civil Law sits in opposition to much of the
United States' procedural heritage. Nonetheless, both notaire and
huissier are historical figures that aided and continue to enhance
American law through the notary and special master. Indeed, the
emergence of the huissier as a separate profession under the notaire
in France is illustrative of the similarities between special masters,
who are typically lawyers and once served, generally, as a separate
legal profession, and their historical counterpart, the huissiers, who
are also legally trained professionals but who do not advocate on
behalf of any party (though they may do so, in some circumstances,
where they do not also serve as a neutral fact-finder).
required"; (2) the passage of an examination and "[m]embership in a professional" organi-
zation; (3) exclusive jurisdiction; (4) the keeping of a "permanent register of all public
documents subscribed before h[er]"; (5) the notary may serve as "a legal advisor to ...
[private] parties and is ... supervised" by the government. Id. at 430. These developments
made the notary's function incompatible with service in a judicial capacity. PONDA, supra
note 139, at 550.
153. Malavet, supra note 17, at 422 (quoting PONDC, supra note 139, at 267 (Malavet
trans., unofficial)).
154. Id.
155. See Beardsley, supra note 13, at 462-65 (discussing the rationale for restricted rights
of proof). See generally Stephen J. Spurr, The Duration of Litigation, 19 LAW & POL'Y 285
(1997) (suggesting a number of variables in the length of a lawsuit).
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2. Emergence of the Contemporary Huissier
Nevertheless, the French notary was never fully the ministerial
official the huissier has come to be.' 56 Indeed, the notary's functions
are generally incompatible with such officials. 5 7 The key "differ-
ence is that the notary has a jurisdiction: [his act] receives its
authority from his signature alone; ... [whereas a huissier, or like
ministerial official, derives her] authority from the signature of the
judge."l5 s
Not unlike the word chancery, huissier itself derives from a
phrase for secret; instead of lattice or screen, huissier once indi-
cated door (as in a doorkeeper). 19 Initially, huissier indicated a
person who was responsible for the (physical) assurance of the
156. Although notaries do qualify as an officier ministerial under a strict definition-a
lawyer appointed by the State, limited in number, and with monopoly in certain matters, see
Pierre Georges Lepaulle, Law Practice in France, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 945, 950 (1950)-the
huissier (bailiff) is the subject of much French legislative authority. Here are a few of these
numerous laws: NOUVEAU CODE DE PROCEDURE CIVILE [N.C.P.C.] arts. 640-94 (Fr.), trans-
lated in THE FRENCH CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ENGLISH 121-35 (Christian Dodd trans.,
2006) [hereinafter "FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH"] (New Code of Civil Procedure rules on,
inter alia, huissiers); Law of Dec. 27, 1923,Journal Officiel de la Rtpublique Fran~aise [JO.]
[Official Gazette of France], Dec. 29, 1923, p. 12132 (temporary replacement of injured
huissiers); Ordinance No. 45-2692, of Nov. 2, 1945, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran-
aise [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 3, 1945, p. 7163 (status of bailiffs); Decree No.
75-770 of Aug. 17, 1975,Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran~aise U.O.] [Official Gazette
of France], Aug. 22, 1975, p. 8 5 8 8 (fitness for the office of huissier); Order of Feb. 9, 1987,
Journal Officiel de la Rtpublique Fran4aise J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Feb. 18,
1987, p. 1852 (list of degrees and diplomas equivalent to a law license for the exercise of the
profession of huissier); Decree No. 92-1448 of Dec. 30, 1992, Journal Officiel de la R~pub-
lique Fran~aise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 1, 1993, p. 40 (implementing Law
No. 90-1258 of Dec. 31, 1990, Journal Officiel de la R6publique Fran~aise [JO.] [Official
Gazette of France], Jan. 5, 1991, p. 216, and subjecting huissier companies to statutes and
regulations); Decree No. 2004-365 of April 22, 2004,Journal Officiel de la Rtpublique Fran-
caise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], April 25, 2004, p. 7556 (modifying an earlier
decree (Decree No. 69-1274 of Dec. 31, 1969, Journal Officiel de la R~publique Fran~aise
[JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 11, 1970, p. 432) and implementing a law concern-
ing the status of professional societies (Law No. 66-879 of Nov. 29, 1966, Journal Officiel de
la R6publique Fran~aise [JO.] [Official Gazette of France], Nov. 30, 1966, p. 10451), so that
the law applies to huissiers' companies).
157. L. Neville Brown, The Office of the Notary in France, 2 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 60, 61
(1953). The notary's "decree of nomination by the President of the Council of Ministers
designates him as officier public, while that of an avoui, huissier or greffier speaks of officier min-
isteieL" Id. at 61 n.6. "There are also certain incompatibilitis or occupations deemed
incompatible with [the notary's] office; these include avoui, huissier, greffier, estate agent,
insurance agent, juge de paix-, but not mayor or deputi." Id. at 64 n.19.
158. Id. at 61 n.6 (citation omitted).
159. The use should not be confused with the keeper of the gate, or porta, a separate
role in the keeping of medieval palaces. J.H. Round, The Staff of a Castel in the Twelfth Century,
35 ENG. HIST. REv. 90, 97 (1920); see also Chambre Nationale des Huissiers de justice, supra
note 141; JuriTravail.com, http://www.juritravail.com/lexique/Huissier.html [hereinafter
JuriTravail.com] (author's translation) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
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proceeding's tranquility, in much the same sense a modem Ameri-
can bailiff ensures the routine and non-violent presentation of
evidence at trial.16° With time, as the codification of the law as well
as a preference for closed and secret hearings emerged on the
Continent, this definition grew to encompass the role of the mod-
ern huissier audiencier.
1
'
6
In the Pre-Modern societies, in what now comprises France and
to some extent Belgium and Switzerland, the huissier audiencier had
not yet fully emerged in its contemporary form. Following the rise
of Christianity in the West, the collapse of social order rendered
the ancient Roman scribnatorial professions, such as the appari-
tores, executores, the audientiarius, and the secretarius and notarius
(among others), inadequate or too distant for direct continuance
of their procedural duties and terminology. However, the general
structure of the law was retained, though greatly localized without
the unifying forces of the Roman Emperor. In the emerging Fran-
cophone world, the aforementioned professions evolved, or
reemerged, in new guises which represented the contemporary
legal order
62
For instance, prior to the fourteenth century, sergeants were em-
ployed in a role that shared aspects with both the contemporary
advocates and the huissier audiencieri1 These persons put together
litigants' claims, executed the decisions of the judges, and took on
more particular roles in manorial jurisdictions. This epoch,
where the term huissier also came to signify the contemporary no-
tion of bailiff as the protector of order in a court, greatly expanded
160. JuriTravail.com, supra note 159.
161. See Beardsley, supra note 13, at 459 (noting that the "distrust of oral evidence and
the unwillingness of the [French] judge to compel the parties to produce evidence" nor-
mally leads to the appointment of an expert to pursue fact-finding investigations); see also
JEAN-MICHEL DARROIS, RAPPORT SUR LES PROFESSIONS DU DROIT 21 (2009) (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/
14082396/Rapport-Commission-Darrois-8-avril-2009 (a French government commission's
report noting that judges can commit huissiers to make fact-findings-to be huissiers audienci-
ers); SERGE BRAUDO & ALEXIS BAUMANN, DICTIONNAIRE Du DROIT PRIVt, http://www.
dictionnaire-juridique.com/definition/constat.php (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (defining the constat as a document prepared by a public official,
such as a huissier; noting that a civil magistrate can commit the huissier to determining the
facts of a case).
162. The breadth of the French world caused a number of variations of the huissier to
emerge in separate territories. From Nebraska to the Low Countries, huissiers were either
brought with settlers or imposed upon native populations. See generally E. Lameere, The
Origins and Functions of the Audiencier in the Low Countries, REv. UNIV. BRUXELLES 1, 8-10
(July-Sep. 1896) (tracing the office of the French Chancery to the Dukes of Burgundy,
who introduced it to the Low Countries where it continued until 1744); Tibbels, supra
note 133 (describing huissier-sheriffs).
163. Chambre Nationale des Huissiers dejustice, subra note 141.
164. See id.
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the competence of the huissier by encouraging the reintroduction
of, or at least greater professionalization of, multiple subordinate
legal professions such as the huissier, greffier, or notaire.161
Such positions were attained through the sale of monarchical
powers to wealthy subjects. This method of distributing legal powers
emerged in the context of the Burgundian invasion of the Low
Countries, when it became imperative to sell such tiles as a revenue
source.16  The evolution remained long after the invasion, and so the
professional legal offices of France-not entirely unlike American
bars or the licensing agencies of private professions-emerged.
67
By the 1500s, at least in the major urban areas of France, the
huissier had taken on increased significance and came under fur-
ther-though to the modem eye perhaps superficial-regulation,
particularly as government became more highly structured and hi-
erarchical, with increased emphasis on unity and standardization
between the divergent jurisdictions of early Modem France. For in-
stance, huissiers were ordered to wear a particular costume and to
carry with them a staff with special significations; it was a style so dis-
tinctive as to be found frequently in contemporary popular culture,
such as on the decks of the popular tarocchi card games of Medieval
Europe. '8 There were also rules on religious adherence, familial
status, and certain oaths and allegiances to justice and superiors in
order for a person to qualify to serve in the role of huissier.6" 9
Thus, the huissier was one of the venal professions, "the prod-
uct of a time when it was easier for kings to sell rich men powers
and privileges than to tax them." 70 As such, any number of subdi-
visions emerged before the French Revolution. In Paris there
165. See William Doyle, The Sale of Offices in French History, 46 HIST. TODAY 39, 39-40
(1996); Chambre Nationale des Huissiers dejustice, supra note 141.
166. SeeDoyle, supra note 165, at 44; Lameere, supra note 162.
167. See Doyle, supra note 165, at 44.
168. See, e.g., Tarot d Jean Noblet (ca. 1650) (on file with Bibliothhque Nationale, Paris,
France). The uniform demonstrates its later resonance in pre-twentieth century popular
culture in a number of forms, perhaps in light of its elaborate detail: the staff, the feathered
cap, and the symbolic imagery on the sleeves and torso. See, e.g., 2 EDMUND YATES, Two, BY
TRicKs 57 (1874) (describing an Englishman's foray into Parisian society and a "magnifi-
cent" huissier who was hired to call him to a house on particular, unofficial business); Zizi
Sues, Foreign Nms-Roumania, TIME, Mar. 15, 1926, at 15, 15 (describing the huissie-?s service
of process, and his "impressive uniform," in a Paris hotel regarding a widely followed divorce
among the Romanian royalty). For a contemporary use of the huissier costume, see Gail
Mangold-Vine, Being Geneva, Swiss NEWS, Mar. 2005, at 14, 14 (discussing the baton and
other particulars of the traditional costume and detailing the daily life of a high-ranking
government huissier in Switzerland).
169. Chambre Nationale des Huissiers de justice, supra note 141.
170. Doyle, supra note 165, at 40.
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were five separate forms of huissier alone,'71 and specialized huissiers
were employed in a number of services, from royal or bureaucraticfu " .172
functionaries to service as official witnesses at important
events. 173 Of course, a great deal of time passed between the 1500s,
when the role of the huissier was thoroughly venal, and the Revolu-
tionary period, when huissiers continued in a professional capacity,
amazingly enough, despite their historical tie with monarchial au-
thority.
174
In pre-Revolutionary France, offices such as the notaire or huis-
sier, which originally indicated powers given to a person by the
King, gradually became a revenue, in lieu of a formal taxation re-gie1 hegetr7h5owr . 176
gime. The greater the power, privileges, and especially profits
associated with a particular office, the greater the revenue poten-
tial. Thus, tenures were extended to lifetime appointments, and
offices were made alienable through testamentary devices and pub-
lic sales, which also generated further fees and revenue.77 As
financial crises emerged, many new offices were created, and by
1598, the entire French judicial system was venal. 78 Hence, prior to
the 17 00s, the multiplicity of forms of huissiers, from street patrol-
lers to debt enforcers to court reporters and process servers,
emerged and sustained itself.
179
The bestowing of privilege based upon merit-rather than a le-
gal regime based on wealth and venal elitism-was, of course, a
171. Huissier audiencier, huissier i cheval (on horseback serving rural areas); huissier 4 pied
(walker of the city center); huissier priseur (auctioneer); huissier a la douzaine (provost
guards). Chambre Nationale des Huissiers de Justice, supra note 141. In 1705, the various
forms other than huissier audiencier were consolidated under the umbrella term huissier de
justice. Id.; see also infra notes 201-205 and accompanying text (discussing the huissier audien-
cier and the other forms of huissier).
172. See, e.g., Nancy L. Roelker, French News of Great Britain, 1574-1603, 8 Wm. & MARY
Q. 90, 91 (1955) (describing a well connected huissier of the Parlement de Paris).
173. See, e.g., J.L. Boone Atkinson, Memoir of a Balloon Ascension and an Interview with
Gambetta, January 1871, 1 FRENCH HIST. STUD. 357, 358-59 (1960) (describing the atten-
dance of a huissier at a balloon flight).
174. See, e.g., William Doyle, The Price of Offices in Pre-Revolutionary France, 27 HIST. J. 831,
858-59 (1984).
175. Doyle, supra note 165, at 40 ("Before the advent of bureaucrats and bank accounts,
it was almost impossible for states to tap the wealth of anyone with liquid or invisible assets;
especially where, as in medieval France, the authority of the monarch was weak.").
176. See, e.g., id. ("Many offices brought exemptions from common burdens, such as the
salt monopoly.., or billeting soldiers. More prestigious offices conferred tax-exemptions of
varying sorts. The most sought-after privilege of all---ennoblement-brought a whole range
of others in its wake.").
177. Id.
178. Id. ("[lit was not long before the entire judiciary had been venalised, in spite of a
rule which required all judges to swear on appointment that they had not paid for their
office. The oath was finally abandoned in 1598.").
179. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
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backbone of Revolutionary ideology in both France and America.
Nevertheless, the venal/notarial professions survived the French
Revolution, and Napoleon co-opted the basic revenue-generating
premise when he later fully reintroduced those professional mark-
ers, which had been eliminated during the Revolution, into the
new French bureaucratic system of the early nineteenth century;
and those professions further survived the Revolutions of 1848.180
Indeed, despite the ideological fervor, before Napoleon's rise to
power, the concerted efforts to abolish these quasi-private state of-
ficials (the notarial professions) failed for a number of practical
181
reasons.
For instance, the Enlightenment thinking that underpinned
both the America Revolution and French Revolution dictated that
the professions most closely associated with archaic patriarchy,
such as the master and the notarial professions, be emasculated.
82
However, like the masters in the early nineteenth century, late
eighteenth century France also found that removal of entire pro-
fessional classes only created voids in the law.
83
Other technical issues ensued as well. The debts of the venal
professions, such as the costs for investigations, had been assumed
by the prior government; hence, the new government was forced
to assume them as well. 8 4 Then, there was the issue of compensat-
ing the professional classes for the restructuring of professional
offices. Some groups were defter at navigating this change than
others. Notaries, for instance, were "[a]mong the most vocal ...
protesters"185 and in the end gained not only compensation for
180. See Doyle, supra note 165, at 44.
181. Id. at 41-42 (noting that venality was sustained because "[a]bove all, [it] was an ex-
tremely flexible financial resource"); Doyle, supra note 174, at 848.
182. Doyle, supra note 165, at 43. In any event, office holders were the largest group in
the National Assembly, and the professions had already become increasingly alienable and
deregulated before the French Revolution, making them among the leading groups in the
bourgeois class that the Revolutionaries depended upon for power. Id. As in the American
colonies shortly after the American Revolution, the French government instituted programs
designed to simplify the legal profession, and a large scale buy-out of the venal professions
was attempted. Id.
183. See David A- Bell, Lawyers into Demagogues: Chancellor Maupeou and the Transformation
of Legal Practice in France 1771-1789, PAST & PRESENT, Feb. 1991, at 107, 113, 120-25 (noting
that the expulsion of the Order of Barristers-a self-governing association that initially had a
monopoly on the practice of law-and lifting of pleading restrictions precipitated an explo-
sion of scandalous cases where advocates perverted trials to self-promote and settle old
scores). Compare Kessler, supra note 14, at 1203-04, with Doyle, supra note 165, at 43.
184. Doyle, supra note 165, at 43.
185. Doyle, supra note 174, at 848.
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their title and practice but were maintained as a functioning pro-
fession after the reform.
8 6
The emergence of Napoleon, out of the midst of the chaotic
Revolutionary era, brought with it greater regulation, standardi-
zation, and bureaucratization of French government.8 7 Unlike
the United States, where the change in legal form was not as far
reaching, 88 France quickly reinstated a, albeit modernized, version
of monarchy.8 9 Napoleon quickly reinstituted the methodology of
office holding used before the Revolution, finally making the of-
fices freely alienable, limited in number, and later subject to
taxation.' 90 This system essentially remains in place today:
Throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries radicals
and reformers denounced this as a betrayal of the Revolu-
tion's work, but they were met with arguments as old as
venality itself. Even the much diminished ranks of revived ve-
nality were simply too expensive for the state to buy out. To
this day, important French public monopolies remain pri-
vately owned. Anyone familiar with France will have noticed
the oval gilt plaques over doorways in professional districts,
proclaiming the presence of a notaire, a huissier de justice, or a
commissaire-priseur, all holding office on terms first devised
four centuries ago to help warrior kings fight the Habs-
burgs.191
Thus, as post-Revolutionary American and French legal styles di-
verged, with the United States hewing away from many of the
remaining monarchical professions, France continued to adhere to
the traditions of the ancient rigine. The reasons for this are mani-
fold, but nonetheless common elements remained in both
186. Doyle, supra note 165, at 44. Even those professions effectively discontinued in the
early years of the Revolution, such as attorneys and auctioneers, were able to reinvent their
professions in the first few years after the implementation of an unregulated market: "[ T ] he
chaos of an unregulated market in [attorneys' and auctioneers'] services produced new
demands for state control." Id.
187. Id.
188. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, BuREAu OF INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION PRO-
GRAMS, OUTLINE OF U.S. HISTORY 68 (2005) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal
of Law Reform), available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/historytln.pdf#
popup. In America, the monarchical authorities were simply replaced by an array of new
legislatures, by both appointed and elected individuals.
189. See Doyle, supra note 165, at 44.
190. Id. The positions remained, in effect, plum sinecures. Cf, Bennett Schiff, Georges
Seurat and the Color of Brilliance, SMITHSONIAN, Oct. 1991, at 100, 104 (discussing the fact that
Seurat's career was funded by his father, who got his start as a huissier).
191. Doyle, supranote 165, at44.
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countries throughout the nineteenth century as the notary, special
master, and huissier, each survived the American or French Revolu-
tionary attempts to eradicate them. By the early twentieth century,
the United States once again attempted to have its lawyer class as-
sume these notarial tasks, when other nations, including France,
left these legal tasks to their non-lawyer professional classes. 92
III. UsEs OF THE HUISSIER AUDENCIER IN CIVIL LITIGATION
Despite the divergence between French and American proce-
dure during the twentieth century, the huissier remains relevant to
American lawyers for a number of reasons, both theoretical and
practical. In the global economy it has become plain that any num-
ber of legal matters will need, at the very least, to be concluded
through, or evidenced by, foreign procedural mechanisms. Fur-
ther, where American courts hold jurisdiction over incidents in
foreign nations, particularly nations without a broad notion of dis-
covery, a third party fact-finder may be crucial, not only to the
foreign aspect of the litigation, but also in assembling evidence for
use in the American trial.
One result is purely practical: it is necessary to recognize foreign
legal systems in order for the United States to meet treaty obliga-
tions and address cross-border issues. 93  Another result is
theoretical: understanding the operation of the huissier can serve as
a catalyst for comparison and reform of domestic institutions,
and huissiers may assist in overcoming foreign legal barriers to dis-
covery.9 5 In any event, understanding the current status of the
huissier audiencier in French law is a necessary predicate to under-
standing the functions similar institutions (i.e., the special master)
have played in U.S. litigation, and it also provides a basic under-
standing of the huissier for those instances where it is used in Civil
Lawjurisdictions.
192. The greater flexibility in the United States stemmed from its not having an en-
trenched, venal professional class in the American economy or political regime.
193. Zehnder, supra note 4, at 1772 (noting that despite controversy over the use of in-
ternational sources in the domestic context, "[t]here is little dispute whether comparative
inquiry is a desirable practice in issues involving treaties or matters bearing cross-border
consequences").
194. Cf Lee, supra note 4, at 119 (discussing the possibility of the Supreme Court look-
ing for a "universal consensus on a moral question").
195. See M. Neil Browne et al., The Perspectival Nature of Expert Testimony in the United
States, England, Korea, and France, 18 CouN. J. INT'L L. 55, 97 n.286 (2002) (discussing Dayan
v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan 1), 466 N.E.2d 958 (111. App. Ct. 1984)). For further discussion
on Dayan I, see infra Part III.B.
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A. The Huissier Under the Nouveau Code de Procidure Civile
The New French Code of Civil Procedure (Nouveau Code de
Procddure Civile ("N.C.P.C.") ), 96 introduced in 1974, never makes
specific reference to the status of huissiers. Nonetheless, the
N.C.P.C. furnishes the French judge a number of opportunities
with which to appoint third parties for special functions under
Tide VII, "L'administration judiciaire de la preuve" ("The Taking of
Evidence"), where provision is made for consultants, 197 technical
experts,198 surveyors,9  and the investigation of witnesses by the
judge,' °° among others.' °1
In addition to the fact-finding functions of the huissier audiencier,
the huissier de justice also serves in capacities more commonly asso-
ciated with bailiffs, sheriffs, or social workers in the United States.
These responsibilities include international service of process;
202
the enforcement of court judgments; service of process; debt col-
lection; providing legal advice, as representative in the commercial
court, in the sub-district court concerning wage garnishment, and
in the agricultural rent tribunal; and, the most common function,
inspecting households in dissolution of marriage and custody
196. See generally N.C.P.C., translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156.
197. Id. art. 256, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 49.
198. Id. arts. 232, 263, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 46, 50.
199. Id. art. 264, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 51.
200. Id. art. 204, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 40.
201. For instance, Article 232 of the Nouveau Code de Procidure Civile states that "[t ] he
judge may appoint any person of his/her choice to provide him/her with guidance in the
form of observations, written advice or by way of a report on a question of fact which calls
for such technical guidance." Id. art. 232, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note
156, at 46. Further, such appointments may be made at a party's request, to preserve evi-
dence for pending litigation, through the reeri probatoire. Id. art. 145, translated in FRENCH
CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 31 ("If, before any proceedings have commenced,
there is a legitimate reason to preserve, or to establish the method of proving, the facts upon
which the outcome of the of the [sic] dispute shall turn, legally permissible directions may
be given at the request of any party, pursuant to an application or by way of a summary ap-
plication."); see also Wendy Kennett, The Production of Evidence Within the European Community,
56 MOD. L. REv. 342, 349-50 & n.44 (1993) ("In situations where it is essential that the ap-
plication for protective measures be kept secret, Article 145 also permits such measures to
be sought via ex parte proceedings (requite). For example, a huissier may be appointed to
enter a potential defendant's business premises and compile an official statement of certain
categories of documents or other items to be found there." (footnotes omitted)). Further,
even where a huissier is not permitted access to enter a potential defendant's business of to
compile a dossier, access to the evidence is nonetheless permitted under free evaluation of
evidence principles, typically prejudicial to defendants. Id. at 350.
202. If a U.S. litigant does not wish to use the service offered by the French government
pursuant to the Hague Convention, service may be made by a huitsieror American or French
attorney. Judicial Assistance in France, in 1 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LITIGATION & ARBITRA-
TION 2006, at 1341, 1344 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. H-739,
2006) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), available at
http://travel.state.gov/law/info/judicial/udicial_647.html.
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battles. Nonetheless, in these aspects, the huissier is typically or
effectively employed by private parties, and thus lacks the distinc-
tion of audiencier status (i.e., of being appointed by the court).
1. Introduction to the Contemporary HuissierAudiencier
The distinction between the two forms of huissier is crucial, as
one-the audiencier-serves a role more akin to the special master,
whereas the other, "non-audiencier," operates in a private capacity
that is already accounted for in the American system through sher-
iffs, notaries public, and others. The huissier audiencier is the
primary focus of this Article, and it is distinguished by serving
principally as usher during court settings and as a fact gatherer or
investigative magistrate. 4 Indeed, audiencier itself indicates "lis-
tener" or "hearing," and derives from the Latin audientiarius,°5 a
person that is or gives an official audience.0 6
Essentially, the huissier audiencier performs three roles for or on
behalf of the court, based upon the nature of the testimony and
evidence deemed necessary under N.C.P.C. Title VII, Chapter V.
The first is the constatation,°7 in which the huissier creates an oral or
written dossier based on technical questions and does not provide
opinion regarding the consequences of the findings. The second is
the consultation,0 8 a typically oral statement of expert facts that does
not require a highly structured analysis. Finally, there is the exper-
tise 09 which, as explored below, may be further subdivided and
serves a number of procedural functions.2 0 The French court will
usually avoid the expertise, where possible, as a result of its complex-
ity.2
203. See UIHJ, supra note 10.
204. See WESTON, supra note 9 and accompanying text.
205. EMILE Lrrrt, 1 DICTIONNAIRE DE LA LANGUE FRAN4AISE 714 (Gallimard
Hachette 1961) (1877) (author's translation); see also Definition of "Audiencier,"
http://www.mediadico.com/dictionnaire/definition/audiencier/lexique (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
206. W.H. MAIGNE D'ARNIS, LEXICON MANUALE AD SCRIPTORES MEDLE ET INFIMiE
LATINITATIS 241 (Paris, M. l'Abb6 Migne 1866). Audientiarius was typically also associated
with two other Latin words of legal significance whose English descendants are unmistak-
able, secretarius and notarius. See id.; supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text.
207. N.C.P.C. arts. 249-55, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at
48-49.
208. Id. arts. 256-62, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 49-50.
209. Id. arts. 263 to 284-1, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 50-56.
210. The general organizational scheme of this sub-section is extrapolated from Taylor,
supra note 32, at 197-203.
211. See id. at 199.
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a. The Constatation
The constatation is, simply, the compilation of an official report,
the constat, on factual situations, excluding opinion on matters of
• 212
fact or law. The constatation is produced by a huissier audiencier or
other investigative magistrate (stylized the constatant), who verifies
213technical questions. The judge may order a constatation at any
time during the proceedings and may order those findings to be
delivered in court, though this is typically reserved for simple
214
cases.
In essence, the constat supplants much of the discovery and pres-
entation of eye-witness testimony that occurs in the United States.2 5
For instance, in civil litigation, witnesses are often interrogated by
the huissier rather than the Judge Delegate (hereinafter, judge or
French judge) and a constat is prepared summarizing the state-
ments provided by the witness. Additionally, where the production
of documents or investigation of office conditions is required, for
example, huissiers may perform tasks necessary to both and draw
upon relevant documents and industry, legal, or contractual stan-
dards, drafting notes later used in the creation of the constat
212. Loretta Nelms-Reyes, Comment, Deal-Making on French Terms: How France's Legisla-
tive Crusade to Purge American Terminology from French Affects Business Transactions, 26 CAL. W.
INT'L LJ. 273, 308 n.232 (1996) (citing CHRISTIAN DADOMO & SUSAN FARRAN, THE FRENCH
LEGAL SYSTEM 125 (1993)); see also Taylor, supra note 32, at 197 n.148 ("Constations are de-
rived from a very old practice in French law, known as the constat d'audience. Certain
jurisdictions made a practice of designating the huissier or court clerk to make a finding of
fact for the benefit of the court. Being purely factual in nature, the exercise did not require
the clerk to make any opinions. This practice presented certain dangers, however, in that
the clerk could be tempted to present a de facto expertise without respecting the contradic-
tory atmosphere which has been acknowledged to be the basis for a fair trial in France. The
N.C.P.C. revived this old procedure, being careful to provide certain safeguards to protect
the philosophy of 'due process.' Provisions governing constatations are found in N.C.P.C.
arts. 249-55. These sections provide specific regulations for both the judge and for the ex-
pert technician." (citation omitted)).
As matters of law are considered to always be within the competence of the judge, they
may not be delegated. Examples of matters of law include the following: assessing the legal
ramifications of the litigants' claims, assessing the soundness of legal theories, assessing
parties' notarial acts, and assessing private agreements (those concluded without a notaire).
Id. at 202-03.
213. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 32, at 197-98 ("The Judge Delegate may require simple
fact verification, in which case she would turn to a specialist, the technicien constatant....
Opinion evidence is left to the more complex procedures of consultation and expertise."); see
also N.C.P.C. arts. 234, 249, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 46, 48.
214. N.C.P.C. arts. 238, 249 para. 1, 253, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra
note 156, at 47-49.
215. Although, the French judge retains considerable leeway to interrogate witnesses
sua sponte. See id. art. 231, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 45.
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summarizing relevant documents, witness statements, or other fac-
tual conditions.16
b. The Consultation
The consultation serves as a middle ground between the constata-
tion, which is only useful in relatively simple fact-finding matters,
and the expertise, which requires complex formalities: "When a
purely technical question does not require complex investigation,
the judge may instruct the person he/she shall appoint to provide
him/her with a simple opinion. 21 7
Neither fish nor fowl, the consultation is "one of the most re-
markable innovations in the N.C.P.C. '2 18 Like the constat, the order
may be made at any point; though with consultation, the order is
not subject to interlocutory appeal.21 ' Further, the mode of presen-
tation is the inverse of the constat, with the preference for in-court
oral opinion, though the judge may order a written report.22°
c. Expertise
Finally, the expertise is another task with which investigative mag-
istrates, third party fact-finders, and huissiers assist in the French
system. This most complex aspect of gathering evidence under the
b , 221
N.C.P.C. is also the one with the greatest breadth. Pursued as a
matter of last resort,22 an expertise requires one or more persons
(experts) to research and draft a discussion on a specific issue.222
There are three general forms of expertise expertise aimable
(friendly expertise), expertise officieuse (informal expertise), and ex-
pertise judiciaire (judicial expertise) .224 Expertise judiciaire may be
216. Cf. Browne et al., supra note 195, at 97 n.286.
217. N.C.P.C. art. 256, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 49.
218. Taylor, supra note 32, at 198.
219. Id. (citing N.C.P.C. arts. 257, 272).
220. Id. at 199 & n.160. Compare N.C.P.C. art. 257 para. 2, translated in FRENCH CODE IN
ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 50 (consultation), with id. art. 250 para. 2, translated in FRENCH
CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 48 (constatation).
221. Cf Taylor, supra note 32, at 199.
222. See N.C.P.C. art. 263, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 50
("An expert opinion shall only be ordered in cases where a finding of fact or independent
advice would not be sufficient to provide the judge with guidance."); see also id. art. 265,
translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 51 (requiring a showing of why an
expertise was necessary).
223. Taylor, supra note 32, at 199.
224. Id. at 199-201.
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further subdivided between expertise demand& t titre principale (ex-
pertise demanded for preservation of evidence) and expertise
demande ci titre incident (collateral expert investigation) .225
"[Eixpertise aimable only arises as a result of a contract between
the parties," and thus the experts in this situation are not officers of
226the court, but are agents of the parties. Accordingly, the huissiers
are governed by Code Civil provisions for mandataires (agents) .27
Experts appointed in an expertise aimable therefore lack audiencier
status. Further, the expertise officieuse is similar to Article 145
N.C.p.C. 25 in that it provides a potential litigant with an opportu-
nity to adduce relevant facts prior to filing a lawsuit.
229
Expertise judiciaire, however, is particularly relevant, as here offi-
cials appointed by the judge compile reports and therefore haveth e tatu of .230
the status of audiencier. In its two basic forms, it permits a poten-
tial litigant to bring an adversary before the court so that evidence
may be preserved for subsequent litigation (expertise demandee ii titre
principale) ,5 and it also allows the judge to acquire aid for the find-
ing of facts, relying on constats, consultations, and other forms of
expertise (expertise demande i titre incident) .32
The expertise demandie a titre incident serves a similar purpose to
expert testimony in the United States, namely the enlightenment of
the fact-finder in areas which are beyond their typical knowledge or
225. Id. at 200, 201.
226. Id. at 200.
227. Id.
228. N.C.P.C. art. 145, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 31.
229. Compare id., with Taylor, supra note 32, at 201.
230. Taylor, supra note 32, at 200 ("[Elxpertisejudiciaire is directed by the court at the re-
quest of one or more of the parties or by the court's own motion .... ). Taylor goes on to
state:
[T]he expert's report is filed with the court.... There are no specific statutory re-
quirements as to the style or form of the written report, although custom dictates that
it contain certain information. The preamble usually contains names and addresses
of all involved with the operation of the expertise and a copy of the court's directions
to the expert. Records of the various meetings of the parties, together with a record
of their attendance, is included, as well as copies of their requests and observations
throughout the course of the exercise. The second section of the report provides a
detailed account of the actual operations of the expertise. The third [and final] sec-
tion is a discussion of the results with answers to all questions presented during the
procedure. Reasons must be given if specific questions in the mandate were not an-
swered.
Id. at 207 (footnotes omitted).
231. It thus has similarities to pre-litigation depositions under Rule 27(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, which are rare, but permissible. FED. R. Civ. P. 27(a).
232. Taylor, supra note 32, at 201.
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competence."'5 In the American system, dual approaches are per-
mitted, with multiple experts often presented by both parties,
typically with contradictory conclusions.' The Civil Law, however,
eschews this method. In its place, the judge appoints a select group
of persons to compile a comprehensive and neutral report summa-
rizing the relevant facts and providing an opinion as to those facts,
though not the law.235 This is the most common form of expertise in
the French system.236
2. The Huissier's Report
Huissiers do not act in isolation. The parties can challenge and in-
form the huissieis report. During the compilation of any expert
report the parties have the right to "know the ends and chosen
means of the expert's mission,2 37 "be present during some of the
,,218 231expert's activities, "suggest alternative approaches" to the judge,3 9
233. Id. ("A titre incident indicates that the Judge Delegate uses expert instruction during
the litigation as an aid to him in his judicial duty to find facts."); see also id. at 202 ("Expertise
judiciaire [including its most common form, expertise demandie t titre incident,] is a method of
judicial education directed to enlightening the judge on points outside his realm of compe-
tence.").
234. Ted Dunkelberger & Stephen C. Curren, Debating Court-Appointed Experts, N.Y.L.J., Feb.
13, 2001, at S8 ("[It is natural that the plaintiff will choose an expert from one polar end of
the spectrum of scientific opinions, and the defense will choose an expert from the other.").
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides for expert witnesses. FED. R. EvID. 702
("If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to under-
stand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an
opinion or otherwise ...."). However, an extremely partisan approach remains in practice.
David E. Bernstein, Expert Witnesses, Adversarial Bias, and the (Partial) Failure of the Daubert
Revolution, 93 IOWA L. REv. 451, 489 (2008) ("Rule 702 attempts to solve the problem of
adversarial bias through a reliability test, but it leaves intact the general adversarial structure
that creates the underlying reliability problem."); see alsoJoseph Sanders, Expert Witness Eth-
ics, 76 FORDHAM L. REv. 1539 (2007) (describing how the American adversarial system and
its use of expert witnesses undermines the trial goal of assisting the factfinder's search for
the truth).
235. Cf Taylor, supra note 32, at 202-03.
236. Id. at 201 (noting that "[tihe most common form of expert testimony is expertise a
titre incident ('collateral expert investigations')").
An action, the object of which was to have the court nominate experts has been held
to be without legal foundation (irrecevable). By the same token, ajudge delegate may
not direct expert instruction when no controversy has been alleged. This has been
recognized in a preponderance of doctrine and case law on the subject.
Id. at 201 n.189.
237. Id. at 203.
238. Id.
239. N.C.P.C. art. 276 para. 1, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at
53; see also Taylor, supra note 32, at 204 ("After an expert has been appointed by the court
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and "dispute the ... findings before the judge."2 ° The contents of
the report are partly dictated by custom and partly by the circum-
stances of each case, and are typically composed of a preamble
with all relevant names and addresses, followed by records of meet-
ings and attendance. 24' A second section typically provides a
detailed account of the actual operations, and a third discusses the
results and conclusions of the appointed third party, with variations
• 242
in opinion attached and explained .
The final report, which is subject to amendment at the judge's
discretion, is confidential.242 Once finalized, however, it can still be
nullified on procedural or policy grounds established by statute: the
"report was prepared in violation of a statute, ... an error violate [s]
a substantive or procedural right of... [a] part[y], or... public pol-
icy was compromised" in the compilation of the report.2" Remedies
are, however, solely within the court's competence and can include
anything from purging of the tainted sections to a new expertise.4"
Judges are not bound by any expert's opinion since the ultimate
conclusions of law are solely within their competence.246 Further,
the Cour de Cassation has ruled that a judge need not indicate any
reason for rejecting an expert's opinion, though typically it is diffi-
cult for a judge to contradict an expert without contradictory
reports or a dissenting opinion within a single report, since conclu-
sions therein are typically beyond the competence of the Judge
Delegate.247
and assigned the mission, the parties may request a hearing to make comments about the
expert's mission. If the Judge Delegate agrees, the expert may make a statement about the
research, including a description of his chosen methods. The parties then have a right to
make verbal or written statements to the expert about the mission.... This right of 'com-
munication' also confers a right to be informed when an expert schedules events in the
investigation potentially worthy of observation by the parties. It should be recognized, how-
ever, that an expert is entitled to carry out purely technical activities in private." (citing
Judgment of Mar. 14, 1978, Cass. Civ. 3e, 1978J.C.P. IV 160 (Fr.))).
240. Judgment of Feb. 15, 1977, Cass. Civ. 3e, 1977J.C.P. IV 96.
241. Taylor, supra note 32, at 207-08.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 208.
244. Id. (footnotes omitted); accord N.C.P.C art. 114, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENG-
LISH, supra note 156, at 23. Examples of public policy being compromised include
"investigations by one expert instead of the three required," "investigation by an expert not
appointed by the court," investigations "by a legally incapacitated expert," and "failure of the
expert to sign the report." Taylor, supra note 32, at 208-09.
245. Taylor, supra note 32, at 209; cf N.C.P.C. art. 177, translated in FRENCH CODE IN
ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 36.
246. N.C.P.C. art. 246, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 48
("The judge shall not be bound by the observations of conclusions of the expert."); Taylor,
supra note 32, at 209.
247. Taylor, supra note 32, at 209-10.
SUMMER 2010] 1085
1086 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
3. Conclusion
Plainly, the powers vested in the French courts to appoint third
persons in the collection of evidence and drafting of expert opin-
ions exceed those of the common law judge. Huissiers enable the
court to obtain testimony and technical data, to gain opinions on
relevant items that are beyond the judge's competence, and to pre-
serve evidence; all but the last being available without motion by
the parties.
"The further question is whether the evidence obtained by these
means can be used in proceedings in another jurisdiction."24 This,
of course, turns on the law of that jurisdiction. In Civil Law juris-
dictions, free evaluation of the evidence will likely render the
report admissible and subject to some level of deference, particu-
larly in intra-European Union affairs. 49 Under the common law,
however, including England, drafters of reports in the French style
are likely to be subject to in-court direct examination and then in-
court cross-examination before admission of any of their find-
ings. 20 Thus, in the common law system, which lacks a substantially
equivalent profession,25' huissier reports are inevitably challenged as
hearsay, and exceptions are necessary for their use at trial. 5'
B. The Dayan and Socidti Civile Cases: Use of the Huissier
in Contemporary U.S. Civil Litigation
While the huissier is not a part of contemporary U.S. litigation,
and its relationship with the special master is attenuated by shifts in
legal theory, it is nonetheless clear that U.S. courts have and con-
tinue to recognize the huissieis reports and authentications of
documents where transnational elements or concurrent jurisdic-
tion so necessitate. In their capacity as sheriffs, as huissiers dejustice,
the huissiers are recognized through their ability to authenticate
documents, provide service of process, and enforce judgments and
debts where they have jurisdiction. It is, perhaps surprisingly, also
the case that in civil litigation the reports, or at least the testimony,
248. Kennett, supra note 201, at 351.
249. See id.
250. See id. at 352.
251. But see id. at 350 (discussing English court use of Anton Piller Orders, which "are
narrower in scope than the measures that can be ordered under French law, but they are
extensively and effectively used" (footnotes omitted)). Recently, English courts have moved
toward enforcement of Anton Piller orders through use of a neutral official, rather than a
solicitor. Id.
252. See id. at 352; see also infra Part 111.B.2.
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of French huissiers audienciers can be permitted in American trials
despite potential hearsay issues.252 While none of these practices
have been addressed by the United States Supreme Court, all rele-
vant American case law discussing the huissier has recognized this
profession as authoritative, with certain rights and privileges under
the domestic laws of other nations.254 Hence, U.S. courts may rec-
ognize or admit evidence of huissiers' acts where the authenticity of
reports and documents generated by a huissier may be tested pre-
liminarily by the court.255 While uniformly accepted, the huissiers
place in American case law remains sparse, doubtless due to its
only arising in the limited context of litigation involving a relatively
narrow set of legal or factual issues (e.g., discovery or other proce-
dure) and a particular class of foreign legal functionaries. Since
1815, twenty-six American cases have at least mentioned the huissier
in passing, whether in its French, Belgian, or Canadian context.
251
Of these, only four (three of which related to the case of Raymond
Dayan, discussed below) directly address the American courts' use
of official huissier reports. 257 The remaining twenty-two cases can
be divided into separate groups according to time frame and the
reason for mention of the huissier.
2 8
In the nineteenth century, the huissier was mentioned in cases re-
lating to the legal protest of bills of exchange between American
and French merchants and the authentication and legal registra-
tion of related documents259 for comparative purposes in the field
253. See cases cited infra note 269.
254. See cases cited infra note 269.
255. See cases cited infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
256. See cases cited infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
257. See cases cited infra note 269.
258. See cases cited infra notes 259-269 and accompanying text.
259. See, e.g., Caune v. Sagory, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 81, 86-87 (La. 1815) (finding that two
documents to the court purporting to be signed by a huissier and by two witnesses were ap-
propriate to signify the protest of a bill of exchange because authentication by huissier was
recognized by the French Code of Commerce); Tuttle v. Jackson, 6 Wend. 213, 221 n.a (N.Y.
1830) ("A protest of a bill of exchange by a huissier ... will not be received in evidence
without proof of the code." (citing Chanoine v. Fowler, 3 Wend. 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829)));
Chanoine, 3 Wend. at 178 (discussing the authenticity of a huissier-authenticated document
on similar facts to Caune, and remanding for insufficiency of proof of the French Code of
Commerce and of the protest of the bill).
It would be an innovation, perhaps a dangerous one, to give to the acts of any person
who might be authorized to protest foreign bills by a law or regulation of any particu-
lar country, the same faith and credit that is given those of a notary public, whose
functions ... are not created by the laws of any particular state, but by the custom of
merchants, which is in fact the commercial law of nations.
Id. at 179. Federal courts also permitted introduction of French law into evidence. See, e.g.,
Neederer v. Barber, 17 F. Cas. 1273 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1843) (No. 10,079) ("The court does not
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of enforcement of debt obligations.6 This suggests the ease with
which notice can be used to evade liability in a property dispute, 1
262in a discussion of the inability to sell a right to litigate, in discuss-
ing the perfection of a fraudulent indebtedness against the United
States government by a French estate263 and in determining the
right of foreigners to sue the United States government. 26 Between
1871 and 1976, not a single case mentioned the huissier, but during
the closing years of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first, over sixteen cases mentioned or discussed the huissier in
the following areas: French service of process,26 Canadian service of
266 267process, service of process under the Hague Convention, French
intend to intimate any opinion that the French law may not be received in evidence in
commercial questions, as the English is by the books supplying that proof in their own
courts. The question of the sufficiency of the protest does not become material in this case
260. See, e.g., Hawley v. Cramer, 4 Cow. 717, 736 (N.Y. Ct. Eq. 1825) (citing Hall v. Hal-
let, (1784) 1 Cox 134, 140 (Ch.) (Eng.)) (considering whether an attorney may become a
purchaser without consent of the client and finding huissiers may not; also finding that the
French code, so far as it relates to attorneys, has been sustained). Further, consider that in
modem French litigation, Article 145 of the Nouveau Code de Proc6dure Civile (refiriproba-
toire) is partly premised on the idea that by "having an official record of the state of the site
and adjoining buildings at the time the building commenced, it is hoped to avoid later liti-
gation." Kennett, supra note 201, at 350.
261. See, e.g., Pierce v. Musson, 17 La. 389 (1841) (citing a French treatise as authority
that notice by a huissier might relieve a party of liability for some inconveniences and costs
incurred when reconstructing common walls).
262. See, e.g., New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Webb, 7 La. Ann. 164, 168 (1852) (heavily
relying on French legal scholarship and law to find that the sale of a right to sue nullifies
that right).
263. See, e.g., H.R. REP. CT. CL. No. 157 (1858); S. Misc. Doc. No. 190 (1858). Both of
these congressional documents contain a report from the Court of Claims on the case of
Bigelow v. United States, 1858 WL 4630 (Ct. Cl. 1858), regarding the administration of Francis
Cazeau, a Canadian and French agent of the American Revolutionary forces, and the au-
thentication of a transfer of indebtedness by a huissier.
264. See, e.g., De Give v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 517, 518-21 (1871) (mentioning that
the Belgian huissierserves process and may enforce judgments).
265. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (process served
by French "Hussier [sic] de justice"); Vinten v. Jeantot Marine Alliances, SA., 191 F. Supp.
2d 642, 644 (D.S.C. 2002) (same); Alfadda v. Fenn, Nos. 89 Civ. 6217 (LMM), 90 Civ. 4470
(LMM), 1993 WL 526065, at *2 & n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 1993) (same); Sec. Exch. Comm'n
v. Kimmes, No. 89 C 5942, 1992 WL 122818, at *2 (N.D. Ill. May 18, 1992) (same); Per-
fumer's Workshop, Ltd. v. Roure Bertrand du Pont, Inc., 737 F. Supp. 785, 789 (S.D.N.Y.
1990) (service by huissierwould be proper).
266. See, e.g., United States v. Islip, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 852, 861 (1998) (quoting a Cana-
dian declaration that mentions huissiers); Goodstein v. Bombardier Capital Inc., 167 F.R.D.
662, 665-66 (D. Vt. 1996) (describing personal service by huissierin Quebec); O'Keefe v. St.
Lawrence & Ad. R.R. Co., 167 F.R.D. 30, 32 (D. Vt. 1996) (same);
267. See, e.g., Dimensional Commc'ns, Inc. v. Oz Optics Ltd., 218 F. Supp. 2d 653, 659
(D.N.J. 2002) (service by huissier under the Hague Convention); Suzuki Motor Co. v. Supe-
rior Court (Armenta), 249 Cal. Rptr. 376, 389-90 (Ct. App. 1988) (same).
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depositions,2 68 and the uses of huissier audiencier reports and testi-
mony in evidence.269
With such breadth of potential application, the huissier could be
a figure of some, albeit minor, significance in American courts.
While many of these cases mention the huissier solely in passing,
and only occasionally discuss huissiers acting in an official, court
appointed capacity as the huissier audiencier, it is nevertheless sym-
bolic of the historical and contemporary similarities between the
adversarial and inquisitorial traditions even though the notion of
the huissier, taking evidence without confrontation, is antithetical
to American legal values. Furthermore, more insight can be gained
into this new approach to litigation, with concurrent jurisdiction,
by increasing the admissibility of huissier audiencier reports in
American courts, as well as showing how the role of the special
master can be enhanced.
1. Introduction to Using Huissiers'Reports in U.S. Courts
The huissier audiencids report is an official document, created by
the huissier on the basis of notes taken during initial investigations,
in field visits, or through interrogatories.27 ° In France, emphasis
falls primarily on the finished report, an official court document
that must be preserved by the huissier for a number of years; the
notes and other materials used in its creation are of little or no in-
terest to the French judge.271
During the collection of data and creation of the report, par-
ties are allowed to submit interrogatories through the huissier,
and to challenge and attempt to direct the huissiers scope and
method.72 Further, after the report is submitted, an opportunity
to challenge its findings is provided, though this opportunity is
not commensurate with the American notion of live testimony
268. See, e.g., Denman v. Terrien, No. B148080, 2002 WL 1824941, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 8, 2002) (describing presence of a "Huissier de justice" at a deposition).
269. See, e.g., Societ6 Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Redstar Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d
224, 228-29 (Ct. App. 2007); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan 1), 466 N.E.2d 958, 968-71
(Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (discussing use of huissier audiencier reports); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.,
466 N.E.2d 945, 955-56 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (apportioning costs and fees and discussing a
separate, private huissier employed by McDonald's); Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 382 N.E.2d
55, 57 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (granting preliminary injunction).
270. See Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 970; see also supra Part III.A.
271. See Dayan 1, 466 N.E.2d at 970 n.3.
272. Id.
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and cross-examination.""2 It would seem, then, that the report is
classic hearsay under the federal rules. 74
Thus, in order to use advantageous huissiers reports, or at least
their findings, in an American court, some type of concurrent ju-
risdiction must be present.27 Once the report is available, however,
the work of the advocate is not complete. An adequate hearsay ex-
ception must be found under which the report can be submitted
into evidence, and the reliability of those reports demonstrated.76
Thus, the persuasion of the court, the ability to subpoena the huis-
siers, and the availability of likely discarded original notes may be
determinative where a hearsay objection is raised. 77
2. The Dayan Case: An Opportunity for the
Transnational Litigator?
McDonald's Corporation is the quintessential example of the
modem global franchise company, if not its progenitor. McDon-
ald's forays into numerous, often culturally dissimilar markets, have
made it a favorite of corporate scholars and school-aged children,
273. See N.C.P.C. art. 242, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 47
(stating that the technician can collect oral or written information of all persons and further
noting that the parties may request that they be heard by the judge, who carries out a hear-
ing if the judge sees fit); Taylor, supra note 32, at 206 & n.237. Of course, French litigation is
premised on the notion of due process rights through contradictoire (contradiction),
whereby parties may challenge one another's assessment of the findings, but this is not fully
analogous, nor as rigorous in application, as American cross-examination. See generally id. at
206 nn.237-41 (citing sources).
274. SeeFED. R. EVID. 801(c).
275. See, e.g., Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 945, 951-52 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)
(dismissing as manifestly false the content of huissier report); infra note 291 and accompany-
ing text.
276. See FED. R. EviD. 803(8) (stating an exception to the hearsay rule for "[r]ecords,
reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of public offices or agencies, setting
forth ... in civil actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases,
factual findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law,
unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness").
This rule is underutilized. Fred Warren Bennett, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(8): The Use of
Public Records in Civil and Criminal Cases, 21 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 229, 267 (1997).
277. See also Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988) (noting that pub-
lic investigatory reports containing factual findings, opinions, and conclusions are
admissible under the public records exception to the hearsay rule under Rule 803(8) (C)).
Indeed, reports that are ministerial in nature and prepared under nonadversarial circum-
stances are not inadmissible hearsay; only adversarial, evaluative reports, such as crime scene
reports are proscribed because of the risk of fabrication. United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d
789, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1979) (finding that customs records of border crossings were admissi-
ble as nonadversarial and ministerial under Rule 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence);
United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598, 604 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that reports about fire-
arms' serial numbers were admissible records of routine factual matters prepared in
nonadversarial circumstances).
The French Huissier
while also drawing the ire of its discontents. However, McDonald's
was not always a ubiquitous symbol cutting across global boundaries
with hamburgers, and its operations were just beginning in the
France of the early 1970s, long before it became a totem of anti-
American sentiment there. These early international franchise
operations ultimately led to the first American cases that examined
and admitted the findings of huissier audienciers into evidence. In this
sense, Dayan v. McDonald's Corp.17 represents an amalgamation of
the procedural histories of the United States and France.
Raymond Dayan was an early franchisor of McDonald's in
Paris, 79 and had selected a method of apportioning earnings and
services between McDonald's Corporation and himself whereby
Dayan paid 1% of earnings to McDonald's for the name and brand
rights, but McDonald's would only provide limited services to
Dayan in terms of finding and concluding leases with suppliers and
land holders, construction of restaurants, and assistance in main-
taining quality, service, and cleanliness ("QSC")2 8° in accordance
with the master licensing agreement.281' Dayan had previously been
warned that this particular arrangement was disfavored by man-
agement and difficult to manage, as it later proved to be for
Dayan. 82 Dayan's treatment by McDonald's was ultimately charac-
terized as "a unique and stylized franchise""3 that differed from the
method typically encountered in a McDonald's franchise arrange-
ment where, for a 3% fee, McDonalds provided extensive services
aimed at guaranteeing compliance with the QSC and other provi-
sions of the licensing agreement.
284
It was these QSC provisions that Dayan was ultimately unable to
meet, despite a concerted effort by McDonald's to critique Dayan
and allow opportunity for conforming performance and treatment
beyond that required by the 1% fee arrangement scheme.285 As the
filth and disorderliness of Dayan's restaurants became apparent,
28 6
278. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan 1), 466 N.E.2d 958 (Il. App. Ct. 1984).
279. McDonald's in a License Fight in Paris, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1981, at D3 (discussing
how McDonald's sought to protect the integrity of its brand by ejecting Dayan despite the
current costs of doing so).
280. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 963-64; see also Dayan v. McDonald's, Corp., 485 N.E.2d
1188, 1189-90 (Il. App. Ct. 1985).
281. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 962-65.
282. Id. at 963.
283. Id. at 964 (internal quotation marks omitted).
284. Id. at 962-63.
285. Id. at 964-65.
286. Id. at 965.
In particular, [McDonald's witnesses] testimony revealed that Dayan was not using
approved products, he refused to delay the opening of his first restaurant even
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McDonald's patience wore through, and it moved to terminate the
licensing agreement, provoking extended litigation with concur-rentFr ch . ... 288
rent French and American jurisdiction.
As the restaurants under Dayan's control were located in Paris,
the litigation began there with a motion for the appointment of
huissiers to investigate Dayan's compliance with the licensing
agreement for possible use in potential court proceedings. 9
"Based on findings by the Huissiers on April 14, 1978, McDonald's
gave notice to Dayan of default .... ,290 In his responsive pleadings,
Dayan then retained a private, and plainly biased, huissier to con-
tradict the findings of the court appointed huissier audienciers.
In France, Dayan was unlikely to succeed in having a huissier
audiencier's report declared inadmissible by a court.22 Hence, he
invoked the jurisdiction of the Chicago Chancery Court, before the
same judge who had previously upheld the validity of Dayan and
McDonald's Chief Executive Officer Ray Kroc's franchise agree-
ment,2 9' which had been made over drinks one evening on a
though McDonald's personnel had declared it unfinished and unsuitable for open-
ing, he used no pickles, he charged extra for catsup or mustard, he hid straws and
napkins under the counter, he responded to complaints from McDonald's personnel
with "If they don't like it, they can buy me out"....
Id.
287. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan I1), 382 N.E.2d 55, 57-58 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).
288. See Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 961.
289. See Dayan II, 382 N.E.2d at 57; cf. N.C.P.C. art. 145, translated in FRENCH CODE IN
ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 31.
290. Dayan II, 382 N.E.2d at 57. Dayan's motion to quash the order appointing the huis-
siers was denied. Id. A further report by another huissier audiencier was provided in September
1978. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 968. The inspections lasted between 10 and 12 hours, during
which detailed notes were taken concerning cleanliness, cooking procedure, service proce-
dure, finished products, specific equipment, temperatures, cooking times, product holding
times, customer service, and like personal observations alongside photographs. Id. at 969.
291. See Dayan v. McDonald's Corp, 466 N.E.2d 945,951-52 (Il1. App. Ct. 1984).
Additional evidence that plaintiff knew his pleadings were false is revealed by his re-
sort to testimony that was clearly perjured.... Dayan presented photographs and
testimony from ... a privately retained huissier .... The trial court found that ...
"[t]he one fact that [the privately retained huissier] did testify to with unwavering cer-
tainty (i.e. [sic] the time and circumstances of certain photographs) was later
exposed as a complete and total fabrication-that fact was presented here by this
French court official with knowledge that it was false. [The private huissier] discred-
ited himself and disgraced his office"....
Id. at 951.
292. That would perhaps necessitate the submission of the contradictory report to try to
show that McDonald's lacked good cause to terminate Dayan's license.
293. Telephone Interview with Richard G. Schultz, Attorney for Respondent McDonald's
Corp., Principal, Schwartz Cooper Chartered (Feb. 28, 2008) [hereinafter Schultz Interview].
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napkin, and later questioned by McDonald's board.294 In the
United States, as one theory arguing for retrial, Dayan objected to
the admission of the huissier audiencier reports into evidence under
the hearsay doctrine.295
Arguing "that the testimony and reports of the court-appointed
huissiers were biased and insufficiently credible and should have
been rejected by the trial court,",29 6 Dayan first objected on the
grounds that the huissiers were not credible witnesses and hence
the trial judge should have rejected their testimony," and second,
that the reports were hearsay and erroneously admitted into evi-
dence as past recollection recorded.298
The court quickly dismissed the objection to the credibility of
the huissiers as witnesses by deferring to the trial court's findings:
The franchisee must have believed that the American judge would be more likely to rule in
his favor than would a French judge. Id.
294. Id. (commenting that when confronted with a huissier in American litigation, the
court should treat that person as any other testifying or deposed witness); see alsoJames R.
Figliulo, Breaking the Language Barrier, LITIGATION, Winter 1984, at 32.
The tale of the napkin and the Dayan-Kroc contract may be apocryphal, although men-
tioned by counsel for the franchisor on both sides of the Atlantic. See Interview with Claire
Ayer, Partner, Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, in Paris, France (June 18, 2008); Schultz Interview,
supra note 293.
295. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 968 ("Dayan attacks the credibility, competence and admis-
sibility of the testimony and reports of these French court officials."). In identifying the
huissier, the Court stated:
The record reveals that five huissiers de audiencier, Delatre, Lachkar, Adam, Petit, and
Linee, were specifically appointed and ordered by the Paris court to conduct inspec-
tions of Dayan's restaurants in April and September of 1978. Under the French legal
system, the court determines facts from reports submitted by huissiers and not from
oral testimony. All five of these French court officials held the special title of "Huissier
dejustice Audiencier" which indicates that they work for the court system and receive
their assignments directly from the court. Huissiers that are not "audiencie9' receive
their assignments from and work at the request of a private party.
The record further reveals that the mission of any huissier is to relate to the court
the facts in dispute with objectivity and with the highest regard for the truth by mak-
ing the observations directed and preparing an official report. However, a huissieis
report prepared at the instance of a private party is limited by the specific requests
and instructions of the retaining individual. In contrast, a court-appointed huissier de
audiencier receives his instructions from the judge .... [T]he huissiers de audienciertes-
tified at trial that they enjoy the "utmost confidence" of the court....
Id. at 968-69.
296. Id. at 969.
297. Id. at 968-70. In effect, Dayan objected to the reports' admission "into evidence,"
whether as a matter of fact to be determined by the trier of fact or as an outside statement of
French law, or both, Id. However, the reports were admitted, and the appeals court upheld
the trial court's use of the reports. Id. at 970; see also infra note 299 and accompanying text.
298. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 970 ("(E] ach court-appointed huissier testified at length from
their present recollection or from their present recollection as refreshed by their reports
and photographs .. .
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[T] he trial court made specific findings that the five huissiers
were objective, impartial, honest, and worthy of high credibil-
ity .... The huissiers were not privately retained by
McDonald's but were appointed by the French court to obtain
information the court had requested. The fact that McDon-
ald's had petitioned the French court resulted in McDonald's
having to bear the cost of the huissier inspections and reports
by paying a fee to each huissier for his work .... [T] his ar-
rangement does not render the huissiers' testimony or reports
incapable of belief.29
The Court then shifted its focus to Dayan's hearsay objection.00
Dayan contended that the reports did not fit the relevant hearsay
exception used by the trial court-past recollection recorded-
which requires that the witness have firsthand knowledge of a re-
corded event, a written statement must be made at or near the
time of the event, the witness lacks any present recollection of the
event, and the witness vouches for the accuracy of the memoran-
dum. 1 Huissier reports are, of course, not made concurrently with
the inspection or interrogatory, but are instead made a brief time
later based upon original notes. °2 Dayan argued this was insuffi-
cient to meet the second element for past recollection recorded,
namely that the statement be original and made at or near the
time of the event.
The Trial Court did not admit the huissiers' reports in full.30 4 In-
stead, a bifurcated approach was taken to determine the
admissibility of the findings. First, and crucially, the huissiers had
appeared as witnesses in the American trial.00 Secondly, those por-
tions of the report admitted under the past recollections recorded
hearsay exception were limited to the numerical findings and
quantitative data copied directly from field notes into the re-
ports.
30 6
Admissibility under the past recollection recorded doctrine is
premised on:
299. Id. at 969.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 970 (citing Johnson v. City of Chi., 431 N.E.2d 1105, 1106 (111. App. Ct.
1981)).
302. Id. at 971.
303. Id. at 970.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 971.
306. Id. at 969-71.
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sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and re-
liability because the recorded recollection was prepared at or
near the time of the event while the witness had a clear and
accurate memory of it. Under these circumstances, the reli-
ability of the evidence is perceived to outweigh the inherent
testimonial infirmities of hearsay occasioned by the inability
107
of the opposing party to effectively cross-examine.
The best-evidence rule establishes a preference for original
documents, as they tend to be freer of the inaccuracies that may
occur in the process of transcription.3 08 However, copies of the
original document may be used-as, in this case, the huissier re-
ports in place of the original field notes-where the original is
unavailable.3 0 9 The Court further conditioned its finding on the
fact that the notes had not been destroyed in bad faith, but rather
as a matter of custom, and that they alone served as the best evi-
dence of service times, temperatures, and other numerical data. 1 °
It is unclear what value the Dayan Court may have accorded to
the huissier reports without live in-court huissier testimony (or at
least depositions thereof) .31 Thus, while huissier reports might be
used by an American litigant, the extent to which these reports
may be allowed is uncertain in a case where corroborating evi-
dence and other indicia of reliability is less readily available than in
Dayan.1 2 For instance, if a huissier is unavailable to testify, it seems
unlikely that his/her findings could be admitted into evidence, as
the appropriate testing for reliability could not be performed by
the court.
313
307. Id. at 970 (citation omitted). For a discussion of confrontation and hearsay, see
Ralph Ruebner & Timothy Scahill, Crawford v. Washington, the Conftontation Clause, and
Hearsay: A New Paradigm for Illinois Evidence Law, 36 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 703, 777 & n.577
(2005).
308. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 970-71; see also McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE §§ 229-30 (John
W. Strong et al. eds., 5th ed. 1999).
309. Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 970-71 (citing McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 301 (Edward W.
Cleary et al. eds., 2d ed. 1977)).
310. Id. at971.
311. Id.
312. Id.
313. But see FED. R. EVID. 803-04 (describing exceptions to the general rule against
hearsay).
In Dayan, the huissiers had been deposed through evidence depositions in France where
both parties were represented by counsel, ensuring against the outright loss of the findings
had any huissier not been able to attend the American trial. Schultz Interview, supra note
293. This might, in other words, be classified as "legal tourism":
[A] n American lawyer who installs himself in a deluxe hotel room for as little as one
day or as long as six weeks, with a degree of circumspection which demonstrates great
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3. Socit Civile. Extending the Dayan Theory
Plainly, the circumstances that give rise to a huissiees report be-
ing used in an American trial are rare. Yet, Dayan's case, while for
many years the only such use of a huissiers report as evidence in a
U.S. trial, recently demonstrated its continuing relevance and use-
fulness in easing the resolution of disputes with transnational
elements in a predictable and coherent fashion; this new case was a
foreign judgment enforcement proceeding under the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act ("Money-Judgments
Act") .314
The enforcement proceeding in Sociit Civile Succession Richard
Guino v. Redstar Corp. was in itself unremarkable." 5 While it followed
the lead of Dayan by admitting the findings of a French huissier,'1
6
deference to the principle of professional confidentiality. Once installed, legal tour-
ists use their best efforts to obtain, primarily by means of depositions, the testimony
of witnesses and the documents with which they hope successfully to represent the in-
terests of their clients in a United States court. Citizens of France, the United States
and third countries are invited unceremoniously to testify in what might irreverently
be described as a three-star chamber.
Jacques Borel & Stephen M. Boyd, Opportunities for and Obstacles to Obtaining Evidence in
France for Use in Litigation in the United States, 13 INT'L LAW. 35, 35 (1979).
It should be noted that "[t]he power to compel a witness to appear for a deposition taken
for pre-trial discovery ... does not exist in France" as a result of general limitations on dis-
covery rights. Figliulo, supra note 294, at 33; see also Steven J. Stein, Depositions in Foreign
Jurisdictions: "Innocence Abroad," LITIGATION, Spring 1981, at 14 (providing an overview of
procedures for compelling the attendance of witnesses at evidence depositions in foreign
nations and describing the difficulties of translation in the Dayan case and the importance
of a reputable translator), cited in Figliulo, supra note 294, at 33.
314. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act is adopted in several
states as the U.S. Constitution does not provide for the enforcement of foreign judgments.
Montr6 D. Carodine, Political Judging: Ven Due Process Goes Internationa4 48 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1159, 1165-66 (2007). The Act's due process provision is nearly identical to that of the
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. Id.; see also Mark D. Rosen, Should "Un-American"
Foreign Judgments Be Enforced?, 88 MINN. L. REv. 783, 792 (2004) (discussing the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws' instructions for enforcing valid foreign judgments). Compare
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(1) (a), 13 U.L.A. 58-59 (2002),
with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 482(1)(a) (1987).
315. 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224 (Ct. App. 2007). This case had been the product of ongoing
litigation in France over certain counterfeit castings of statues, the intellectual property
rights of which laid with Richard Guino, a twentieth century artist and assistant to Pierre
Auguste Renoir. Petition for Entry of a California Court Judgment Under the Uniform For-
eign-Judgment Recognition Act, Soci~t6 Civile Succession Richard Guino v. Red Star Corp.,
No. BS059900 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 4, 1999). The statues were entitled: "Head of Little Ve-
nus," "Medium Washwoman," "Head of 'Venus Vetrix,'" "Bust of Mrs. Renoir," "Large
Maternity," "Bust of Paris," "Little Standing Venus and Base of the Judgment of Paris," and
"The Blacksmith." Id. at 2.
316. Sociigt Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229 ("Plaintiffs submitted uncontradicted material
from an official in the French Ministry of Justice and from a French 'huissier de justice'
The French Huissier
the Socit Civile court's reasoning can be understood to reflect a
longstanding tradition of respect, even in common law America, for
the huissier and for huissier reports.
In Socigti Civile, the defendants had forged sculptures, and the
plaintiffs sought money damages, which were awarded by the
French court in distinct allocations.1 7 One allocation was provided
as a reserve (titre de provision), which the defendants argued was not
"final and conclusive and enforceable" since the French judgment
contained the terms "temporary payment" and "temporary
amount" in its disposition regarding this allocation but not the
other, and much smaller, amount.3 The trial court had concluded
that the "[p] laintiff has failed to establish that any portion of the
0,19French Judgment is for a fixed sum.
In concluding that the judgment was in fact final and enforce-
able, the appellate court examined various possible interpretations
of the French judgment, including the conclusions of a French hu-
issier on the finality and enforceability of the French judgment
under French law.320 The key findings related to whether the provi-
sion of the French Code, under which the judgment was made,
indicated a specified sum of money.3"
In relevant part, the huissier de justice's uncontradicted report,
submitted by the Plaintiffs, indicated that "the order in the French
judgment for 'provisional execution' allows a prevailing party 'to
immediately seek the execution of a court decision, despite the
staying effect of the ordinary review process constituted by the ap-
peal.' ,,302 In any event, the French appeal had been dismissed as
untimely in the case, rendering the judgment conclusive: "The
proof of its ... enforceable nature appears on the [udgment]
itself where the latter is not subject to a review capable of staying its
execution.
23
(one who has certain judicial and legal functions) ... " (citing Dayan I, 466 N.E.2d at 968-
69; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 757 (8th ed. 2004))).
317. Id. at 226.
318. Id. at 226, 229 (internal quotation marks omitted).
319. Id. at 227 (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id. at 229.
321. Id. at 228 nn.7-9.
322. Id. at 229 n.10; see also Xavier Vahramian & Eric Wallenbrock, France, in INTERNA-
TIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 233 (2003).
As for the uncontradicted nature of the report, see Brief for Appellant at 22, Socit Civile,
63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224 (No. B192862) [hereinafter Socifi Cizie Appellant Brief] (citing Brewer
v. Reliable Auto. Co., 49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966) (finding that failure to provide counter-
affidavits is tantamount to an admission of truth)).
323. Socieii Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 228 n.8 (quoting an internet translation of Article
504 of the Nouveau Code de Procedure Civile) (alteration in original) (internal quotation
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Essentially, the court read the huissiers report as being authorita-
tive, with the report effectively concluding that the French
judgment was final and enforceable, even had an appeal been
available." 4 The French judge had decided that the judgment was
final, conclusive, and enforceable, and hence, the California Court
of Appeals determined it was enforceable-mainly relying on the
huissier's finding-under the Money-Judgments Act;315 he reached
this determination despite a French legal classification that, when
literally translated, indicated an unconcludedjudgment2 6 because,
327in operation, the judgment was enforceable in France.
The Court in Socigti Civile was confronted with a situation differ-
ent from that in Caune v. Sagor 8 or Chanoine v. Fowler,325 where the
issue primarily related to the authenticity-the conclusiveness-of
documents originally produced by a huissier for French procedural
purposes but now presented in an American court.30 Still, in
choosing to recognize a huissieis findings, the Socijtj Civile Court
continued long-standing precedent beginning with Caune and E &
• 1 331
H. Chanoine that huissier documents are authentic and reliable.
Yet, the Sociiti Civile court breaks with tradition by taking the fac-
tual situation beyond mere authentication. Indeed, the court
apparently could take the opinions of the huissier33 2 and a similar
marks omitted); accord N.C.P.C. art. 504, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note
156, at 96.
324. Sociiti Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229.
325. Id. at 231.
326. Id. at 225 n.3 ("Different translators, equally competent, will use different lan-
guage, and give a different gloss, or shade to the meaning in transferring the idea intended
to be conveyed from one language to another... ." (quoting Mulford v. LeFranc, 26 Cal. 88,
100 (1864)).
327. Id. at 229 ("By virtue of the express language of the judgment, under French law
discussed above, plaintiffs could immediately enforce that measure providing for such ad-
vance payment. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that the 3-million-franc award was
not a judgment 'granting ... recovery of a sum of money' under the [Money-Judgments]
Act." (omission in original) (quoting CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1713.1(2))); see also N.C.P.C.
art. 515, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, at 99 ("In addition to cases
where provisional enforcement is obtainable as of right, it may be ordered at the request of
the parties, or of his/her own initiative whenever the judge shall deem it proper and appro-
priate to the subject matter, provided that it is not prohibited by law. It may be ordered for
all or part of thejudgment.").
328. 4 Mart. (o.s.) 81 (La. 1815).
329. 3 Wend. 173 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
330 The timing was different. In Soci&t Civile, huissierYann Jezequel's statement was pre-
pared for the U.S. litigation, after the French judgment had been rendered, per the request of
plaintiff Soci&6 Civile's attorney, Richard W. Morris. E-mail from Richard W. Morris, Attor-
ney, Morris Law Firm, to Dwayne A. Robinson, Research Assistant to Professor Robert W.
Emerson, University of Florida (Oct. 8, 2009, 10:26:02 EST) [hereinafter Morris E-mail] (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
331. See Sociti Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229-30.
332. Id. at 229.
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opinion issued by the French Ministry of Justice,"' as being advan-
tageous for any further liability disputes or enforcement actions!s"
The choice of the California court to follow that understanding is
tantamount to attribution of the findings of the huissier to the
Judge Delegate. Thus, the Court takes the huissier's findings, as
commissioned by the plaintiff's American lawyer, and gives it equal
weight to that of a French judge's holding itself in determining
whether the French judgment would be conclusive and enforce-
able.
Sociit Civile extends the Dayan theory beyond its original scope,
which was simply to allow the huissiers' testimony into evidence in
an American trial where it could be challenged by the opposing
party on the facts; the limited context of the huissiers' testimony was
not meant to extend to the very meaning of the decisional lan-
guage by a French judge Delegate, as it was in Sociiti Civile 7
While it is true that the findings were similarly subject to contro-
version by being placed into evidence,338 the Sociiti Civile court in
effect gives the findings even greater direct credence, dispensing
with any hearsay analysis, for instance.339 The California court also
implicitly conceded the utility of the huissier's office and functions
by using his report while failing to undertake any extensive discus-
sion of that report's role, or lack thereof, in an adversarial system.340
333. Id.
334. Id. As mentioned previously, the huissier's report in Societi Civile was commissioned
after the French court's judgment. Morris E-mail, supra note 330.
335. Socidtg Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 230. One could argue that the huissie's report
should be treated as nothing more than the opinions of a layperson since his proposition
that in the Civil Law a judgment was enforceable immediately regardless of appeal was not
conclusively authoritative as it lacked precedential value. However, not only is this proposi-
tion independently verifiable but, along with further recommendation from the French
Ministry of Justice, it underlies the Judge Delegate's final judgment. Sociit Civile Appellant
Brief, supra note 322, at 21-23.
336. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp. (Dayan 1), 466 N.E.2d 958, 971 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
337. Sociti Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229.
338. Id. at 226-29.
339. As the hearsay issue apparently was not raised (even were it raised, the court never
considered it), one could contend that the effect, by not even dealing with it in the U.S.
court, was to put great stock in the huissier's report.
340. In the appellate opinion, there was simply a very short discussion of the huissie's
role. See Socigti Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229. The trial order is just one page, and does not
mention huissiers. However, it may be argued that the court's adoption of the huissiers re-
port represents something other than the court's implicit recognition of the report's
authoritativeness. For one, it can be said that the report is merely an analysis of French law.
However, neither the respondent, whom the report detriments, nor the court treats it as
such. In its brief, the respondent considers the huissie~s report to be an "affidavit" and "evi-
dence." Respondents' Brief at 21, Soditi Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224 (No. B192862), 2007 WL
1406372. Moreover, the Court refers to the report as "uncontradicted material," which,
arguably, is synonymous with uncontroverted evidence. Sociiti Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 229.
In the alternative, another interpretation of the court's wholesale adoption of the huissieis
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The court thus turned to a report without considering the overall
evidentiary ramifications: how a third party's evidence-gathering
challenges the role of the jury and repudiates the confrontational
aspect of a trial."'
4. Conclusion
In the utilization of huissiers' reports in American litigation, one
can see how dossiers gathered by third parties are compatible with
the American adversarial system. The evisceration of the special
master in 1938 was largely premised on its incompatibility with the
jury, particularly as it appeared to supplant the role of the jury.
However, particularly in corporate litigation, use of the jury has
diminished, which demonstrates not only the "visceral negativity"
with which juries are viewed in other nations, but also comes as a
result of their reputation for unfavorable rulings against "deep
pocket" defendants, and the concentrated "all-issues" trial (not a
seriatim trial, featuring a number of hearings on parts of the case
rather than one grand trial for which discovery occurs). The "all
342issues" trial necessarily results in extensive pre-trial discovery.
This Article has shown how French huissier reports can be admit-
ted in U.S. trials on transnational issues; such usage strongly
suggests that huissier-like procedural tools can be of substantial
report could be that the appeals court accepted the report as a true statement of fact be-
cause of its uncontested nature. The respondent failed to timely object to its introduction.
Reply Brief for Appellant at App. I, Socitd Civile, 63 Cal. Rptr. 3d 224 (No. B192862), 2007
WL 1539179. Thus, it may be argued that the appeals court merely accepted it as fact, a
procedural custom in the American adversarial system. See id. at 4. A rebuttal is (1) that the
respondent challenges, in its brief, whether it conceded any points and (2) that another
aspect of American system is to construe all facts in the light favorable to the non-moving
party, which here is the respondent. As such, the California court, if this second alternative
theory is to hold true, should have given little to no consideration of the huissieis report.
341. See Kessler, supra note 14, at 1240.
342. SeeJay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 513, 545, 549
n.156, 581 & nn.281-82 (2006). While the jury is certainly ingrained in the American legal
mind as an essential, if not mandated, item at many trials,
negative perceptions about the jury's unpredictability linger among foreigners, do-
mestic business interests, and portions of the public. In terms of people's willingness
to accept adjudicatory outcomes, perceptions matter.... Of course, the abolition of
juries does not end the American system's commitment to decentralization; other,
more significant manifestations remain .. , [especially] private forms of ADR that
place decision-making... into the hands of the disputants themselves.
Id. at 582-83.
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value in a common law system. As this Article turns to a reexami-
nation of the special master's role after the 2003 amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as to the effect of legal
globalization on reforming American legal practices, Dayan and
Socigti Civile are prescient examples of how American courts have
already implemented inquisitorial procedural methods without
compromising the integrity of the American civil trial system.
IV. THE HUISSIER AS A MODEL: REFORMING U.S. DISCOVERY
THROUGH ADAPTATION
So why does the huissier, this apparent vestige of pre-
Revolutionary ideology, have any potential application in an
American system that has sought to answer to the legal principles
of the Enlightenment philosophers?3 " American law has come
under serious criticism for its costs in the last decade. Notable
examples of these allegedly extreme legal expenses include, in
general, greater risk of criminal liability and, in particular, the
challenges faced by equity holders in enforcing derivative actions
as well as meeting the numerous regulatory mandates emanating
from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.3" In an increasingly de-harmonized
federal system,"' corporations and corporate equity holders have
come to shy away from the United States and its legal regimes, 7
and the consequences in productivity and competitiveness will be
far-reaching without change.
Underlying American regulations and the legal regime is a com-
plex and highly detailed system in which costs easily come to
exceed the benefits of participation, and, with the developments of
343. Admission into evidence of French huissier reports would, of course, have to meet
the standard admissibility threshold: indicia of reliability, and an opportunity for the oppos-
ing party to submit contradictory evidence.
344. See, e.g., Charles K Rowley, An Intellectual History of Law and Economics: 1739-2003,
in THE ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS: ESSAYS BY THE FOUNDING FATHERS 3 (Francesco
Parisi & Charles K. Rowley eds., 2005) [hereinafter ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS]
(showing how Revolutionary thinkers envisaged a legal framework favoring deregulated
markets).
345. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
346. See, e.g., A. Benjamin Spencer, Anti-Federalist Procedure, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 233,
277 & n.222 (2007) ("The Supreme Court also has embraced states' rights, articulating in a
string of cases over the past decade or so a robust view of constitutional federalism." (citing
Stephen G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC. 24, 25 (2001))).
347. A.C. Pritchard, London as Delaware? 20-21 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. John M. Olin
Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 09-008, 2009), available at
http://law.bepress.com/umichlwps/olin/art00 (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
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recent years, potential litigants and investors have come to regard
the idiosyncrasies, expense, and attention to arcane detail of the
U.S. system as undesirable. Thus, the American litigation process
not only inhibits the efficient implementation of regulatory re-
gimes, but it also sours international investors on the U.S.
markets. 348 London's The Times ran one tagline in 2008 which
stated: "US legal system 'worse than Russia' [:] A survey shows that
European in-house lawyers would rather face litigation in China
and Russia than in America.",3 9 America's legal reputation surely is
in tatters when 29 percent of European businesses identify the
United States as the worst nation in which to face a major dis-
pute.35
And it is not corruption, nor a lack of funding (both pervade
Russia and China) ,1 that is to blame. By all means, America exhib-
its the key indicia of the ethical rule of law, and its lawyers and
court system are comparatively well-paid and amply funded. 2 In-
stead, as one in-house counselor said, the American system is
"filled with traps in which the inexperienced or uninformed may
easily become caught."0
5 3
At the same time, as the jury becomes increasingly subject to sci-
entific scrutiny, the issues that are used to strongly prefer oral, as
opposed to transcribed, testimony have been shown to matter far
less than once thought.354 Through reforms providing the master
with greater powers, such as some of those available to the huissier
audiencier, the special master may be transformed into an institu-
tion that enhances the effectiveness of American litigation, the
desirability of a U.S. forum, and stability as well as "rule of law" cer-
tainty underlying domestic investment. In the absence of such
needed changes, the legal-economic analysis of comparative pro-
348. See generally Robert A. Kagan, Adversarial Legalism and American Government, 10 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 369 (1991).
349. Michael Herman, US Legal System Worse than Russia' A Survey Shows that European In-
House Lawyers Would Rather Face Litigation in China and Russia than in America, TIMES ONLINE,
Mar. 18, 2008, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/law/article3570695.ece (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
350. Id.
351. See, e.g., TRANSPARENCY INT'L, 2008 CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS INDEX TABLE
(2009),
http://www.transparency.org/policy-research/surveysindices/cpi/2009/cpi-2009-table
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (showing China to be the
79th country in terms of corruption, with a lower number indicating a better posture for
that country; although China's record was poor, Russia's was far worse-146th).
352. Kagan, supra note 348, at 375-76.
353. Herman, supra note 349 (internal quotation marks omitted).
354. See infra notes 526-529 and accompanying text (discussing Lindholm, supra note
80, at 1310, which indicates that factfinders perform better evaluating the evidence from
written transcripts than from oral testimony).
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cedure is, to put it mildly, poignant in the present environment;
the American litigation system suffers by comparison to others.355
A. A Comparative Law and Economics Analysis of Procedure
In a comparative law and economic analysis of litigation, the
trade-off between the costs of the procedure in question and the
costs of error are strong factors in determining the overall cost and
relative value of that procedure.356 However, before an analysis is
made regarding the choices of parties and the trade-offs between
these costs, several issues must be addressed, including the Euro-
pean scholarly distrust of the law and economics trend 5 ' and the
distinctive nature of a comparative law and economics analysis in
contrast to the traditional law and economics analysis applied to
common law procedure.5 8 Also, the general assumption that the
American legal regime, or at least the common law, is effectively
premised on efficiency and therefore superior in a cost-benefits
analysis when compared with the Civil Law, will be challenged in
part.
359
The area of comparative law and economics, as opposed to its
progenitor in traditional American-centered law and economics, is
relatively new.3 60 Of course, its underlying premise is the same:
"More or less during the same period in which comparative lawyers
have been working out their theory of legal change based on trans-
plants and borrowings, Law and Economics scholars have been
attempting their own explanation of why a change in legal institu-
tions happens." 36' Thus, a combination of these principles will yield
a more complex understanding of legal change and explain how
the U.S. system stands to benefit from adopting procedural aspects
from the Civil Law.
Certainly, the American legal system has many efficiency advan-
tages and was instrumental in the development of law and
355. See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal-Economic Analysis of Comparative Civil Procedure, 45
AM.J. COMp. L. 905,905 (1997).
356. Id. at 906.
357. Oren Gazal-Ayal, Economic Analysis of "Law & Economics," 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 787,
788 (2007).
358. UGO MATITEI, COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS 3 (1997).
359. Compare Frank B. Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SuP. CT. ECON.
REV. 21, 24 (2007), and Charles R. Epp, Do Lawyers Impair Economic Growth?, 17 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 585 (1992), with Samar K. Datta & Jeffrey B. Nugent, Adversary Activities and Per
Capita Income Growth, 14 WORLD DEV. 1457, 1457-61 (1986).
360. See MATrEI, supra note 358, at ix.
361. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and Econom-
ics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 4-5 (1994).
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economics theory.62 However, in the rush to extol the virtues of the
flexible approach of the common law, especially in its approach to
363contractual interpretation, procedural costs have been over-
looked or, in any event, the cost of American procedure has been
underestimated.3M
Much of this, of course, has to do with Richard A. Posner's early
work, drawing upon Friedrich Hayek, extolling the virtue of the
common law, with its judge-made flexibility as opposed to the statu-
tory, and therefore static, Civil Law. 65 Posner's models, which are
over thirty years old, have failed to account for preference and util-
ity functions: "[T]he law is not so efficient as Posner argued."3 66
Nonetheless, it is certainly true that the American system has been
rigorously analyzed by law and economics scholars, and that these
early models, while flawed, have led to expansive literature that is
much more empirical and accurate.367 As a result, a number of
scholars have either argued that the Civil Law is more efficient,
3 68
or that at least portions thereof reduce key costs.' 69
This Article's goal, however, is not to engage in a wholesale com-
parison between common law and Civil Law in the perspective of
efficiency, but instead to take a "micro" approach 70 to understand
how particular procedural rules can enhance the international
competitiveness and efficiency of the United States and its legal
system's procedural costs. Doing so requires an exploration of the
principles of efficient adjudication, the challenges those principles
face in an international legal context, and how the French meth-
362. See Cross, supra note 359, at 21-22.
363. See, e.g., Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Why No "Efficient Breach" in the Civil Law?: A Compara-
tive Assessment of the Doctrine of Efficient Breach of Contract, 55 AM.J. COMP. L. 721, 721 (2007).
364. Compare Daniel Soulez Larivihre, Overview of the Problems of French Civil Procedure, 45
AM. J. COMp. L. 737, 738 (1997) (arguing that, in terms of procedural cost, the French sys-
tem is the cheapest in the world), with Cross, supra note 359, at 42 (finding that while the
United States has moved away from the common law and toward statutory based law, other
nations have moved toward a common law-like system, challenging the theory of common
law-that is, American-superiority in a law and economics analysis).
365. Paul H. Rubin, Why Was the Common Law Efficient?, in ORIGINS OF LAW AND Eco-
NOMIcS, supra note 344, at 383; cf F.A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960); F.A.
HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1973); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF LAW (7th ed. 2007).
366. Rubin, supra note 365, at 384; see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Ad-
judication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) (admitting earlier models had
erred).
367. Rubin, supra note 365, at 385.
368. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, THE CASE AGAINST THE COMMON LAW (1997).
369. See, e.g., Larivihre, supra note 364, at 738-40, 742-44 (discussing both efficient and
inefficient aspects of the French judicial system).
370. Rubin, supra note 365, at 392.
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odology employed by the huissier can serve those principles at less
cost than the United States' current system.
[I]n the moment in which a strong case is made for the re-
birth of "legal process-style" comparison of alternative legal
institutions, it seems that comparative law may offer to eco-
nomic analysis a reservoir of institutional alternatives not
371merely theoretical but actually tested by legal history.
This Article seeks exactly that, but what exactly does a comparative
law and economics legal approach entail? The boundaries are cer-
tainly indefinite.372 Nonetheless, key principles are apparent.
An economic analysis is generally premised on the Coase theo-
rem, which, when applied to the legal context, is the idea that
where transaction costs are high, legal remedies are efficient, and
when transaction costs low, injunctions are more likely to be effi-
cient. 73  Thus, parties should be protected from negative
externalities in private law through injunction and in public law
through compensatory damages.374
Ronald Coase's analytic model further draws upon nineteenth
century theories of the capital market, which at the time were gen-
erally within the purview of economic thinkers including
proponents of state control such as Vilfredo Pareto.3 75 The principle
of Pareto efficiency, stipulating that transaction costs and technology
371. MAT EI, supra note 358, at ix (footnote omitted) (citing NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPER-
FECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107
HARV. L. REV. 2031 (1994)).
372. MATrEI, supra note 358, at x.
373. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 7-8 (1960); see also
TULLOCK, supra note 368, at 10.
374. TULLOCK, supra note 368, at 10 (citing ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 17 (1988)).
375. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, in ORIGINS OF
LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 344, at 168, 169. Indeed, some viewed Pareto as "the Karl
Marx of Fascism." Max Millikan, Pareto's Sociology, 4 ECONOMETRICA 324, 324 (1936); see also
John R. Commons, Communism and Collective Democracy, 25 AM. ECON. REV. 212 (1935) (not-
ing that Mussolini acknowledged Pareto as the economic founder of fascism, supposedly in
order to have governmental control of capital and thereby meet the interests of employees
and farmers; concluding, however, that in practice Pareto's academic theory develops into
state control, through military dictatorship, by the big financial, industrial and agricultural
capitalists, both under Mussolini in Italy and Hider in Germany).
Pareto's observations provide some understanding as to why transplanted democratic in-
stitutions have withered in many less developed countries, why communism took on
totalitarian forms in spite of the dreams of many Marxist theorists, and why internal pres-
sures for liberalization ultimately developed in Eastern Europe in the last decades of the
20th Century. Vincent J. Tarascio, Vilfredo Pareto: On the Occasion of the Translation of His
Manuel, 6 CAN.J. ECON. 394 (1973).
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define an outer boundary of current potential economic achieve-
ment in a given society, and that no move away from the status quo
is possible without making another player disadvantaged or
through shifting the boundary outward, is intertwined with the
theory of an economic analysis of the law.
3 76
Involved, however, are "Pareto superior changes," whereby ex-
changes can occur where no one is better or worse off,37 7 such as
the exchange of a commodity at its fair market value. At the end of
the exchange the two parties still have something of equivalent
market value, regardless of social or emotional enrichment.378 This
example, however, excludes the transaction costs. This key element
is what Coase accounted for, that these costs are no different from
any other costs; they may "at any given moment help define the
Pareto possibility frontier. 79 Thus, by making efforts at reducing
transaction costs, the Pareto boundary (which through inductive
reasoning inhibits the outward expansion of markets, i.e., devel-
opment) can be enlarged, a state can be reached where some are
better off as a result of transactions occurring that would otherwise
be impossible because of the transaction costs, and no one will be
worse off. s°
Underlying these arguments, however, are the principles of the
American common law system and the concept that such a system
was enhanced with latent or intuitive economic principles.381 In-
deed, the contemporary law and economics field emerged in the
United States and until the mid-1990s was mostly focused on do-
mestic systems. 82 The common law seemed a perfect fit, as one key
premise of the law and economics theorists was to aim to give par-
ties what they would have bargained for had they properly planned
their contract.8 3 This kind of redrafting of legal promises is anti-
376. See Calabresi, supra note 375, at 169.
377. See id. at 171.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 173.
380. See id. at 175 (citing Harold Demsetz, The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights,
7J.L. & EcoN. 11 (1964); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8J.
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979)).
381. Rowley, supra note 344, at 8-12.
382. MATTEI, supra note 358, at ix, 72; see also Gerrit De Geest, Comparative Law and Eco-
nomics and the Design of Optimal Legal Doctrines, in 6 THE ECONOMICS OF LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS: LAW AND ECONOMICS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES 107, 108 (Bruno Deffains &
Thierry Kirat eds., 2001) [hereinafter ECONOMICS OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS] ("Posner ...
just tries to prove that the common law is efficient. Yet comparative lawyers know very well
that continental law leads in many cases to the same final results, albeit on the basis of dif-
ferent doctrines. Posner does not attempt to determine what the optimal formulation is.").
383. See Robert D. Cooter, The Confluence ofJustice and Efficiency in the Economic Analysis of
Law, in ORIGINS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 344, at 222, 236 ("Efficiency requires
the allocation of legal entitlements to the parties who value them the most.").
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thetical to European legal cultures,384 where specific performance
is still considered preferable in contracts suits.i 5 Thus, any com-
parative law and economic analysis must be sensitive to the issues
of the field's American birth, its tenuous application beyond that
field, and the relative dearth of comparative law and economic lit-
erature.
Despite this caution, a comparative economic approach builds
on other comparative approaches such as common core, legal
transplants, and legal formants and provides a means toward the
scientific measurement of differences among legal systems. s ' How-
ever, several differences in approach from the simple economic
analysis must be taken.
For instance, efficiency in comparative law "maintains a clearly
dynamic meaning, strictly linked with the notion of legal change,"
and a comparison is made between efficiency before and after a
legal change.37 Thus, the evaluation centers around determining
whether the institutional arrangements in one nation are more or
less efficient than those in another.388 At its core, however, the com-
parative economic approach continues to develop law through
non-positive notions of efficiency rather than justice or social engi-
neering.389 While the legal transplant theory is maintained, it is the
explanation of the transplant, or the argument for or against a
transplant, which is altered by the efficiency analysis.39° Certainly, it
continues to be the case that "most changes in most systems are the
result of borrowing,3 9 1 but the economist seeks to answer why this
is the case rather than mere compilation of data suggesting it is
392
SO.
Therefore, applying the traditional economic axiom that ineffi-
cient rules or methods tend to become the subject of change, a
transplanted rule is therefore a more efficient alternative if it was
actually adopted in a competitive international legal arena.393 Al-
ternatively, a need for a legal change may be demonstrated, and a
384. See Scalise, supra note 363, at 722, 729.
385. See id. at 729-30. But see id. at 730-32 (discussing several exceptions to the prefer-
ence for specific performance of contract obligations under French and German law).
386. See MATTEI, supra note 358, at xii-xiii.
387. Id. at 1-2.
388. See id. at 2.
389. See id. at 3.
390. Id. at 123-24.
391. Id. at 124 (quoting ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COM-
PARATIVE LAw 95 (Univ. of Georgia Press 1993) (1974)); see also Ewald, supra note 28.
392. See MArEI, supra note 358, at 124-26.
393. Id.; see also Rubin, supra note 365, at 384 ("[T]he process by which outcomes are
generated is shown to lead to efficiency.").
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potentially more efficient legal methodology scrutinized, as this
Article attempts.
B. Efficiency of the French Procedural Method
Traditionally, it has been widely argued that an economic analy-
sis of Civil Law would fail to yield functional results.39' However,
Civil Law countries including France have now been subjected to a
number of studies addressing jurisprudential costs and compe-
tence. 5 ' In fact, despite the restrained role of a French judge in
making a cost-benefit analysis as compared to her American coun-
terpart, the French code has, since its inception during the
Revolution, sought to make the judicial system "simpler, quicker
and less costly."3 96 Thus, much as the common law is impliedly
premised on notions found in economics, the various French
codes since the Revolution, including the N.C.P.C., have been un-
derpinned by efficiency concerns. 397 French law is not purely
positivist and can be subjected to economic analysis, though to a
French legal professional or scholar the result will not appear as
immediately useful as it does to a similarly situated U.S. party.
398
394. Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Carmen L. Brun, Lost in Translation: The Economic Analy-
sis of Law in the United States and Europe, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 602, 617-19 (2006)
(noting that European legal systems, including the civil law society of France, "are less ame-
nable to ... economic analysis," partly due to a rejection of the need of the analysis in law).
395. See, e.g., Thierry Kirat, Legal Systems and Economic Analysis: How Relevant is American
Law and Economics for the Understanding of French Jurisprudence ? in 6 ECONOMICS OF LEGAL
RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 382, at 61, 61-62.
396. Larivihre, supra note 364, at 737 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
397. See id. at 737-38; see also Michael Faure, Tort Liability in France: An Introductory Eco-
nomic Analysis, in 6 ECONOMICs OF LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS, supra note 382, at 169 (noting that
the primary goal of the French system of tort law is "victim compensation").
398. Faure, supra note 397, at 171.
It is certainly possible to incorporate the economic notions of fault (through weigh-
ing marginal costs versus marginal benefits) into article 1382 of the French Civil
Code. This would mean that the French judge would examine whether it would have
been possible for the injurer to avoid the accident by investing additionally in preven-
tion whereas these additional investments would have substantially reduced the
accident risk. Such an explicit weighing of costs and benefits can almost never be
seen in French case law based on article 1382 CC.... [T]he French judge might im-
plicitly have referred to economic criteria .... [but] the ... American Learned Hand
case can not be found in French case law.
Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, a number of French concepts of risk-bearing, such as
created risk and guarantee, serve as theoretical bases for civil liability and cannot be fit
squarely in an economic model. Id. at 172; see also Kristoffel Grechenig & Martin Gelter, The
Transatlantic Divergence in Legal Thought: American Law and Economics vs. German Doctrinalism,
31 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMp. L. REv. 295 (2008) (exploring why the law and economics dis-
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In the Fifth Republic, French legislators have taken great care to
improve the simplicity, speed, and cost of proceedings. 99 While the
reasoning behind this was initially to ensure post-war economic
growth, it continues a lengthy trend of encouraging lower costs of
procedure created shortly after the Revolution.00 An example of
this is the decision not to extend the right to a jury to civil pro-
ceedings.40
Contemporary analysis of legal or transactional costs in France
has illuminated the benefits, as well as the key problems, underly-
ing government efforts. For instance, France has far fewer
potential procedural landmines in terms of deadlines, formalities,
and the gathering of evidence; businesses do not require the same
legions of attorneys; legal costs are comparatively low and settle-
ment is widely encouraged.4 °2 While procedural costs are low, the
cost of error is quite high in France, the inverse of the American
course has failed to play a significant role in Germany and other Civil Law countries; argu-
ing that Germany and other European countries are strongly anti-Utilitarian, Idealist, and
therefore hostile to law and economics).
399. WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT McKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 177 (1995)
(noting that civil procedure has been the subject of intense revision in the prior few dec-
ades, with the main focus of the Nouveau Code de Proc6dure Civile (1975, since amended)
being to streamline and accelerate procedures); Marc Bruschi, Procidure Commerciale, in
REPERTOIRE DE PROCtDURE CIVILE I (Dalloz 2009) (focusing on commercial courts, while
mentioning the objectives of simplicity, celerity, and frugality); Loic Cadiet & Soraya Am-
rani-Mekki, Civil Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 307, 327 (George A. Bermann
& Etienne Picard eds., 2008) (referring to French law's "development in the direction of
simplification"); Edward A. Tomlinson,Judicial Lawmaking in a Code Jurisdiction: A French Saga
on Certainty of Price in Contract Law, 58 LA. L. REv. 101, 121 n.l0 (1997) (noting the high
rate of commercial litigation in France, attributable at least in part to the low cost of litiga-
tion); accord Georges Wiederkehr, L'accdlration des Procidures et les Mesures Provisoires, REvuE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROIT COMPARI 449 (1998).
In the last two years, the modernization of the justice system has been a critical concern
for the French government, which ordered (and received) two important reports from ex-
pert committees dealing directly with that, matter: The Guinchard Report, LAmbition
Raisonne d'uneJustice Apaisie, COMMISSION SUR LA REPARTITION DES CONTENTIEUX PRI9SIDPE
PAR SERGE GUINCHARD (2008), http://lesrapports.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/BRP/
084000392/0000.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), and
the Magendie Report on the Celerity and Quality of the Appellate Justice, CGdliti et Qualiti de
lajustice Devant la Cour D'appel, RAPPORT AU GARDE DES SCEAUX, MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE,
May 24, 2008, http://www.justice.gouv.fr/artLpix/1lrapportLmagendie_20080625.pdf (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
400. Larivi~re, supra note 364, at 742-46.
401. Id. at 737-38.
402. See N.C.P.C. art. 21 & 127, translated in FRENCH CODE IN ENGLISH, supra note 156, 4
& 25 ("The judge has the duty to mediate between the parties"; "Parties may negotiate a
settlement between themselves or a settlement may be engineered by the judge at any time
during the proceedings"); TULLOCK, supra note 368, at 53-59; Larivire, supra note 364, at
738-43; Miller, supra note 355, at 907.
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system."' Of course, these findings are debatable; one could find
that the cost of error was also high in the United States considering
the cost of correcting errors through appeal.
Concurrent with this concern is that of cultural differentiations:
arguments over whether the common law is or is not "better" dis-
regard concerns with the importance of certainty, as well as how
multinational entities can make use of differing legal regimes in
structuring favorable transnational business schemes, among oth-
ers. Such a question "is like asking whether the French language is
superior to the English language. Better for whom?"
4 4
Further, a number of papers have examined the inefficiencies of
the French legal system, even in the context of arguing that certain
segments may be more efficient than common law methods.4°5 The
common law, in general, provides an efficient means of dispute
resolution; it is the current American practice of common law that
needs adjustment. Procedural costs are at a breaking point in the
United States, and a procedural "surrogate" (i.e., an enhanced
special master) would greatly reduce these burdens, such as the
cost of discovery, compliance with securities laws, or expert investi-
gation.416 The market has already shown its preferences: even
before Sarbanes-Oxley, U.S. corporate privatization had expanded,
and foreign corporations limited their exposure to U.S. regulatory
regimes, incidentally moving profits, stock ownership, jobs, and
other benefits outside of the United States. 7
403. Miller, supra note 355, at 907-08. And the cost of error can be high, as claimants
acting in bad faith can cause much trouble over a small investment, especially as damages
for such abuse are low. Id. at 907 (citing Larivire, supra note 364, at 744).
404. Scalise, supra note 363, at 766; see also Oscar G. Chase, Some Observations on the Cul-
tural Dimension in Civil Procedure Reform, 45 AM.J. COMP. L. 861,863 (1997).
405. See Lariviare, supra note 364. For an overview of the contemporary outlook on the
efficiency of the common law, see Cross, supra note 359, at 24-44.
406. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in the Pretrial Development of Big Cases: Potential
and Problems, in MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 74, at 1, 3. For a brief overview
of the effects of competitive pressures on American procedure, see Tidmarsh, supra note
342, at 540-52, 542 n.124.
407. Some examples discussing securities regulation reforms are: Steven M. Davidoff,
Regulating Listings in a Global Market, 86 N.C. L. REv. 89 (2007) (arguing that non-U.S. com-
panies began to spurn U.S. stock markets even before Sarbanes-Oxley); James R. Doty,
Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 62 Bus. LAw. 1233 (2007) (arguing that foreign corporations desire a codified, rather
than case-by-case, regulatory regime); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Princi-
ples-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. Bus. L.J. 1 (2008) (discussing the adoption of
"principles-based" securities regulations in foreign financial centers which compete directly
with the United States and their comparative success in attracting listings); Edward F.
Greene, Resolving Regulatory Conflicts Between the Capital Markets of the United States and Europe,
2 CAPITAL MARKETs L.J. 5 (2007) (discussing means to resolve the burdens of cross-border
securities regulation between the European Union and the United States).
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In such an environment, it is key to look to other ways to lessen
procedural costs, where new regulation is likely to emerge4 8 that
would otherwise increase these costs and weaken overall economic
productivity by slowing the rate at which the Pareto boundary can
be expanded. France, with its historically low procedural costs, pro-
vides sources for legal adaptation that, when applied in the
American adversarial system, may optimize domestic transaction
C tS409costs.
4°
C. Giving Parties to Commercial Litigation the Right to
Choose an Investigative Magistrate
Legal adaptation is a sensitive issue, though its ultimate end of
convergence is beneficial to creating a competitive international
legal market.1 0 Thus, any legal transplant or adaptation will inevi-
tably be a piecemeal effort, barring upheaval 411 As a result,
delineating jurisdiction and specific powers is essential, and here
the proposal impacts commercial transactions. Once te parame
ters have been defined (as a kind of prototype), the ability of
American parties to have an investigative magistrate assume certain
roles in the litigation and regulatory process will serve as a test of
the effectiveness of the adaptation at providing greater efficiency.
408. See Nelson D. Schwartz & Julie Creswell, Wat Created This Monster, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
23, 2008, at C1 (discussing potential regulatory responses to the 2007-2008, and potential
future, financial crises); U.S. is Reviewing Regulation of Investment Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26,
2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/26/business/worldbusiness/26iht-26regs.11443403.
html (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
409. See supra notes 373-374, 376, 378 and accompanying text.
410. MArrEi, supra note 358, at 124, 126. Convergence is "the phenomenon of similar
solutions reached by different legal systems from different points of departure." Id. at 126.
411. See Nelken, supra note 28, at 37 ("Even within a society legal interventions can be
considered 'too successful' when they 'colonise' or displace other established normative
patterns of relating without the use of law (leading to juridification)."). One can look at
broad reforms that ended in quagmire, such as the French Revolution or the "shock ther-
apy" practiced in some Soviet Republics after 1991, as further demonstration of the virtue of
gradualism. Compare Doyle, supra note 165, at 43, and Shael Herman, The Contribution of
Roman Law to the Jurisprudence of Antebellum Louisiana, 56 LA. L. REv. 257, 304 (1995) (dis-
cussing Napoleon's concern with restoring order through the Roman law and the
emergence of an emphasis on price in characterization of transactions as Napoleon stabi-
lized the post-Revolutionary government), with Rein Mfillerson, Promoting Democracy Without
Starting a New Cold War?, 7 CHINESEJ. INT'L L. 1, 64 (2008) (discussing arguments suggest-
ing that radical legal reforms promoted by the United States were simply meant to
undermine Russia's geopolitical stability and not enhance well-being).
412. SeeALI/UJNIDROIT PRINCIPLES, supra note 21, at xxxv.
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It also presents parties a greater range of contractual choice-a key
415goal in efficiency rationale premised on rational choice theory. 3
In many ways, the movement toward a greater role for the spe-
cial master has already begun, ameliorating the inefficiencies
represented in high U.S. procedural costs, possibly reflecting the
reality that procedural costs are having a broader effect on U.S.
414
competitiveness. Indeed, the 2003 amendments to the FRCP on
special masters were a reflection of a natural development in the
common law toward providing masters a greater role in increas-
ingly common complex litigation.4 5
At any rate, the new potential of the special master has not been
fully explored, and there are yet further amplifications, particularly
in the area of administrative law, where such a procedural mecha-
nism or person would reduce cost. Much as the huissier audiencier
serves as a liaison between the court and the parties, and between
private parties, thereby reducing the need for additional lawyers
and reducing legal fees, the special master can supplement the
American attorney's role, aid with regulatory compliance, and
416bring suits to resolution in less time.
V. ENHANCING THE SPECIAL MASTER: DOMESTIC COMPLICATIONS
AND ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE
Of course, it has been argued that changes geared toward
streamlining the litigation system will narrow the settlement range,
reducing the cost-benefit of settlement.
413. Contra Kojo Yelpaala, Legal Consciousness and Contractual Obligations, 39 McGEORGE
L. REv. 193 (2008) (juxtaposing classical rational choice and efficiency theory in contracts
against the conclusions of behavioral scientists). The ability of parties to opt-in or out of new
avenues in civil procedure, particularly those developed by comparativists, is a common one.
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Michele Taruffo, Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure,
30 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 493 (1997) (providing a set of civil procedure rules designed to en-
sure greater efficiency in international legal disputes, but permitting parties the right to
litigate under current domestic conflict of law rules).
414. Brazil, supra note 406, at 2 ("The picture of the discovery system that has emerged
*.. is disturbing.").
415. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
416. Brazil, supra note 406, at 3-5.
It is sufficient here to emphasize the bottom line: big-case discovery far too often
takes place in what I have characterized as a "responsibility vacuum": none of the
principal actors in the discovery arena... regularly assume effective responsibility for
the system as a system. The result is a process that is inefficient ....
Id. at2.
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But these criticisms miss the mark. Pressed to their limit, they
argue for an exorbitantly expensive procedural system in
which alternate dispute resolution is almost always preferable.
Given that the status quo entering litigation is an actual or
threatened loss borne by the victim, such expensive proce-
dural systems in effect create a policy of bias in favor of
injurers' actions and against victims' needs for redress. Fur-
thermore, the ways in which [alternative dispute resolution]
might make the civil justice system change would not neces-
sarily make litigation less costly.... "
Whatever the case may be, the move toward contractual and
economic legal models in U.S. jurisprudence, alongside the re-
emergence of the special master following the 2003 Amendments
to the FRCP, demonstrates that the "overburdened and under
staffed" federal courts are seeking quasijudicial, often court ap-
pointed, persons to assist the supervision and decision-making
process.41 ' Greater procedural efficacy in Europe should inhibit the
early, nuisance-value settlement of what would likely turn out to be
meritless claims. The same should hold true for American civil ac-
tions, where the social safety net is relatively lacking (compared to
Europe), and potential plaintiffs may have a greater incentive to
persist in an action than would European parties. In Civil Law ju-
risdictions, where a magistrate or judge usually conducts or at least
oversees the investigation to determine if a claim is valid, the gov-
ernment ordinarily assumes the economic burden.4 '19 This alleviates
some of the pressure for a defendant to "settle quickly" to avoid
unnecessary litigation expense if an objective, well-versed magis-
trate can make a judgment on the merits-rather than going
through a long, discovery heavy, adversarial process of empanel-
ling, educating, and then persuading a lay jury. In America,
without these inquisitorial tools, injured parties lacking meritori-
ous substantive claims appear likely, through the exercise of their
procedural rights, to bring to trial a cause of action; the plaintiffs
would be seeking to extract from risk-averse, cost-conscious defen-
• 420
dants a settlement of at least nuisance value. In Europe, an
417. Tidmarsh, supra note 342, at 552; see also Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle":'Judicial Pronotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1362 (1994).
418. Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters in the Federal Courts Under Revised Rule 53: De-
signer Roles, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF SERVING AS A SPECIAL
MASTER IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 1, 5 (2006).
419. That assumes there is no significant party reimbursement of, or other fees associ-
ated with, private payment for public administrative and investigative costs.
420. Christopher Hodges, Multi-Party Actions: A European Approach, 11 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT'L L. 321, 343-44 (2001); see also Tidmarsh, supra note 342, at 526 ("The inquiry is not,
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injurious but meritorious defendant might be better treated in
court since the government's assumption of economic burden en-
courages the theory that behavioral control and the bearing of
losses should come not from litigants but from regulation and wel-
fare421 (i.e., the socialization of negative externalities) .42
Regardless of these cultural differences, the current shift in
American law toward a contractual model "has yet to be accompa-
nied by clear rules to guide lawyers or judges or by exploration of
the normative implications of the nascent doctrines."4 23 Since this
Article argues that broader use of the special master should be
gradual and confined to parties best able to confront new, experi-
mental models of procedure because of their ability to contract
into or out of specific legal obligations or rights, 424 the implementa-
tion of the broader application of the quasi-judicial features of the
huissier audiencier (and, to a lesser extent, the huissier de justice)
through masters conforms to a contractual approach to civil pro-
cedure. This choice, presented to the parties to a contract or in
commercial and class action litigation, seeks to transplant the effi-
ciency of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (here, as
developed from the Civil Law) and thereby overcome the addi-
tional cost of masters and magistrates with more efficient,
government-led dispute resolution. 5 While, as explored below, the
special master has much in common with the huissier, and its use
has grown,4 26 a number of political and social forces, particularly
427
constitutional concerns and the problem of defining privacy
What do substantive law and justice require? Instead, the inquiry is, Have the rules of the
game been carried out strictly? If any material infraction is discovered, ... our sporting
theory ofjustice awards new trials, or reverses judgments, or sustains demurrers in the inter-
est of regular play." (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the
Administration ofJustice, 29 REP. A.B.A. 395, 406 (1906))).
421. See Edward F. Sherman, Dean Pound's Dissatisfaction with the "Sporting Theory of Jus-
tice": Where Are We a Hundred Years Later?, 48 S. TEX. L. REv. 983, 984-85, 987 (2007)
(discussing differences between common law and Cvil Law procedures).
422. In a limited, direct way, we see this distinction between the American rule, where
each party bears its own costs (unless Congress, a state legislature, or a special common law
exception has crafted a fee-shifting statute), and the approach found elsewhere, where the
winner of a suit ordinarily is reimbursed for legal expenses from his opponent.
423. Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 627 (2005).
424. See id. at 598-99; see also supra Part IV.C.
425. See Farrell, supra note 418, at 17 (citingJack M. Sabatino, ADR as "Litigation Lite":
Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute Resolution, 47 EMORY LJ.
1289, 1292 (1998)); Ferleger, supra note 61, at 8; Resnik, supra note 423, at 627.
426. SeeHanrahan & Fioravanti, supra note 88, at 10-11 (discussing the increased use of
special masters by Delaware's Chancery Court).
427. See Farrell, supra note 418, at 7-22.
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rights in the age of informatiques,428 have limited the expansion of
the profession.
A. The Special Master After the 2003 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure Amendments: New Potential
The special master and the huissier share many aspects in com-
mon, particularly in regard to the breadth of potential roles they
can be appointed to play in a given proceeding.4 9 However, in the
French system such a figure is indispensable, while in the United
States the master's responsibilities often can be shared or assumed
by the attorneys, the judge,'43 or the jury. 43' Thus, despite Brandeis'
maxim of courts' "inherent power to provide themselves with ap-
propriate instruments required for the performance of their
duties,"432 the special master has continued to suffer from its twen-
tieth century history and remains mired in contests over
appointment 433 and the common law constraints of the "excep-
tional condition 434 requirement for appointment.
However, by the end of the twentieth century, the master began
to reemerge as an essential figure in complex litigation that other-
wise threatened to overwhelm the courts, especially during
discovery.3 5 While courts continued to caution against the "risk of
having significant, potentially dispositive issues"43 6 stripped from
their jurisdiction by masters, the trend toward adoption of the new
Rule 53 was clear by the late 1990s, extending it beyond pre-trial
roles.437 Indeed, these led up to the 2003 amendments, which
428. Informatiques, a French word with a meaning closely resembling informatics, or in-
formation technology, was coined by Phillipe Dreyfus. See Phillipe Dreyfus, L'Informatique, in
L'INFORMaTIQUE 11 (Librairie Larousse 1976).
429. See Farrell, supra note 418, at 7-22.
430. See, e.g., Peter F. Schlosser, Lectures on Civil-Law Litigation Systems and American Coop-
eration with Those Systems, 45 U. KAN. L. REv. 9, 12-13 (1996) (discussing the role of the
judge in the development of the case in Civil Law nations and the United States).
431. See, e.g., Chase, supra note 404, at 870; David Edward, Fact-Finding: A British Perspec-
tive, in THE OPTION OF LITIGATING IN EUROPE 43, 45-46 (D.L. Carey Miller & Paul R.
Beaumont eds., 1993) (discussing the rise and emphasis on the jury in the common law).
432. Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920). But see Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 241 F. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y. 1917) (noting that despite the potential conven-
ience, the court cannot compel parties to use a master).
433. See, e.g., Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Revisions in Federal Rule 53
Provide New Options for Using Special Masters in Litigation, N.Y. ST. B.J.,Jan. 2004, at 18, 19-21.
434. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(a) (1) (B)(i).
435. See Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 433, at 24 n.19 (listing late twentieth century
cases that experimented with a less limited role for the master).
436. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 123 F.R.D. 62, 63 (W.D.N.Y.
1988).
437. SeeScheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 433, at 21 & 25 nn.27-32.
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dramatically diminished the procedural hurdles to appointing a
masters and rendered the master's powers increasingly similar to
those of the huissier.
For instance, pre-trial masters were able to mediate, settle, and
evaluate claims, supervise discovery, interpret settlements, coordi-
nate related cases, make preliminary rulings on evidence, and
generally assist and supervise parties.39 Trial masters serve as ap-
pointed experts, review disputes for final decision or subject to
court review, and accept referred matters from the court for find-
ings and recommendations."0 The master's role can also transcend
both pre-trial and trial roles in "a) taking and interpretation of
technical or complex evidence and b) compilation of data,"44'
which is remarkable considering that the same differentiation ex-
ists in France among the several forms of expertise.442 Similarity
between the two entities is also demonstrated in the post-trial mas-
ter, who serves as an advanced form of the French bailiffs (or
huissiers, without the distinction of audiencier): drafting opinions;
administrating settlement and judgment funds; monitoring com-
pliance; serving as a neutral observer; and general investigation. 3
438. Id. at 22.
439. Ferleger, supra note 61, at 9-11 & nn.19-26.
440. Id. at l2.
441. Id. at 12-13 (footnotes omitted).
442. For instance, the expertise demandie & titre incident allows a judge to acquire relevant
aid in findings of fact, often in areas that in the United States would be considered pre-trial
roles for attorneys or subject to confrontation, but also to obtain interpretive evidential
reports during litigation. Jo~lle Godard, Fact Finding: A French Perspective, in THE OrTION OF
LITIGATING IN EUROPE, supra note 431, at 57, 59-61; supra Part III.A.1 (discussing the exper-
tise officieuse, permitting the judge to obtain limited analysis of the facts from the appointed
expert, and also discussing the constatation and consultation where the parties or judge may
order the huissierto compile reports or other data in an essentially non-analytic fashion). In
France there is no "trial" stage as known in the common law, but simply a continuous litiga-
tion event. Beardsley, supra note 13, at 480 (stating that "there is no 'trial' in the common
law sense in French civil procedure"); see also BELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 93-109 (detailing
the litigation process in the French court of general civil jurisdiction, the Tribunal de
Grande Instance, and thereby showing the numerous pre-trial events and the relatively few
activities at the closest thing to a civil trial, the hearing (l'audience) before the tribunal);
CATHERINE ELLiOT ET AL., FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 174 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that French
pretrial civil procedure includes a number of tasks which in England would take place at the
court hearing itself); Lambert, supra note 13, at 233-34 ("The [French] court exercises great
control over pretrial proceedings, the parties being relegated to the more passive role of
conducting discovery and otherwise refining the case for trial. The trial itself is composed of
a series of separate hearings before ajudge, rather than the continuous single-event trial so
familiar to common-law jurisdictions .. . ."). In addition, huissiers are able to broker settle-
ments, offer legal advice to parties, and to interpret the law either in ajudicial capacity or as
a legal advisor to the Judge Delegate, much as the master may make limited procedural
rulings, induce settlements, and review and make determinations on, or analysis of, legal
issues in dispute. See supra Part IIIA
443. Ferleger, supra note 61, at 14-17 & nn.34-43.
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U.S. courts have also implemented the "augmented master," with
additional assumption of roles traditionally reserved to the judge
or parties to the lawsuit.)
Regardless of these similarities in form between huissiers and
masters, and the apparent willingness of U.S. courts, obstacles to
widespread use continue to exist for various reasons. These include
protecting the role of the jury and judge in American procedure45
and the simple matter of cost."6 Indeed, while the use of masters
might contain systemic issues and slash procedural costs, in indi-
vidual cases masters "increase[] communication costs and can lead
to delay in adjudication due both to the time required for the mas-
ter's review and reporting, and then to rulings on objections to
reports."" 7 The master tends to assume the role of the jury; thus, to
turn to a master's findings is now forbidden in jury trials unless the
parties consent, 48 and concerns about the master's taking legal de-
cisions out of a court's hands449 remain and must be addressed.450
As discussed below, while increased use of the master will neces-
sarily change American jurisprudence, this is neither out of sync
with historical jurisprudential values nor does it necessarily impact
the judge's ultimate authority in the same way the use of masters in
a jury trial would.451 However, as masters' reports are subject to ju-
dicial review, increased application, even if limited to non-jury
444. See id. at 23-25 (listing "elements [that] might be among those in an order for an
'augmented mastership"').
445. See In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 428 (9th Cir. 1979) ("We recognize that
use of masters in jury cases is ' ... the exception and not the rule ... ,' because they do
represent a limited inroad on the jury's traditional sphere." (omission in original) (quoting
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b))).
446. See David I. Levine, Calculating Fees of Special Masters, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 141, 143
(1985) (noting that special masters' fees can be "quite large"); id. at 151, 166 (reviewing
cases where courts found fees excessive).
447. Ferleger, supra note 61, at 8.
448. Current Rule 53
accepts the practice under the former rule of appointment of masters to functions
agreed to by the parties. So long as the appointment meets with the court's approval,
and the master is not to preside at ajury trial, the parties can consent to a master per-
forming any specified duties.
Id. at 25-26 (footnotes omitted); accord 9C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2613 (3d ed. 2008).
449. See, e.g., Scheindlin & Redgrave, supra note 433, at 21.
450. In effect, it is that venerable issue for almost all proposed procedural reforms: how
to keep errors to a minimum, in number and degree, while still reducing overall procedural
Costs.
451. See, e.g., United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 123 F.R.D. 62, 63
(W.D.N.Y. 1988); Conn. Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227
(D. Conn. 1940);Jerome I. Braun, Special Masters in Federal Court, 161 F.R.D. 211, 216 (1995);
Cross, supra note 359, at 58; Kessler, supra note 14, at 1224-38; see also infra Part V.B. 1.
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trials, could simply result in a greater appellate backlog as parties
challenge lower court decisions on the grounds of error by the
master or in the master's appointment.4 2 This would increase the
cost of error in American courts, potentially negating the benefits
of having masters to induce settlement and relieve the courts or
parties of onerous procedural burdens. As it currently stands, the
United States' cost of error is comparatively low; 454 while expensive,
American courts tend to arrive at sound conclusions. 45 Clear stan-
dards for the use of masters and their findings are therefore
essential, something potentially difficult to assess in current law as
a result of the recent changes to Rule 53.456
Since it is imperative that the courts define the master's new
role, there is, at present, a sizeable opportunity to provide masters
with broad powers and to give greater discretion to lower court
judges in utilizing masters' findings457 and also to make such find-
ings more difficult to controvert at the appellate level. Certainly,
452. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in Com-
parative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 683 (1997) (finding that
the American system has "been too successful in opening the courthouse door"); Miller,
supra note 355, at 911-12 (discussing a scenario where a reduction of procedural costs
would increase the amount of litigation in the United States).
453. See Paul R. Rice, Judicial Management of Complex Litigation: Further Comments on the
Use of Informal Management Techniques and on Procedures for the Resolution of Privilege Claims, in
MANAGING COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 74, at 293, 302 (finding that the benefits of
using special masters are more likely realized where "lawyers [want] them to work" and they
are willing to assume the added cost and make a good faith attempt at expeditiously resolv-
ing the dispute).
454. Miller, supra note 355, at 908; cf Burbank & Silberman, supra note 452, at 676-77
(finding that the American system has "been too successful in opening the courthouse
door").
455. See Miller, supra note 355, at 908.
456. See Margaret G. Farrell, The Sanction of Special Masters: In Search of a Functional Stan-
dard, in ALI-ABA COURSE oF STUDY: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF SERVING AS A SPECIAL
MASTER IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 35 (2007).
457. See generally Shira A. Scheindlin & Jonathan M. Redgrave, Mastering Rule 53: The
Evolution and Impact of the New Federal Rule Governing Special Masters, FED. LAw., Feb. 2004, at
34, 37-39 (finding that the amended Rule 53 affords greater flexibility in the use of mas-
ters).
458. At the appellate level, a master's findings or report are ordinarily regarded as pre-
sumptively correct, see, e.g., Int'l Indus., Inc. v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 696, 699
(3d Cir. 1957); Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Treadwell, 217 F.2d 325, 329 (9th Cir. 1954), and
set aside where "clearly erroneous," see, e.g., Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 235 F.2d 253,
257 (7th Cir. 1956). In the case of a special master, the reviewing court must recognize "the
need for judicial restraint in reviewing his or her findings." 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 627
(2003); see also Lampe v. Sec'y for Health & Human Servs., 219 F.3d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir.
2000). However,
when findings fail fully to resolve a controversy, or fail to supply a clear understand-
ing of the basis for a decision, or when the findings are significantly contradictory,
they cannot support ajudgment. Moreover, even when there is evidence to support a
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the parties should be able to challenge such reports, and there will
inevitably be egregious incidents on appeal where the findings or11 459
uses of the master are untenable. In France, for instance, the
right of contradictoire, in some ways corresponding to the American
right of confrontation, permits parties to guide the huissier in her
examinations and to challenge various findings of fact, conclu-
sions, or analyses.6 °
Thus, the opportunity for U.S. courts to reduce procedural costs
following the 2003 amendments cannot be overlooked. However,
the reforms will be imperfect without clear standards. 46' At the
same time, a greater role for the master brings about benefits in
harmonization and uniformity of the law,62 while the appropriate
deference will ensure that the savings in procedural cost are not
overwhelmed by the increased cost of error.63
B. Complications to Effective Reform
Despite the potential of the master to be reinvigorated by the
recent changes to Rule 53, the process of expanding the master's
role is fraught with a number of issues unique to U.S. procedural
finding, it can be held clearly erroneous if, on review of the entire evidence, the re-
viewing court arrives at the firm conviction that the finding is mistaken.
In re U.S.A. Motel Corp., 450 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1971) (citations omitted).
459. See In re U.S.A. Motel Corp., 450 F.2d at 503.
460. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
461. See James S. DeGraw, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The Lack of
Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 800, 803 (1991) (discussing the lack of clear rules,
guidelines on the use of masters, and appellate standards of review for masters' reports);
Farrell, supra note 456, at 39, 42-46.
462. Miller, supra note 355, at 916-17 ("Harmonization, it should be noted, is not the
same thing as efficiency.... [A] number of economic arguments counsel in favor of har-
monization.... On the other hand, harmonization carries economic costs."). Benefits of
harmonization can include the opening of legal jurisdictions to persons outside local bar
monopolies, greater certainty (or at least awareness of options) for potential litigants, and
the evisceration of obscure local rules. Id. at 917. However, it must be kept in mind that
"civil procedure is in fact strictly connected with the great intellectual movements of peo-
ples; and that its varied manifestations are among the most important documents of
mankind's culture." Mauro Cappelletti, Social and Political Aspects of Civil Procedure-Reforms
and Trends in Western and Eastern Europe, 69 MICH. L. Rzv. 847, 885-86 (1971). Of course,
this has not prevented harmonization from becoming a key force in global jurisprudence,
particularly in the European Union courts, where it approaches the sacrosanct. Case 26/62,
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandsie Administratie der Belastingen, 1962 E.C.R. 95; cf Luca
Enriques & Matteo Gatti, The Uneasy Case for Top-Down Corporate Law Harmonization in the
European Union, 27 U. PA.J. INT'L ECON. L. 939, 944 (2006) (attempting to show harmoniza-
tion as a "real-world" and inevitable process rather than an idealized objective).
463. Miller, supra note 355, at 918 (discussing the Hazard-Taruffo transnational rules of
civil procedure).
1119
1120 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
history. On the one hand, the Seventh Amendment gives a defen-
dant the right to demand ajury trial in civil cases. 4 Conversely, the
use of a master challenges these rights, sometimes in fundamental461
ways. While historically the master was not viewed as impinging
on constitutional rights, modern jurisprudence paints a more
complicated story.
4 6 6
1. Discovery in the American Tradition
An enhanced role for special masters, where they take on as-
pects of the presentation of evidence, eviscerates the attorney's
role in certain aspects of litigation, and in American litigation the
unearthing of important documents can be determinative of set-
tlement options and trial outcomes. 6' Thus, in the American
system, parties may be reluctant to yield control over the proceed-
ings to a third party, especially where doing so eliminates the
examination of witnesses in court or where expertise is required.68
Prior to the FRCP's adoption in 1938, American discovery was
more akin to the Continental system of limited access to docu-
ments than the modern notion of broad discovery rights:
"[R] estrictions undergirded a court process structurally antithetical
to information gathering tools." 469 The movement toward notice
pleading sought to eliminate the "sporting" rules of evidence and
procedure preceding the 1938 reforms, which had left a number of
"hidden traps for the unwary.470 And, for a time, the novelty of
American discovery showed its virtues in the tobacco and asbestos
cases, both inconceivable without broad access to corporate docu-
ments. 1 Nevertheless, by the 1970s, weaknesses in the current
system had already emerged, and each round of amendments to
the FRCP since 1983 has, in some way, further limited discovery
464. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
465. See Kessler, supra note 14, at 1247-50.
466. Id. See generally DeGraw, supra note 461.
467. See generally Seymour Moskowitz, Discovering Discovery: Non-Party Access to Pretrial In-
formation in the Federal Courts, 1938-2006, 78 U. CoLo. L. REv. 817 (2007).
468. Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital Resource in
the Era of Complex Litigation, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1269, 1286-87 (2005) ("As a practical
matter, the special master referrals have occurred, and will continue to occur, when the
court and the parties feel the need for a special master. A judge who tries to foist a special
master on litigants who strongly oppose a master will need a rather high exceptional condi-
tion to justify the reference.").
469. Moskowitz, supra note 467, at 829.
470. Id. at 832.
471. Id.
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rights in an effort to contain the increasing procedural costs asso-
ciated with the 1938 rule.472
The expense and time delay associated with the current discov-
ery regime-in addition to the increase in complex litigation and
judicial workload-has, since the end of the twentieth century,
demonstrated once again the need for masters in civil and criminal
. 473
filings, necessarily limiting the New Deal conception of discovery
rights and, likely with it, public access to a greater amount of dis-
covery information.474 This ultimately implicates the public's First
Amendment right of access, broaching the issue of how an ad-
vanced role for the master might implicate the tradition of live
testimony at trial .
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of the accused to
cross-examine a witness.476 While the Sixth Amendment confronta-
tion right does not apply in a civil trial, confrontation is still the
norm there. 78
472. Id.; see also id. at 826 ("Opponents of public access to discovery information often
claim that this potential availability will make court proceedings dramatically slower and
more expensive.").
473. Fellows & Haydock, supra note 468, at 1287-96. For a similar analysis of the situa-
tion in state courts, see Lynn Jokela & David F. Herr, Special Masters in State Court Complex
Litigation: An Available and Underused Case Management Tool, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. Rxv. 1299,
1314-23 (2005).
474. See Moskowitz, supra note 467, at 875-78 (arguing that advances in electronic case
management will ameliorate the need for dramatic reform of discovery methods).
475. Sixth Amendment at Trial 36 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PROC. 621, 623 (2007); see
also David Crump, The Case for Selective Abolition of the Rules of Evidence, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV.
585, 619 (2006); Charles Hobson, The Minimalist Privilege, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 712, 713,
715 & n.43 (2005). Although practically universally rejected by most courts, the notion that
defendants in civil proceedings have due process rights that include the right of confronta-
tion has some support. On occasion, courts have imbued traditionally civil proceedings with
certain criminal characteristics that would enable judges to enforce the full panoply of
criminal defendant protections. See Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608, 610-11 (1967)
(invalidating a Colorado law instituting proceedings "whether denominated civil or crimi-
nal" to commit sexual offenders by finding that the procedure entailed making a new
criminal charge, which necessitates due process safeguards); cf People v. Burnick, 535 P.2d
352, 369 (Cal. 1975) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment demanded that the standard
of proof be beyond a reasonable doubt for sex offenders in civil commitment proceedings).
Moreover, one commentator has documented that several courts have recognized due proc-
ess rights to confronting witness in civil settings, namely school discipline hearings. See, e.g.,
Brent M. Pattison, Questioning School Discipline: Due Process, Confrontation, and School Discipline
Hearings, 18 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTs. L. REv. 49, 53 & n.31 (2008) ("There is significant dis-
agreement among courts about whether, or when, procedural due process requires
confrontation of witnesses in school discipline hearings.... [Sleveral courts ... have found
confrontation to be required by due process."); see also Klein, supra note 34, at 721. The
author suggests courts create a middle of the road hybrid proceeding that exists between
civil and criminal law and proposes that the confrontation right be included among the
procedural safeguards in the hybrid system.
476. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
477. Crump, supra note 475, at 619.
478. Hobson, supra note 475, at 715 & n.43; see also supra note 475.
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Two aspects of this tradition of confrontation come to play when
examining the huissier and the special master.47 9 As to the huissier,
the gathering and use of evidence obtained abroad, as in the Dayan
case, poses special issues to the American litigator,4 0 while, on the
other hand, the special master in domestic matters tends toward
attenuation of the tradition of live testimony currently favored in
civil trials.8
Where evidence must be obtained abroad, French law provides
few alternatives if American courts fail to recognize a huissier's re-
port or findings on the grounds that "the use of unconventional
foreign methods of examination.., exceed the limits of accepted
American standards of fairness and reliability."4 8 2 For instance, in
United States v. Salim, the French court forbade taped depositions
and teleconferencing during depositions, only allowing a U.S.
court reporter to transcribe portions of the proceedings and, fol-
lowing the typical procedure of the huissiers (though the American
court referred to such as magistrates), the French court required
the keeping of a separate record by the magistrate and the submis-
sion of interrogatories in written form by the American prosecutor
and defendant. 483 A second deposition ultimately permitted tele-
conferencing and private translation (three languages were in use
during the deposition), and the findings were later read into evi-
dence at trial, leading to an appeal by the defendant under Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,4  Rule 804(b) (1) of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 5 and the Confrontation Clause. 6
479. See infra notes 489-490 and accompanying text.
480. Bryan A. Carey, Should American Courts Listen to What Foreign Courts Hear?: The Con-
frontation and Hearsay Problems of Prior Testimony Taken Abroad in Criminal Proceedings, 29 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 29, 31-32 (2001) (discussing complications that arise in connection with interna-
tional deposition taking); Matthew J. Tokson, Virtual Confrontation: Is Videoconference
Testimony by an Unavailable Witness Constitutional?, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1581, 1611 n.176 (2007)
(citing United States v. Salim, 855 F.2d 944, 947, 949-50 (2d Cir. 1988)) (discussing French
prohibition of taped depositions; French prevention of fishing expeditions and attendance
of defendants at depositions).
481. Hobson, supra note 475, at 713.
482. Salim, 855 F.2d at 946.
483. Id. at 947; see also Carey, supra note 480, at 47-49.
484. FED. R. CrM. P. 15.
485. FED. R. EvD. 804(b)(1).
486. Salim, 855 F.2d. at 949; see also Carey, supra note 480, at 48. In finding against the
defendant on appeal and holding that the evidence obtained in the deposition was admissi-
ble, the Second Circuit demonstrated the readiness with which U.S. courts have accepted
testimony obtained under foreign legal strictures. For instance, the Court found that while
use of written questions was not as spontaneous as an oral deposition, the procedure allowed
for counsel to review responses and draft new questions, thus alleviating the problems of the
French format. Id. at 50-51. The deposition in Salim was therefore taken in compliance with
Rules 28 and 31 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and it had sufficient indicia of reli-
ability to fit within the hearsay exception for former testimony, much as in Dayan. Id. at
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On the other hand, of course, the special master is a particular
challenge to the right of cross examination and the right to a jury.
As one judge lamented:
Any party who so desires is doubtless free to put before the
jury any competent evidence at variance with the Master's
conclusions and to submit any resulting conflict to the jury.
There will, however, be no opportunity to discredit the Mas-
ter's conclusions with the jury by the contention that vital
evidence submitted to the jury was not before the Master. For
the rule in subdivision (e) (3) [of Rule 53] expressly provides
that injury actions "the master shall not be directed to report
the evidence." This provision clearly, and very sensibly, con-
templates that for all purposes of the Master's report the jury
shall not be burdened with the mass of evidence underlying
the findings. That being so, any offer to show the content
(positive or negative) of the evidentiary record which was be-
fore the Master would be excluded and the court might
properly instruct the jury that since under the prescribed pro-
cedure, Rule 53(d), every party had as much opportunity to
present evidence to the Master as to the jury it must be pre-
sumed that all pertinent evidence within the scope of the
Master's report had been made available to the Master and
had received judicial consideration by the Master in formulat-
ing his report and by the court in accepting the report.
47
Thus, the master's conclusions appear inevitably hard to refute,
and conflicting with the American concept of cross-examination as
the means to challenge the facts and accuracy of an opposing party
and their proffered evidence. Yet, the U.S. procedural system has
long tolerated such incursion, particularly before 1938.488 It is in-
congruous to argue that today the master has somehow become
more offensive to the foundational principles of American juris-
prudence and the adversarial trial.
48-50. Compare Salim, 855 F.2d at 952-54, with Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 466 N.E.2d 958,
969-70 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Because Salim came before the changes to the Confrontation
Clause analysis wrought by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), its fitting within a
hearsay exception was sufficient to meet the Confrontation Clause requirements. Salim, 855
F.2d at 955; Carey, supra note 480, at 50-51.
487. Conn. Importing Co. v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 42 F. Supp. 225, 227 (D. Conn.
1940).
488. See supra Part IIA.
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2. The Changing Nature of the Adversarial System and the Jury
Since the master is, like the huissier, appointed and instructed by
the judge and subject to judicial review and censure, the changes it
brings to contemporary jurisprudence or procedure are at least
less striking than in the case of the jury. 9 Indeed, even in France,
where the jury has been retained for criminal trials, the huissier's
role is attenuated, as certain rights to cross-examination and live
testimony remain from historical law or emerged recently, particu-
larly as a result of the European Court of Human Rights and, to a
lesser extent, the European Union.49 °
Nonetheless, France has experienced a fragmented history with
the jury.49' While the English version of the trial by jury was French
in origin,49 2 it fell out of favor in post-Revolutionary and modern
France. In numerous ways current French jurisprudence has
sought to make amends for the evisceration of a lay decisional
force in civil adjudication;493 efficiency concerns drove early re-
forms away from a jury in civil cases, and a number of arguments
have been leveled against the efficacy ofjuries since then.494
One of the major issues discussed in 1790 was whether a jury
should be used in civil proceedings as well as in criminal pro-
ceedings. Once again, it was perhaps the obsession with
simplicity, speed and cost that was behind the decision not to
use ajury in civil proceedings, a decision that has had a major
impact on French judicial procedure until the present time.495
Indeed, while the jury is more significant in American legal cul-
ture, its use is not alien to the inquisitorial system and, in any
489. Compare Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciayy or
Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHi. L. REv. 394, 417-18 (1986) (arguing that judges must
maintain tight control over the master and the case), with Dwight Golann, Making Alternative
Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 OR. L. REv. 487, 493 (1989) (dis-
cussing criticisms of adopting alternative dispute resolution techniques in government-led
adjudication, particularly as it regards their challenge to the right to ajury trial).
490. See David Corb6-Chalon & Martin A. Rogoff, Tort Reform A la Frangaise:Jurispruden-
tial and Policy Perspectives on Damages for Bodily Injuy in France, 13 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 231, 231
(2007); John D. Jackson & Nikolay P. Kovalev, Lay Adjudication and Human Rights in Europe,
13 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 83,89 & n.22 (2006).
491. Jackson & Kovalev, supra note 490, at 89.
492. Burkhard Schafer & Olav K. Wiegand, Incompetent, Prejudiced and Lawless? A Gestalt-
Psychological Perspective on Fact Finding in Law as Learning, 3 LAw, PROBABILITY & RISK 93, 99
(2004).
493. Larivihre, supra note 364, at 743-46.
494. "The principal effect of [Hazard-Taruffo's] rules would be to eliminate the jury in
[international tort litigation] ... ." Miller, supra note 355, at 918.
495. Larivihre, supra note 364, at 737-38.
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event, was simply supplanted there by alternative institutions such
as the three-judge panel.49
The jury or other substitutes, such as lay judges or the three
judge panel, is broadly recognized across Western cultures as an
essential institution to maintain the fairness of law and prevent ex-
•,• 491
cessive elitism. Yet, while juries are a permanent fixture in the
American legal landscape, this does not mean that the legal system
is beholden to them.4 98 On the contrary, even disregarding the de-
cline of jury trials in American commercial litigation, the U.S.
court system provides checks on the jury's power through various
procedural mechanisms, the foremost of which is appeal.499 Hence,
there are reasons to challenge the tradition of requiring live testi-
mony in order for juries to properly determine witness veracity
embodied by the hearsay rules of the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
The concept of a third party fact-finder serving in a civil jury
trial is therefore not inimical to U.S. jurisprudence. Rather, it pro-
vides an additional check on juror activism and bias, and anyway,
psychological studies of layperson legal decision-making demon-
strate that the use of additional professionals and court appointed
actors in the litigation process will not skew the outcomes of jury
trials.5 0 1 Further, those studies show which decisions juries are most
efficient and accurate at making. The modern jury is one quite
496. Id. at 744.
497. See id.
498. Arie M. Rubenstein, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the Modern Juy Trial 106
COLUM. L. REV. 959, 976 (2006) (discussing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), where
the Supreme Court adopted a functionalist approach to the right to ajury trial).
499. See id. at 982 (discussing approaches to regulating jury nullification in criminal tri-
als). By way of analogy, and even more recently, the use of videotaped interrogatories,
particularly in child molestation cases, has opened the door to further changes in the notion
of live in-court cross-examination before the jury. David F. Ross et al., The Child in the Eyes of
Jury: Assessing Mock Jurors' Perceptions of the Child Witness, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 5 (1990)
(assessing the reactions of mock jurors to varying forms of child testimony, particularly the
use of written versus videotaped examinations of children). A number of state jurisdictions
have experimented with the use of independent child psychologists as examiners in a one-
time, taped session, played before jurors, that is meant to effectively secure a defendant's
confrontational rights while preventing undue psychological stress on the child witness re-
sulting from vigorous, adversarial cross-examination. Frank E. Vandervort, Videotaping
Investigative Interviews of Children in Cases of Child Sexual Abuse: One Community's Approach, 96J.
CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1353, 1377-80 (2006). Such a use of an independent examiner,
albeit in the criminal law context, is parallel to uses of masters, huissiers, or other officers to
marshal testimony humanely and prepare a report of relevant data. See supra Part I1A.
500. Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33 CONN. L.
REv. 1, 2 (2000).
501. See, e.g., Lindholm, supra note 80 (discussing eyewitness accuracy and perceptions
thereof by laypersons and legal professionals); Schafer & Wiegand, supra note 492, at 106-07
(investigating juror activism and bias in the United States and the United Kingdom); Leif A.
Str6mwall & Pkr Anders Granhag, Affecting the Perception of Verbal Cues to Deception, 17 APPLIED
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 35 (2003) (discussing deception detection research).
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dissimilar from the jury familiar in the time of the American Revo-
lution, and even from the juries of the nineteenth century, when
the master was increasingly viewed as an antagonist to their role.02
Indeed, early juries followed rules and expectations quite the
opposite of the eontemporary conception: they were expected to
ascertain facts which they did not know, to discuss the case with the
parties and with each other, and to ask questions of witnesses, all
evincing a Continental preference for truth-seeking over proce-
dure.0  Even as evidence began to be presented in court during
the eighteenth century, juror activism remained prevalent in
American courts well into the twentieth century.0 4 In fact, it was
not until 1930 that open questions from the jury ceased,00 which
was, perhaps unsurprisingly, contemporaneous to the demise of
the master.
The reemergence of the special master in the 2003 FRCP
amendments comes at a time almost a century of change away
from the jury activism of the nineteenth century. Hence, the mas-
ters' impact on the jury (if such use is one day permitted in jury
trials) and their ability to judge the accuracy of eyewitness testi-
mony out of court is unclear. In the modern period, the
conception of the jury has evolved into a mechanism for purely
factual determination, hence the rise of antagonism to jury nullifi-
cation, or the jury's finding of innocence or guilt based not on law
but on personal disagreement therewith, during the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. 56 The master, like the jury, is vested
with the responsibility of ascertaining facts for their accuracy and,
as a result of the movement toward greater emphasis on factual
verification by the jury rather than a check on state power,50 7 must
502. See Rubenstein, supra note 498, at 963-72; Schafer & Wiegand, supra note 492, at
99.
503. Schafer & Wiegand, supra note 492, at 99.
504. Id. at 99-100. In 1907, for instance, North Carolina formally permitted juror ques-
tioning. Id. at 100.
505. Id. The ability ofjurors to question does remain, though rarely invoked, within the
discretion of trial courts. Id. at 97-98.
506. See Rubenstein, supra note 498, at 967-68.
507. Id. at 967.
Changing cultural and epistemological 'fashions' can have a significant influence on
this process. Common law and continental law initially both put a premium on
knowledge at the expense of neutrality. In the common law countries however, the
emerging predominance of empiricist philosophy and ideas typical of the Scottish
enlightenment helped to shift the balance toward neutrality. These thinkers placed a
premium on direct, personal experience and were skeptical of 'indirect' knowledge-
knowledge acquired by reading authoritative writing.
Schafer & Wiegand, supra note 492, at 95.
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now seamlessly operate as both an instrument of accurate repre-
sentation of facts but also guard against excessive state interference
in private affairs, particularly in private law. Since the special mas-
ter is particularly used in non-jury trials, she inevitably has the
responsibility of upholding these two values in such trials; there,
the master serves as a substitute for a lay-person decision force in
much the same way as multiple or lay judges.
Torun Lindholm's cognitive approach to comparing the veracity
ofjudging witness statements between laypersons and professionals
demonstrates the changes, at the determinative level, brought
about by the use of neutral third parties such as masters in place of
jurors, the judge, and advocates.5 09 Lindholm gauged the use of
Swedish law-enforcement professionals, such as police detectives
and judges, and compared them to laypersons, attempting to ad-
just for the influence of racial and ethnic backgrounds and
presentation modality.510 She hypothesized that the law-
enforcement groups would show better performance and accuracy
than laypersons in discriminating among adult witnesses' accurate
and inaccurate answers to cued recall questions regarding a simu-
lated kidnapping.
Lindholm found her hypothesis to be generally correct: law-
enforcement was generally better able to judge for veracity than
laypersons.1 Certain aspects of her findings are worth particular
note, and further demonstrate that the ability of huissiers and other
magistrates to judge witness veracity-and thus their similarity to,
or difference from, juries-will be influenced by their professional
training. Of all three groups studied, police detectives were the
most effective at determining accuracy of eyewitness statements,
and laypersons the least So.4 While judges were somewhat more
515 5 16
accurate than laypersons,5 their methodology was distinctive:
"U] udges' high hit rate was primarily due to their tendency to use
508. Lariviare, supra note 364, at 743-46.
509. Lindholm, supra note 80, at 1301.
510. Id. at 1304-05.
511. Id. at 1302.
512. Id. at 1305.
513. Cf id. at 1312.
514. Id. at 1306. Although "[e]ven at their best, the detectives made a substantial num-
ber of incorrectjudgments, and some of them performed at chance levels." Id. at 1311.
515. Id. at 1308. Lindholm concludes that judges are not significantly more accurate than
laypersons: although the judges' hit rate is higher for declaring truthful statements to be
true, that stems from a greater willingness to respond that a statement is truthful. Id. at
1310-11. Lindholm addresses reasons for the judiciary's increased readiness; she hypothe-
sizes it has more to do with sheer quantity-the judge's heightened exposure to witness
statements-rather than any specific set of criteria. Id.
516. Id. at 1310.
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a liberal response criterion when judging the statements, and the
only group that showed a recurrent ability to discriminate correct
from incorrect witness responses was the police detectives.
'
"
517
It seems then that masters, who are typically attorneys or retired
judges and share a similar education and background to judges,
would presumably fall into the judicial category and use specific re-
sponse criteria to determine veracity. Since the greater use of
masters would necessitate a large standing reserve of qualified pro-
fessionals, it is unlikely that masters would be as inaccurate as
laypersons who "lack... experience with what witnesses to crime [or
tort] scenarios may recall"518 and therefore "have more difficulty
when judgments concern an eyewitness's memory for details."515
Nevertheless, judges were not significantly more accurate than
laypersons"2 The master may combine the best features of both
the judge and the jury - maintaining legal expertise but also acting
as a balance against excessive state interference. Indeed, the mas-
ter may sometimes come to identify certain aspects of the
proceedings with personal identity and belief and thus have the
ability to shift findings in ways that mirror the effects ofjury nullifi-
cation. Of course, as previously discussed, appellate courts will
have to maintain vigilance in preventing maneuverings with the
effect ofjury nullification, but the very concept ofjury nullification
517. Id.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id. at 1311. All persons studied had a bias toward judging statements to be correct
rather than incorrect, but it was strongest among judges:
The judges' strategy may be based on prior knowledge regarding the typical recall
ability of crime witnesses. That is, given the witnessing conditions, and the details
witnesses were asked for in the current study, judges may know from experience that
the ratio of correct witness responses is relatively high.... It seems reasonable that an
experienced judge who is uncertain as to whether a specific witness statement is cor-
rect or not would choose to give the witness the benefit of the doubt.
Id. at 1310-11. "Alternatively, judges' response bias may be a result of their perception that
the judgment task was difficult." Id. at 1311.
521. Compare Greene, supra note 74, with Rubenstein, supra note 498, at 960 ("But some
juries still acquit even when the evidence indicates that the defendant has violated the
law... Federal courts universally condemn jury nullification. Relying on formalist prece-
dent from the nineteenth century, courts decry nullification on the ground that it exceeds
the authority of the jury. However, recently some scholars have argued that nullification may
in some cases be desirable and have called for increased tolerance of jury nullification."
(footnotes omitted) (citing Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nulification Within the Rule of Law, 81
MINN. L. REv. 1149, 1151 (1997); Joan Biskupic, Injury Rooms, a Form of Civil Protest Grows,
WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at Al)).
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is a key component of the jury's, or any other layperson decisional
force's, ability to guard against the state .
Lindholm additionally discussed the change in perceptions be-
tween written, live, and taped testimony. 23 In most Continental
systems, for instance, judges will only judge testimony in a civil trial
based on a written transcript, 524 and increasing the use of masters
in U.S. courts would render this more common. On another level,
however, it tangentially demonstrates the ability of differently
trained persons to judge the accuracy of documentary evidence,
which is key where the master is used in complex litigation to aid
in fishing expeditions.525
Lindholm's finding that written transcripts were more easily
judged for their accuracy is hence astounding for the majority of
legal systems, which emphasize the importance of live, in-court,
oral testimony.526 Although live testimony is also prized for its ability
to expose witnesses and parties to a more complete form of public
scrutiny and direct challenge by the opposing party on facts as-
serted, it would appear these methods have a negative impact on
accuracy judgments by the observer, regardless of status. 27 While
cautioning that further research is needed in this area, Lindholm
hypothesized that oral testimony, whether in video or live form,
provides visual cues which offer salient, but unreliable, accuracy
information tending to misguide accuracy judgment.5 28 By summa-
rizing testimony in the form of a report, magistrates-like the
master or huissier-may then lead to greater accuracy in the judg-
ments made during trial by a judge or jury since the misleading
529
visual cues will be stripped from the presentation.
Thus, magistrates such as the master and other third party neu-
trals, while they tend to be antagonistic to the role of the jury in
cases where they serve contemporaneously, may in actuality serve
522. See supra notes 493-498 and accompanying text.
523. Lindholm, supra note 80, at 1310-11.
524. Tokson, supra note 480, at 1609.
525. Id.
526. Lindholm, supra note 80, at 1310 ("The fact that current evidence suggests that
testimony transcripts provide a better basis for accuracy judgments than does live or taped
testimony raises concerns regarding the orality principle to which most legal systems adhere
.... "). While the better results for written over oral testimony may be shocking to many
legal observers, that is far from the case for social scientists. Lindholm notes that the better
performance-whether by experts or laypersons-in making accurate judgments by reading
transcripts rather than watching testimony is in accord with previous research. Id.
527. Id.at1310-11.
528. Id. at 1310.
529. One could conclude that the use of a magistrate would only alter the judging as to
the accuracy of oral testimony, which lacks visual cues, to the same extent that documentary
evidence (and its use in court) is affected by the presiding judge or magistrate.
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as a proxy for a layperson decisional force in non-jury trials. Even
where there is a jury, and masters were allowed to operate in U.S.
jury trials, their influence may be to assist the jury in coming to
more accurate conclusions through their likely use of liberal re-
sponse criterion and greater familiarity with eyewitness accounts
and documentary evidence. In this perspective, then, the advan-
tages to greater utilization of masters will not compromise the
institution of the jury, but may in fact enhance its role through
greater accuracy verification or provide a sufficient jury substitute
in commercial civil litigation, where the jury is increasingly absent
in American legal culture and no layperson substitute, such as a
three judge panel, generally exists.
C. Reforming Discovery in Complex and Commercial Litigation:
Twenty-First Century Privacy Concerns
The huissier has had a long history in France and other Franco-
phone societies, and his appearances in popular culture30
demonstrate a deep, cultural resonance that illustrates the para-
mount issue in legal transplantation: cultural relativism.5 3' The
Western legal systems are built upon their distinct histories and,
while bearing a family resemblance to each other even if only tenu-
ously, globalization has brought in legal and economic traditions
that are fundamentally different from, if not antagonistic to, the
Western tradition.32 Roscoe Pound's view of harmonizing disparate
legal regimes within a single nation is problematic in the current
legal landscape, 33 with issues far beyond concepts of privacy and
procedure; extreme examples are, for instance, challenges to the
very concept of interest and usury.34 Yet, of course, the definition
530. Interestingly, these references have often revealed profound, public resentment of
the powerful huissier. For example, countless insults, jokes, and homophobic slurs of North
Americans in the 1700s were recorded in the numerous lawsuits brought by huissiers, some
widely disseminated, against persons suddenly offended at service of process or other court
functions, such as assistance in the sorting and reuse of the human remains of executed
persons. Peter N. Moogk, "Thieving Buggers" and "Stupid Sluts" Insults and Popular Culture in
New France, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 524, 524-25, 531 (1979).
531. See supra note 16.
532. See Tidmarsh, supra note 342, at 546.
533. Id. at 540.
534. A number of nations have, and likely will continue to, adopt and uphold the valid-
ity of Shari'a law, which prevents or limits the charging of interest or debt-financing of
corporations (riba), fundamental to Western concepts of the free market. See, e.g., William
Ballantyne, Introduction: Islamic Law and Financial Transactions in Contemporary Perspective, in
IsLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 1, 1-5 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988). An example of this problem can
be seen in tax law, where Shari'a tax methods have hampered the ability of U.S. taxpayers to
receive foreign tax credits. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Comm'r, 96 T.C. 410, 412-13 (1991).
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and notion of privacy across borders has come into conflict where
evidence can or must be concealed under the laws of foreign na-
tions from U.S. discovery.3 ' The goal of the transnationalist must
therefore be to uncover ways to ameliorate the inevitable discord
created by increasingly numerous interactions between disparate
legal regimes.3t
Particularly in the area of discovery, the manifestation of privacy
is inevitably culturally unique.537 Yet, supranational entities in
Europe have undertaken to change the nature of European law,
procedure, economics, trade, and human rights. 53" Regarding dis-
covery and privacy, the European Court of Human Rights
("ECHR") and the European Court of Justice ("ECJ") have
brought in some cases sweeping changes in French law and offer
presages of a ius commune that is increasingly standardized, codi-
fied, and omnipresent throughout Europe, with likely effects not
only for the huissier, but also on American ideology.
539
In the subtle distinctions between the European and American
view of privacy, and why discovery in America might be viewed as so
intrusive to foreigners, the parables and generalizations of tourist
guides would serve as a perfunctory introduction to the dissimili-
tude:
As a French article warns visitors to the United States, Amer-
ica is a place where strangers suddenly share information with
you about their "private activities" in a way that is "difficult to
imagine" for northern Europeans or Asians.... It is "normal
535. See, e.g., Christopher Cotton & Laurel Harbour, International Discovery: Navigating
Uncharted Waters, 74 DEF. CoUNs.J. 274 (2007) (providing a brief overview of data protection
for major corporations under blocking statutes and the Hague Convention on Taking Evi-
dence Abroad in Civil and Commercial Matters); Karen A. Feagle, Extraterritorial Discovery: A
Social Contract Perspective, 7 DulEJ. COMP. & INT'L L. 297 (1996); David E. Teitelbaum, Strict
Enforcement of Extraterntorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REv. 841 (1986) (discussing means to the
prevention of information havens, or nations where documents might be withheld from U.S.
litigants on the grounds that domestic laws prevent fishing expeditions).
536. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace,
52 STAN. L. REv. 1315, 1320 (2000) ("If the harmonization of privacy rules is ... harmful for
the political balance adopted in any country, then the peaceful coexistence of different
privacy rules becomes essential to avoid online confrontations.").
537. See id. at 1318-19.
538. For an early discussion of this phenomenon, see Priscilla M. Regan, The Globaliza-
tion of Privacy: Implications of Recent Changes in Europe, 52 Am. J. ECON. & Soc. 257 (1993)
(discussing the Council of Europe's consideration of a harmonized data protection regime).
539. See Mitchel de S.-O.-I'E. Lasser, The European Pasteurization of French Law, 90 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 995, 999 (2005) (providing an overview of traditional French juridical models
and the impact of the ECHR, and to a lesser extent the ECJ, on those models, particularly
the failure of the ECHR and the Cour de Cassation to "appreciate the logic and values un-
derlying the other's preferred procedural model").
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in America," an Internet site informs German tourists, for
your host at dinner to ask "not just how much you earn, but
even what your net worth is"-topics ordinarily quite off-limits
under the rules of European etiquette. Talking about salaries
is not quite like defecating in public, but it can seem very off-
putting to many Europeans nevertheless'4 °
These curious insights, however trivial, reflect broader differences
in the concerns of European business, and the current system of
U.S. discovery emphasizes this. 1
In the European tradition, privacy extends to the protection of
personal reputation; much as celebrities in Europe are able to hold
their paparazzi to account, 42 European businesses enter discovery
with a similar expectation of the ability to protect their integrity,
543
and the huissier serves as a manifestation of this concern. Whereas
American discovery forces the litigant to expose copious and often
irrelevant documents to the opposing party, huissiers serve as neu-
tral arbiters of the discovery process, sifting through information
and distilling what is most relevant to the case, without allowing
the opposing party to access and potentially defame the adversary.
American privacy law has focused instead on privacy rights as
protection against the state, rather than against agents within a
broader social context, expressed as the "sanctity of the home.'
Thus, in private litigation, the extensive right to peruse an adver-
sary's documents appears, in a cultural context, less invasive than
the implementation of an arm of the state through a court ap-
pointed third party neutral, such as a special master or huissier. To
the American psyche, and litigator, this intrusion touches upon
the "sanctity of the home" and renders private discovery between
the parties (which necessitates broad access to an adversary's
540. James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1155-56 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
541. Id. at 1156 ("To people accustomed to the continental way of doing things, Ameri-
can law seems to tolerate relentless and brutal violations of privacy in [consumer data, credit
reporting, workplace privacy, discovery in civil litigation, dissemination of nude images on
the internet, and the shielding of criminal offenders from public exposure].").
542. See, e.g., Robin D. Barnes, The Caroline Verdict: Protecting Individual Pivacy Against
Media Invasion as a Matter of Human Rights, 110 PENN ST. L. RZv. 599 (2006) (arguing the
virtues of the ECHR's approach to balancing media and personal privacy rights); Whitman,
supra note 540, at 1169 n.78 (citing cases brought by Princess Caroline of Monaco against
European tabloids for an invasion of her privacy).
543. See Paul Gewirtz, Privacy and Speech, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 139, 185-86 (discussing the
German right to "the free development of one's personality").
544. Whitman, supra note 540, at 1215 ("Where American law perceives a threat to pri-
vacy, it is typically precisely because the state has become involved in the transaction.").
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documents) preferable. 5 In contrast, while the state is still seen
as a threat to privacy in Europe, it also appears less malevolent,
even useful, as the protector of personal integrity, by the use of a
third party (rather than an adversary) to search documents, or by
the use of the state to protect against humiliation at the hands of
the press. 50 However, in countless ways, these notions of privacy as
protection of personhood or protection from state interference
in inter-personal affairs appear quaint when considering the radi-
cal impact of information technology and supranational
entities.547
Numerous proposals have been floated for how to retain privacy
rights in the civil and criminal courts through the differentiation
between types of data in an effort to limit the invasive effects of in-
formation technology, such as the improved ability with which an
individual's movements and speech may be monitored and re-
corded.54s As a result of the emphasis on privacy from the state, as
opposed to the personification of privacy found in Europe, Ameri-
can courts have waffled over the issue of the limits of personal
integrity privacy rights while the EU and ECHR have taken more
proactive measures.549 In like measure, a greater role for the special
master may assist U.S. courts in overcoming the multitude of chal-
lenges that these changes bring as they tend to increase the
complexity and number of documents in any given litigation.
545. Cf id. at 1216 (discussing the European system for maintaining lists of legal given
names as an example of a practice that is untroubling to Europeans, yet would likely seem
invasive to Americans).
546. See id. at 1172-73 (discussing how Napoleon's lifting of press censorship led to a
movement for state protection of personal reputation).
547. See Brian F. Havel, The Constitution in an Era of Supranational Adjudication, 78 N.C. L.
REV. 257 (2000) (discussing the impact of supranational entities, especially the World Trade
Organization, on Article III of the U.S. Constitution). Compare A. Michael Froomkin, The
Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461 (2000) (discussing the decline of personal privacy
and its relevance as a result of the deployment of invasive technologies and information
centralization), with Basil Markesinis et al., Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law
of Privacy (And How Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 Am. J. COMP. L. 133, 203
(2004) (discussing the influence of the ECHR on the development of an English common
law of privacy rights), andJames B. Rule, Toward Strong Privacy: Values, Markets, Mechanisms,
and Institutions, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 183 (2004) (arguing that technological forces render
existing privacy laws anachronistic and in need of strengthening, particularly with regard to
personal integrity privacy rights).
548. See, e.g., Froomkin, supra note 547, at 1533, 1535; Rule, supra note 547, at 220, 224-
25.
549. Barnes, supra note 542, at 599; Froomkin, supra note 547, at 1507-11, 1514; Scott
Rempell, Privacy, Personal Data and Subject Access Rights in the European Data Directive and Im-
plementing UK Statute: Durant v. Financial Services Authority as a Paradigm of Data Protection
Nuances and Emerging Dilemmas, 18 FA.J. INr'L L. 807 (2006) (analyzing the development of
European data protection laws).
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Rather than limiting the range of acceptable documents on
other procedural grounds such as their placement, the legality of
the search, or public knowledge, special masters and huissiers are
uniquely able to access relevant information and provide summa-
ries that broach the core issues, and thereby the intellectual
property and corporate secrets of litigants may be protected. Cur-
rent, broad discovery rights in the United States fail to encompass
the necessary degree of informational privacy that will soon
enough be necessary in a world of "smart dust," satellites with the
ability to scan the interiors of buildings, and databases of emails,
photographs, and video.55° Without some restraint, social advantage
will increasingly move into the hands of "[t]he rich, the powerful,
police agencies, and a technologically skilled elite" with the re-
sources to mine data in trial preparation and in civil life,
potentially with devastating effects on equal access to justice and
the ability to protect one's personal data and integrity.55'
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the course of American history, the use of magistrates, mas-
ters, and other third party neutrals in proceedings has been cyclical
in nature. Clearly, at one point the limitations that the use of a mas-
ter placed on the parties, judge, and jury was acceptable and
expected as a part of the U.S. common law trial. Over the twentieth
century, however, a more fundamental view of the adversarial system
emerged, and with it came the demise of the special master.
While this result may have been desirable and efficient when first
implemented, the law and the legal environment has changed dra-
matically in the past century. Today, with the advent of information
technology and globalization, litigation has become increasingly
complex; the mounting number of documents, the effects on and of
international law, and the need for more expertise, technological or
otherwise, has rendered an ever growing number of issues beyond a
judge's general knowledge and competence. The consequences of
maintaining the current system are already apparent: evasion of U.S.
laws and regulation through refusal to participate in the U.S. legal
system or with blocking statutes, and the concomitant reduction of
international competitiveness for companies involved in the United
States and for the U.S. economy generally.
550. Froomkin, supra note 547, at 1538-39.
551. Id. at 1538.
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Magistrates and other third party neutrals such as the huissier,
however, provide an opportunity to overcome these new chal-
lenges. New and more expansive roles for such magistrates will
bring about a reduction in procedural costs, and can be imple-
mented through pre-existing procedural mechanisms such as the
special master and Rule 53 of the FRCP. By looking abroad to na-
tions such as France and its huissier for reform ideas, the United
States can reposition itself, lessen costs, and lower the burdens
placed on the court system with the current private system of dis-
covery. While such change will certainly encounter opposition, the
2003 Amendments to the FRCP demonstrate a pre-existing desire
on the part of courts and parties to move toward a greater role for
masters. This most organic, and constitutionally and procedurally
compatible, of changes should not be hamstrung by recalcitrant
opponents, but instead encouraged and expanded. While foreign
law has often been looked upon with distrust in the United States,
the huissierhas much to offer.
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